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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that the explanation for 
underdevelopment should be sought primarily in the 
structural distortions of the domestic economy, the 
incoherence of national interests, as well as other 
internal political contradictions. By looking at the 
dynamics of Japan's relations with Nigeria between 1960 and 
1985, it seeks to demonstrate how these factors militate 
not only against a beneficial interchange with a Northern 
economy, but against effective participation in the 
international economy. This constitutes a contrary 
diagnostic position to the literature which underpins the 
logic on which The Bretton Woods and Dependency Schools of 
thought are based.
The thesis considers the following issues. First, it 
critically examines the role of the trading pattern, 
characterized by its vertical structure, along with trade 
policies, in the relationship between Nigeria and Japan. 
Secondly, it considers whether Japanese investments in 
Nigeria have contributed to the growth and development 
process in Nigeria. To that extent it considers whether 
they were merely part of a calculated trade objective; 
namely, the dominance of certain sectors of the Nigerian 
economy. The thesis also examines the role played by 
Nigerian domestic policies and its environment in 
determining the degree of reciprocity and interdependence. 
Finally, it seeks to assess the role played by Japanese aid
and the degree of importance attached to Nigeria in 
particular and development issues in general in Japan's 
foreign policy.
The thesis concludes that at the time of Nigeria's 
independence, the relationship was potentially one of 
interdependence and the explanation for any subsequent 
asymmetry needs to be sought in government's failure to 
mobilize national potential and in terms of the operation 
of the international market economy. At issue is not just 
the nature of a particular bilateral relationship but the 
management of North-South relations.
ACRONYMS
BPD = Barrels per day
CBN = Central Bank of Nigeria
EXIM = Export and Import Bank of Japan
IMF = International Monetary Fund
ISI = Import Substitution Industrialisation
JETRO = Japan External Trade Organisation
LDC = Less Developed Countries
MITI = Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(Japan)
N = Unit of Nigeria currency, the Naira
NAFCON = National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria
NEPA = National Electric Power Authority (Nigeria)
NIC(s) = Newly Industrialised Countries
NNPC = Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
OAU = Organisation of African Unity
ODA = Overseas Development Assistance
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
SITC = Standard International Trade Classification
(United Nations)
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DEDICATION
TO GOD
1INTRODUCTION
In analyses of economic and political relationships between 
the under-developed world and the Western economies, the 
overwhelming weight of interpretation has been informed by 
the theory of Dependency. This theory claims that less 
developed countries are trapped in a web of economic 
disability because of the inherent nature of the 
relationship between developed and under-developed states.1 
As one African writer has asserted "dependency theory is of 
great relevance to the study of African international 
relations".2
This thesis proceeds on the basis of an alternative view. 
It is an attempt, to contribute to that school of thought 
in International Political Economy exemplified by the works 
of Bauer3 and Kindleberger4. Those authors argue that the 
primary obstacles to economic development are internal to 
less developed states and not the result of their exposure 
to the international market economy. In the chapters that 
follow, this view will be explored in relation to a 
particular example, namely Nigeria's relations with Japan.
The thesis has a dual purpose. First, it intends to answer 
these questions about the nature of Nigerian-Japanese 
relations between 1960 and 1985: (a) Have they been
characterized by equality and reciprocity or by dominance 
and dependence?5 (b) The extent to which the
2international system determined the whole pattern of 
Nigeria-Japan relations.6 (c) The extent to which each 
country affected the others growth7.
The second purpose of the thesis concerns other central 
issues which are also of theoretical interest, namely
(a) The extent to which the international system dictates 
the nature of North-South relations;
(b) The extent to which domestic constraints affect the 
participation of the developing economy in the 
international market system;
(c) The extent to which Japan's position in the 
international economy affects its relationship with 
developing economies and,
(d) The position occupied by developing states in Japan's 
foreign policy.
Reflecting an International Political Economy approach, 
these issues constitute the major concerns of this thesis.
II
This study addresses the nature of North-South relations, 
most prominently explained by Dependency Theory. This 
Theory will be examined in detail at the outset in order to 
establish the alternative theoretical view on which this 
thesis is based.
Trade relations between Japan and Nigeria follow closely
3the vertical structure described above. That pattern would 
seem to fit the conventional wisdom of dependency 
theorists.
In dependency analysis, the international economic system, 
controlled by the developed Western economies works through 
alleged conspiracy to reinforce the degree of dependency of 
third world economies. This is done by a deliberate policy 
of extracting concessionary gains through investment, 
foreign aid, multi-national corporate activity, and other 
multilateral policies of economic exploitation. Mostly 
developed in Marxist literature and historiography, trade 
between developing and the developed economies is depicted 
in terms of "unequal exchange". The developed capitalists' 
control of the international market system is said to lead 
to declining prices for developing countries' raw materials 
while raising costs for industrial products of their own 
manufacture. For this School, the international market 
operation exists to serve this one-sided parasitic 
relationship enabling the developed countries to extract 
for their own advantage, the economic wealth of under­
developed countries. It also sees foreign investment as 
hindering the development of Southern economies by 
exporting capital through repatriation of profits leading 
to unemployment and uneven capital accumulation and 
distribution.8
To properly understand the dynamics of this theory,
4reference must be made to its principles as first set out 
by Paul Baran and Andre Gundar Frank.9 By locating the 
cause of economic retardation of the third world ’within 
the dynamic growth of the world capitalist system1 (Baran) 
and by introducing a 'metropole-satellite1 dimension which 
traces this contradiction beyond its international 
manifestation into the local sphere (Frank), both scholars 
established the basic tenets of Dependency Theory. The 
works of Cardosso and Dos Santos were also critical to this 
early development.10 The analytical incompleteness of this 
early theory, as perceived by some scholars, stemmed from 
the constriction imposed by its static nature. For this 
reason, the attack by Palma and Laclau11 precipitated a 
redefinition. The ground-breaking work of Cardosso and 
Faletto12 belong to this attempt. To further redefine its 
complexities, Carporasso and Zare have offered a more 
holistic concept.13 This Marxist oriented debate has since 
broken into two branches; the 'productionist1 and the 
'circulationist' schools of thought.14
In Africa, the dependency model remains the most potent 
explanation of underdevelopment. Recent publications and 
the journal Review of African Political Economy (RAPE), 
which provides the vent for scholarly reflections on the 
subject, bear this out.15 The African dependistas focus on 
'relational inequalities and the vulnerabilities that may 
flow from them1 remain essentially within mainstream 
Dependency and must be located therein to be properly
5understood. Let us try and identify these strands of 
thought in the Dependency explanation regarding Africa's 
underdevelopment.
In the case of Africa, Okolo16 identifies the cause of its 
under-development as the exportation and transfer of 
exploited surplus value to the West. Arghiri17 blames this 
on the nature of the relationship which he claims is marked 
by unequal exchange (described for the purposes of his 
study, as a condition which obtains when products requiring 
and involving the same amount of labour and other inputs 
are rewarded unequally) . Uchendu,18 Yansane19 and their 
contributors, have variously and severally identified other 
features such as neo-colonialism, as characterising the 
nature of the dependent relationship.
The various contributions which make up dependency theory, 
have been applied to explain the nature of the relationship 
between Nigeria and the Western world, including Japan with 
no less deterministic and colourful rhetoric. Ekekwe20, 
for instance, starts his discussion of "state and economic 
development in Nigeria" with the premise that Nigeria has 
followed a developmental strategy dictated by the interests 
of imperialism and its local allies and not by those of the 
majority of the indigenous population. While identifying 
Nigeria firmly as a neo-colonial state, Onimode gave wider 
application to this theory by arguing that a colonial past 
is not necessary for the establishment of neo-
colonialism.21 He further insists that in Nigeria's 
external relations, the interests of what he refers to as 
the comprador bourgeoisie converge with those of the 
imperialist bourgeoisie to promote dependency. According to 
him the open-door policy to foreign capital and investments 
adopted by Nigeria at independence aided this process and 
enabled other Western powers, such as Japan, to join
Britain in exploiting and increasing further dependency.22
There is nothing inherently unusual in Bode Onimode's
views. They are for the most part, a reaction against the 
post-Keynesian conventional wisdom held by some Western 
economists, that industrialized nations form alliances with 
traditional elites and re-inforce control over their 
populace. Whether this wisdom was incorporated in the 
economic policies of Western economies is another issue. 
From all indications, policies among these economies in the 
international market system have hardly converged.
Consider France, the Scandinavian countries and the USA as 
illustrative cases. Nonetheless, the African
dependentistas seem content to uphold this in so far as it 
satisfies a requirement for the theory.
The above point explains Offoing's23 ideas about this 
relationship. On his part, he has extended Johan 
Galtung's24 position in his study of the relationship 
between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Third 
World —  where he contends that the relationship is not one
7aiming at encouraging a diversified spectrum of extraction 
and manufacturing leading to horizontal exchange between 
rich and poor countries —  to account for the relationship 
between Nigeria and Japan. Ihonvbere and Shaw25,
emphatically point to the role of Japan which with the 
United States and other Western European interests, have 
displaced British hegemony, thus successfully entrenching 
multi-lateral capitalism. This, according to their study, 
is the dominant feature of Nigeria's postindependence 
economy. Gana26 assumes a position on the same platform 
and like Onimode, pinpoints the role of the Japanese and 
other multi-national companies in exporting capital from 
the Nigerian economy in the form of profits.
What seems to increase the validity of this argument in its 
application to Nigeria-Japanese relations is the fact that 
Japanese economic relations with South-East Asia in the 
early years of its modernization were characterized by this 
system of exchange. However, without the benefit of any 
tests of particular application to Africa, members of the 
Dependency persuasion are content merely to extrapolate 
from this experience to describe Japan's relations with 
Nigeria. This analysis originates from Marx's ideas 
despite Tetreault and Abel's insistence27, based on 
Baradat28 that the theory is "logically and sometimes even 
actually independent of Marxist thought because of its root 
in the nationalism of third world countries".
8To Marx, relations between market economies are by nature 
conflictual and in the Marxist tradition which has widened 
to incorporate both nationalists and structuralists, the 
dominant market economies not only cooperate in the joint 
exploitation of the weaker economies of the globe, but the 
international economy is seen as an arena for imperialist 
expansion and nationalist aggrandizement (Karl Kautsky's 
interpretation which Owoeye and Vivekande apply to the use 
of Japanese Foreign Aid Capital in Nigeria and Africa29) . 
To them, international economic cooperation is harmful, 
destructive of traditional values, and corrupting in its 
encouragement of materialism in pursuit of luxury goods.
Antithetical to these views is the deeply rooted position 
of the classical and neo-classical tradition. While 
Marxist historiography, from which emerged dependency would 
see international trade in exploitative terms, liberal 
scholars insist that it is the restraints on trade as a 
result of such protectionist principles which makes it 
quite impossible for the advantages to be realised.30 Both 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo view such international 
cooperation along these lines. Thus, to Smith,31
international trade serves to increase the productive 
powers of labour by overcoming the narrowness of the home 
market. The people are thus encouraged to produce more 
goods and therefore to augment their annual produce to the 
utmost. This increases the general wealth of the country 
and consequently, the standards of living.
9On his part, David Ricardo while further demonstrating the 
benefits of international co-operation, emphasised the 
patterns of international trade specialization by the means 
of relative productivity differentials among countries.32 
To him, the increase in the amount and variety of objects 
for revenue expenditure and the availability of these 
commodities at a lower value (due to international 
specialization) is beneficial as it acts as incentive to 
savings and by extension, capital accumulation.33 Neo­
classical scholars improved on these positions with the 
concept of relative factor endowment.34 They emphasised 
the cost of transportation and other factors, such as 
greater mobilities of factors of production. Bertil Ohlin, 
for instance, showed that it was insufficient to put 
forward a theory of comparative costs without consideration 
for the play of demand in each region for goods from the 
other - the reciprocal demand.35 The basis for a realistic 
appraisal of international exchange was thus established. 
Under certain assumed conditions, trade mitigates the 
advantages of the unsuitable geographical distribution of 
productive facilities.36 In simple terms, each region 
exports goods containing a large proportion of its relative 
abundant and cheap factors. In the same vein, goods 
containing a large proportion of scarce factors are 
imported rendering these factors less scarce.37 Although 
this theory does possess inherent imperfections and has 
been extensively re-examined,38 it is still, as Gilpin puts 
it, the most appropriate in accounting for much of North-
10
South trade.39
Schooled on the classical and the neo-classical tradition, 
trade liberals or the "modernization school" contend that 
international cooperation maximises economic growth, 
increases economic efficiency and improves human welfare. 
It thus leads ultimately to strong democratic states 
capable of guiding their own destinies. In contrast to 
this opinion, the dependency belief is that such 
international cooperation makes states insecure, vulnerable 
and dependent on external development.40 Smith and 
Ricardo's carefully observed analysis, and the liberal 
theories built on it, thus became a mere point of 
prescriptive scholarship, and the importance of such 
international cooperation, a mere speculative analysis.
Apart from the stated areas of inquiry which this thesis 
addresses, it does not intend to examine the differing 
views that make up international trade theory. Nor does it 
intend to examine in detail the validity of the Dependency 
theory. This has been done elsewhere41 and does not form 
part of the subject of study with which this thesis is 
primarily concerned. However, a few observations on the 
microcomponents of the theory are appropriate because of 
its dominance in relevant literature. This also enables us 
to set out further what we will be hoping to demonstrate in 
the thesis.
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Dependency theory would seem to be based on an ideological 
persuasion, the dependentistas, like the scholasticists of 
old, "have placed faith before reason and evidence". This 
is so for a number of reasons. First, the danger of 
lumping is all too recognizable. As observed elsewhere, 
"developing countries are characterized by considerably 
more divergence then they showed in the mid 1950s", when 
the theory emerged. This may suggest that "universal 
prescriptions are less valid now than they were when the 
discipline of development economics was in its infancy".42 
To put it bluntly, "every developing country is unique and 
is affected by market conditions and prices for its own 
products and not by the movement of index numbers". It is 
also arguable that internal factors, (and we hold this to 
be supreme), as well as other equally important factors and 
forces other than Japan and the West, are in interaction 
among the determinants responsible for the state of the 
Nigerian economy, its rate of growth and its level of 
development. Further, as one of the theorists has pointed 
out "trade flows alone cannot be used as the criteria for 
exploitation".43 And since Nigeria-Japanese relations are 
made up essentially of trading relations, it is difficult 
to see how it fits in with the dependency paradigm.
Dependency theory further makes other questionable 
assumptions about the use of export capital and foreign 
investments. First, it is alleged that multinational 
companies make excessive profits which are then repatriated
12
to their home countries. (As in the high returns on 
Japanese investments in Nigeria) . If we are to take this 
assumption seriously, it could be demonstrated that 
excessive rate of capital returns is not merely indicative 
of lack of provision of replacement capital thus depressing 
the domestic economy (malinvestment). Rather, as Nurkse 
believes, high business profits in these countries may 
reflect the high marginal productivity of capital that can 
be realized through an overall expansion of the market, and 
"most developing countries, are in a process of expanding
their domestic economy".44 It may also represent
entrepreneurial and management rewards which command a high 
price since these are scarce factors in developing 
countries.45 This simply follows the economic wisdom, 
clearly recognized by Smith which is that "wherever a great 
deal can be made by the use of money, a great deal will
commonly be given for the use of it",46 and the greater the
stock employed in any economy, the lower the rate of 
profit.47
High profits, if we are to continue with the dependency 
assumption, may even be beneficial to developing countries 
since it helps to attract additional resources into use, 
and where entry is unrestricted, to forward growth, as 
Kindleberger's analysis has shown.48
Capital transfers in the form of foreign loans and 
investments have also elicited a great deal of critical
13
attention from the dependentistas. However, the experience 
of national developments across the globe show contrary 
evidence. In his Interregional and International Trade. 
Ohlin, points to the beneficial use of such capital. The 
examples include French capital which developed Italian 
industries and the foreign borrowing of Denmark which was 
used to reorganize agriculture.49 To this list, we may 
also add the foreign loans of Australia.50 It is thus 
quite obvious that the transfer of capital means an 
increase in the combined national incomes of the borrower 
and donor countries.51 It could even be said, as Professor 
Edie has gone so far to assert, that the export of capital 
meant the export of industrial revolution to the less 
developed countries.52
Raul Prebisch, a principal exponent of the inherent 
disadvantages in North-South relations, recognizes the 
indispensibility of such capital transfers. His well known 
exposition of the problem of development in Latin America 
centres around the creation of investment capital. His 
general emphasis is that productivity is low in Latin 
America because of lack of capital, this absence induced by 
a shortfall owing to the small margin of saving? this in 
turn caused by low income and productivity. Foreign trade 
and factor movements therefore present such an obvious 
solution. Prebisch himself advocated such international 
income transfers to fill the gap.53 The Dependency 
attention to the 'evil1 influence of foreign capital is
14
also misplaced because a succession of policies could help 
developing countries to protect their interests and 
therefore, "in the context of development planning the 
effects of foreign investment need no longer be feared as 
being a repetition of the undesirable features in the 
history of colonialism".54 It may be true that most 
developing countries often attempt to follow these 
objectives. However, their rate of success depends on the 
discipline exercised over these policies. It can thus be 
shown that the more successful LDC's are those who have 
attained this objective and the less successful, those who 
lack the economic discipline which is predicated upon the 
effective lack of articulation of national interests.
Indeed, the lack of sustained economic growth in Africa and 
Nigeria in particular rests squarely on the above factors. 
As Nurkse adequately puts it, in all cases, capital 
formation depends on complementary domestic policies.55 
Nigeria is a typical case among the countries where there 
is a lack of articulation of national interests and where 
the interests of the few contrast sharply with those of the 
many. It is a nation where the majority are totally 
committed to subverting the economic interest by the use of 
all means possible; a nation that has elevated corruption 
to a high art form and where society actively rewards 
corruption (whole villages organise parties to congratulate 
convicted corrupt politicians at the end of their prison 
term). It lacks the organisation long recognised in
15
development theory as the key to the effective utilization 
of both domestic and international returns. As Sir Arthur 
Salter phrased it in his study of Iraq, "the heart of 
economic development is the reform and creation of an 
administrative system capable of carrying it out".56 This 
issue lies at the centre of development constraints. Thus, 
Joseph Schumpeter57 emphasized the role of the entrepreneur 
in development - the effective organization of productive 
functions crucial for the combination of factors of 
production in the right proportion.
This situation in Nigeria flows from the lack of 
articulation of national interests. Because power often 
comes from the barrel of the gun, governments are not 
representative and usually indulge the private and not the 
public interest. The obstacles to development in the 
Nigerian case, is, as in Walkinsky's major conclusion on 
Burmese development, that its development "waits on good 
government to provide law, order, honesty and 
responsibility".58 There is simply no Lewis's "will to 
economize".
The lack of a strong democratic process, and the existence 
of institutions which militate against a beneficial 
interchange must therefore be the focus of any meaningful 
analysis on Nigeria's development, not the alleged effect 
of extraneous forces. As Arthus Lewis underscored, an 
enquiry into human behaviour which influences growth is an
16
essential part of the measurement of economic growth.59
Such structural distortions and the lack of articulation of 
national interest is a phenomenon that is not peculiar to 
Nigeria. It is pervasive in most of black Africa. Africa 
is a continent suffering under its own weight. It is a 
continent of butchers and mass murderers (as in Kenya where 
the opposition has been systematically liquidated); of 
depraved psychopaths (as in Uganda where Idi Amin expelled 
Indians and by so doing destroyed the middle class in one 
afternoon)? of common criminals (as in the organised 
banditary of Shehu Shagari with its "Don" Umaru Dikko in 
Nigeria). From the totally ignorant (Master-Sargent Samuel 
Doe in Liberia) to the totally senile (as in Ivory Coast 
where the geriatric life-president spent millions 
reproducing St. Peter's basilica in a country where 
starvation, disease, and ignorance reign supreme), Africa 
is not a continent where the wind blows free. It is a 
continent of repression and massive corruption. Until 
recently, there was not a single democracy in the whole of 
the region. Spread all over the continent are men and 
women who are not dedicated to nation building but to 
construction of other sorts - graves and private bank 
accounts. Are these facts of life about Africa a result of 
a mythical conspiracy? In black Africa's case, dependency 
theory only serves to divert attention from the rather 
serious issues hampering economic growth and proves what 
some scholars have long believed; that it is simply fatuous
17
to be doctrinaire about development problems.60
One observation which must be made to place doubt firmly on 
dependency as a mode of explanation in North-South 
relations is that which follows. Among some of the 
countries today listed according to developmental 
classification, as the Newly Industrialized Countries 
(NICs) are countries with almost identical economic and 
political heritage —  a colonial past, diverse peoples, 
ever increasing populations, etc, —  yet they have been 
able to rise above the so called base of inequality. Why 
then is Nigeria, a country with enormous human and material 
resources that some countries among the developed world 
cannot even compare favourably with, still in the backwoods 
of development? Is this inability to develop forever to be 
attributable to Dependency? The Nigerian case is 
reproduced in much of the under-developed world. Is 
Dependency therefore a "covering law" that explains the 
lack of success of these states in addressing the all 
important question of economic development and subsequent 
improvement of living-standards? Until the above questions 
are sufficiently addressed and until individual cases 
placed in proper perspective, Dependency theory will 
continue to lack credence explaining relations between 
nations. We totally disagree with Tetreault and Abel that 
it "provides a model of international relations in the 
sense that it systemizes and elucidates collections of 
facts about structure and function".61 It is not
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concerned with facts to provide any useful structure but 
makes its conclusions on the basis of mere assumptions. A 
theory that relies on broad generalization and assumptions 
on development economics without examining the economic, 
social and political circumstances of each underdeveloped 
country in detail for empirical assessment has little or no 
place in assessing the true nature of international 
relations.
We must however point out that the employment of 
comprehensive and exclusive Dependency theory, which has 
provided a license for bankrupt economic and political 
systems in Africa, is a phenomenon that dates back in 
history. When Friedrick Meinecke, the great German 
historian stumbled upon "chance" and threatened to stretch 
it beyond all recognizable imagination as the single most 
important explanation to which all others must defer, in 
accounting for Germany's fortunes and the war years, the 
historian and philosopher, E.H. Carr, appropriately 
referred to the preoccupation as the "bankruptcy of the 
great historian's mind under the stress of the misfortunes 
of his country". Carr further observed that such theories 
are only found among nations riding on the trough, and not 
the crest of world events. Likewise, the view that 
examination results are a lottery is likely to be found 
among students placed in the third class.62 We may draw an 
analogy between Carr's summations about the "Cleopatra's 
Nose" school of history and the Dependency theory which, in
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our view, offers very little in the way of explanation but 
merely describes. While acknowledging the role played by 
colonialism, we will seek in the thesis to follow a more 
functionalist theoretical framework. This position is not 
ambiguous. Any "dichotomy between historical1 and 
functionalist modes of analysis is analytically a bad one".
This thesis will attempt to show the obstacles hampering 
the realization of the benefits acruing from the 
relationship with the developed economies as it attempts to 
place empirical evidence before rigid theory.
Ill
Historically, Africa has never been a stronghold of 
Japanese economic influence. The two entities remained far 
apart, not only in geographical but in both cultural and 
political terms. Yet, in the 1930's, Japan not only 
competed for, but gradually won the battle for cotton- 
textile imports into the Nigerian market. It also 
successfully entrenched itself as one of the principal 
trading partners of the country even though it (Nigeria) 
was still subject to the sovereignty of Britain, a dominant 
world power at the time. In the later years of that decade, 
the Nigerian market had become so important in Japanese 
economic calculations that regular shipping services were 
developed to connect both countries. This relationship was 
interrupted during the Second World War, 1939-45, but 
resumed as soon as conditions in Japan allowed. From this 
juncture, the Japanese increased their market share, and
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greatly expanded their commodity supply. In the 1950's it 
had not only successfully overtaken Britain, the colonial 
power in Nigeria, in competition for the supply of piece 
goods but its officials were regularly visiting Nigeria and 
discussing increased participation and greater economic 
cooperation.
Chapter One, which serves as the introductory chapter to 
the thesis (in conjunction with this Introduction) examines 
the factors responsible for Japan's growing interest in 
Nigeria, its increased trading activities and the British 
reaction to this situation in the context of the political 
and economic climate. Since these developments took place 
before October 1st, 1960 when Nigeria became a sovereign 
state, the chapter provides a background study of the 
nature of the bilateral relationship inherited by this 
date. As a preface to modern relations, it identifies the 
nexus and foundation on which further ties in the post­
independence era were built.
Chapter Two studies the nature of the trading relationship. 
It also examines the composition of commodity supplies and 
the investments that were a necessary corollary in Japanese 
engagement in certain sectors of Nigeria's economy. This 
chapter has implications for theory because it critically 
assesses the vertical structure while highlighting the 
efforts made to react to market situations on both sides. 
In sum, it is an analysis of the features, pattern and
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trend of Nigeria-Japanese trade between 1960-1985.
Nigeria is a developing economy endowed with vast amounts 
of natural resources, an enormous population to sustain a 
vibrant market economy and is ranked as the sixth largest 
supplier of petroleum resources in the world. Japan on the 
other hand, lacks natural resources and its needs for 
energy resources border on the critical. As a developed 
country, Japan has specialized in industrial manufacture. 
It has also attained economies of scale that has enabled 
production of a wide variety of goods, consumer and heavy 
industrial needed by a developing economy such as Nigeria, 
at relatively cheaper costs. Its private capital (which 
cannot be distinguished from public capital) has also a 
long history of involvement in overseas ventures. From the 
above description, it would appear that a classic situation 
for reciprocal exchanges obtains? the developed country 
supplying the developing economy with much needed consumer 
goods and industrial manufacturing know-how while taking 
its energy supplies and processed raw materials. Yet, 
between 1960-85 in all but two years, a massive trade 
deficit obtained on the Nigerian side. This deficit 
sometimes ran into billions of dollars even in years when 
the total trade figure on the Nigerian side comprised a few 
million.
Chapter Three, examines the pattern of participation and 
the direct involvement of Japanese firms and private
i
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capital in the developmental process in Nigeria. Chapter 
Four, analyzes the difficult question of trade imbalance. 
These chapters collectively and variously, attempt to 
provide answers to the questions of reciprocity and 
equality. Since they highlight the various international 
and specifically directed trade policies on both sides, 
they provide useful insights into the long drawn out debate 
on North-South trade. At issue is, whether the inequality 
stems from the developing country's overawed exposure to 
the international market system or whether it is the result 
of the absence of and, or laxity of policies in developing 
countries that generate it.
Technical cooperation or the hope that through trade and 
other exchanges with the industrialized economies, the 
developing countries would gradually acquire not only the 
development strategy but technical efficiency to carry it 
through, is an issue, together with grants-in-aid which in 
the main, serves as the subject matter of Chapter Five. 
Since grants-in-aid are an important issue of consideration 
in North-South relations providing an important avenue for 
capital accumulation in Southern economies, this chapter 
will look not only at aid but also more importantly, at the 
technical and managerial expertise that accompanies it. 
This is important since a proportion of aid given to third 
world economies for developmental projects usually ends up 
in private accounts.
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The main thrust of analysis of Chapter Six is the 
development of what are the political —  apart from the 
trade and investment (economic) —  aspects of this 
relationship. This chapter examines the development of the 
political relationship, the degree of importance attached 
to it by both countries through indicators such as the 
place of each in the other's policy formulation, and their 
respective responses to international issues affecting them 
(such as Apartheid and nationalist struggles).
The aspects treated by the various chapters, the importance 
of the study to the debate on North-South international 
relations and further observations on them will be 
reconsidered in the conclusion. This is a general
assessment of the bilateral relationship during the 
twenty-five years under study.
As Professor Katsuhiko Kitagawa63 has observed, and 
certainly, as writings such as John Stremlau's64 
International Relations Research have shown, until 
recently, little or no attention has been paid to 
Japan-Africa relations. To further illustrate, Takashi 
Inogushi's 1991 book, Japan's International Relations 
contain no single reference to Africa.65 Because of this, 
there is an absence of appropriate established methodology 
in academic circles or elsewhere with regard to the topic. 
In Nigeria, most treatment of international relations is 
still weighted overwhelmingly, in favour of Western and
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non-Japanese links. Of the few writings that exist on 
Nigeria-Japanese relations, most consist merely of 
generalized remarks or judgemental opinions on the question 
of the trade imbalance and are furthermore overwhelmingly 
emotional and devoid of much scholarly significance. The 
same is true in Japan where judgements on Africa until 
recently have been based on received colonial prejudice 
with the question of Japan-Africa relations not paid any 
worthy attention. It is against this background and other 
difficulties faced by a pioneering study that this thesis 
is set.
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CHAPTER ONE 
PRELUDE TO MODERN RELATIONS
Nigeria-Japanese relations date back to the period before 
Nigeria became an independent state in 1960. Although 
serious trading contacts began from the early 1930fsf trade 
relations can be traced back to as early as 1914 when Lord 
Fredrick Lugard, the British Colonial Administrator 
amalgamated the Northern and the Southern parts of the 
country.1 From the British colonial records for the colony 
and protectorate of Nigeria, Falola and Ogunremi have dated 
the first exchange of goods to that year with Japan*s share 
of total Nigerian trade of €6.9m amounting to £13l.2 This 
exchange however, not only remained at a very minimal level 
but lacked mutuality. Nigeria did not record the export of 
any goods to Japan until 1929.
Japan*s contact with Africa dates to an earlier period. 
Agbi contends that Japanese knowledge of Africa dates back 
to the Sixteenth Century but was careful to point out that
contacts were severely limited in scope until the mid-
Nineteenth Century3, the period of the Meiji Restoration in 
Japan. That Japanese relations with Africa took roots 
during the Meiji era is not in doubt4, however, other 
extraneous events, occurring independent of Meiji control 
nurtured and bolstered them. These events were the
colonial condition of Africa especially the scramble that 
gave birth to Article III of the Berlin Act of 1885. 
Sitting in Germany and brokered by Bismarck,
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representatives of the various colonial interests in Europe 
sought to introduce safeguards into the partition of Africa 
to prevent a ruinous colonial war that would prove costly 
to Europe. Article III of the Berlin Act was a consensus 
marking out free navigation and trade zones in Africa. 
This Act achieved unintended results? it indirectly 
benefitted the Japanese. The role of this singular Act has 
been acknowledged as one of the most important of the 
factors responsible for increased Japanese activity in 
Africa. According to an official Japanese source, "the 
Belgian Congo became a foothold for Japanese economic 
advancement".5
Jun Morikawa has conveniently divided the early periods of 
contact into two phases; The first phase between 1898-1913 
was punctuated by sporadic, small-scale, unorganised family 
based trade. The second phase between 1914-1941 was marked 
by direct larger scale, well-organised trade.6 From 1885, 
as Japanfs Ministry of Foreign Affairs records indicate, 
Japan began to introduce products from its industrial 
modernisation to Africa.7 For the whole period preceding 
decolonization, Africa was for Japan, nothing but an export 
market for consumer goods, primarily textile products.8 
However, since Africa was under the cultural, political and 
economic domination of the European powers when Japanese 
consumer items began to appear, they were generally 
ridiculed as "shabby" and "cheap" while the products of the 
imperial powers were lauded and embraced.9
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In contrast to other areas of Africa, Japanese interest in 
West Africa was delayed. Investigative reports by 
government agencies or private organisations were non­
existent until the early 1930's. From this date private 
interests began to take an interest and thus the 
initiative. In 1932, the first report detailing a general 
survey of the West African coast was submitted to the 
government by the Yokohama Specie Bank (Yokohama Shokin 
Ginko) .10 This report was complemented in 1934 by a 
government report which concerned itself with economic 
conditions in West Africa.11 By this latter date, enough 
reports had percolated in Japan to raise interests in 
establishing trading relations with the region.
This increased Japanese interest in Africa and 
particularly, West Africa, was a result of some crucial 
factors. First, Japanese industrialists and merchants who 
dealt in cotton textiles and other miscellaneous 
merchandise had increased in number in the years following 
the outbreak of hostilities in the First World War. These 
business interests had been made more competitive in their 
participation in the international market economy by 
factors such as the availability of cheap and highly 
qualified labour, a neighbouring Asian market for the 
supply of raw materials and for fast disposal of goods as 
well as the development of maritime transport. They now 
found the internal market insufficient to absorb their 
products. Secondly, this situation was complemented by
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another factor. With the abolition of the gold standard in 
1931, the value of the Yen fell which made Japanese exports 
more competitive.12 Finally, even more critical than these 
developments was that by the 1930's, Japanese/China trade 
had began to decline (exports to China including Hong Kong 
and Manchuria had fallen 34 per cent) due to boycott and 
increased international competition.13 The need was 
therefore critical to find new overseas markets. The 
resources of Africa presented opportunities waiting to be 
tapped.
In Nigeria, the earliest recorded dual transaction between 
Nigeria and Japan in the Trade Reports for the Colony and 
Protectorate appears in 1929. Japanese imports then 
accounted for .01 per cent of the total import trade of 
Nigeria.14 From this date until 1939, Japanese trade with 
Nigeria increased dramatically. For convenience, we shall 
divide the period into two phases: the pre-1939 period
which was marked by gradually expanding trading contacts, 
and the post-war period from 1951 when trade with Nigeria 
not only resumed but gradually acquired the vigorous 
characteristics of Japanese foreign trade. This period 
merges imperceptibly into the most recent period from the 
date of independence in 1960.
In the period preceding 1939, Japanese exports to Nigeria 
were composed in the main, of consumer goods and
failed to undergo any serious structural changes. Exports
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consisted of apparel, boots, shoes, umbrellas, pullovers, 
beads (other than real corals), clocks and watches, 
artificial silk, buckets, hosiery, silk goods, basins, 
hats, caps and bonnets.15 In addition to the above 
commodities, the Japanese also exported some railway 
materials. The main export commodity, however, was cotton 
piece goods. There were exports from the colony to Japan 
but these were minimal and in some years, amounted to as 
little as £750.16
The post World-War II period of Nigerian-Japanese trade 
began in 1951, almost six years after the cessation of 
hostilities. The late resumption of direct trading 
relations was due to the fact that after the war, all 
controls over Japan*s exports and imports passed through 
General Douglas MacArthur*s SCAP (Supreme Commander of 
Allied Powers) administration. Various laws had been 
introduced which completely banned civilian participation 
in overseas trade. Some of these laws deserve mention. In 
1946, the Foreign Trade Agency was created and charged with 
responsibility for conducting export and import 
transactions through the newly established Foreign Trade 
Funds Special Account. The government prohibited all 
unauthorized transfer of all existing exportable goods 
within the country. This was shortly followed by the 
Foreign trade extra-ordinary measure decree of June 20, 
1946. This prohibited any person or individual other than 
government through the foreign trade Agency from engaging
in export or import activities and invested government with 
the power to order the mandatory transfer of goods for 
export when necessary. As Ozaki has correctly observed, 
the immediate post-war Japan was one in which "foreign 
trade was a case of strict state trading controlled by the 
occupation authorities11.17 These controls were in place 
until 1949 when the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) was established and gradually the controls 
were relaxed and private individuals could once more take 
an initiative in overseas's ventures. It was however, not 
until the outbreak of the Korean war18 and the signing of 
the San Francisco peace treaty of 1951 that control was 
virtually handed over to the Japanese and exports began to 
pick up.
During 1951-1960, the commodity composition of Japanese 
exports not only increased in volume but was expanded. To 
the strong showing made by the Japanese exports of cotton- 
textile goods, another trade item was added: galvanized 
iron sheets. The Japanese had put up such strong 
competition in Nigeria1s importation of this commodity that 
at the end of the 1955 trading year, Japan was responsible 
for 49 per cent of Nigeria's total import of galvanized 
iron sheets.19 Other items like sewing machines, bicycle 
parts, steel plates, enamelled and ceramic wares had also 
began to make their way into Japanese exports to Nigeria.20 
During the same period, Japanese imports of Nigerian goods 
remained insignificant.21
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The Japanese were able to challenge the hold on the 
Nigerian market by its traditional Western European 
customers, most significantly because of the lower prices 
they asked for their products. Their products were also 
more adaptable for use by the local population because they 
were made to suit local tastes. As Ogunremi has shown, in 
1934, printed cotton piece goods exported to Nigeria by 
Japan cost 7.5 cents per square yard. A year later, 1935, 
the same Japanese products cost 7 cents. British cotton 
goods cost 11 cents per square yard in each of the two 
years.22 Again in 1935, while Japanese umbrellas were sold 
at 26 cents each, those of British manufacturers cost 66.6 
cents each.23
In no other sector was the Japanese challenge to the 
traditional British market more remarkable and more 
successful than in piece goods supply. The types of cotton 
piece goods traditionally imported into Nigeria have been 
bafts and drills? unbleached and bleached ("greys" and 
"whites")? drills dyed in the piece? prints? and coloured 
woven goods.24 The demand for these products was enormous 
in Nigeria and before the beginning of direct Japanese 
trade, grey cotton was usually imported by British 
merchants from Japan and India for printing and finishing 
in Lancashire before re-export to West Africa.25 In the 
early years of the trading contacts, Japanese cotton piece 
goods had begun to make their strong presence felt in the 
Nigerian market but it was not until the 1950*s that this
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increased considerably. In 1954, Japan displaced Britain 
as the main supplier of rayon piece goods.26 Japan*s 
volume of cotton piece goods exports further expanded and 
by 1955, it accounted for 43 per cent and 29 per cent 
respectively of the total Nigerian imports of rayon and 
cotton piece goods.27 In 1956 and 1958, rayon piece goods 
made up 60 per cent and 47,3 per cent respectively, of 
total imports from Japan.28 By 1960, cotton piece goods 
from Japan had reached 36 per cent of the value of its 
total imports.29 The figures for selected years below 
underline the strong commitment of the Japanese textile 
industry to capture the Nigerian market.
TABLE 1 (i) JAPANESE IMPORTS OF PIECE GOODS-SELECTED YEARS30
YEAR QUANTITY TOTAL NIGERIAN IMPORTS FROM VARIOUS PIECE GOODS
(M SQ YRD) SOURCES
1955 60 205,407 Cotton
86 104,539 Rayon
1956 28 149,389 Cotton
143 157,642 Rayon
1958 48.6 172,496 Cotton
130 151,575 Rayon
1959 46.7 143,631 Cotton
95.3 101,418 Rayon
To say that Japanese imports of piece goods increased in 
volume however, is not to state that the Japanese came to 
monopolize the trade. This would be far from the true 
picture. Let us illustrate with the 1957 figures. It is 
however, safe to say that they had more than a fair share 
of the market.
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TABLE 1 (ii)
TYPE
(M
TOTAL IMPORTS
QUANTITY 
. SQ. YARD)
OF COTTON PIECE 
VALUE (£000)
GOODS. 195731
PRINCIPAL SOURCE 
OF SUPPLY
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF 
TOTAL IMPORTS
GREYS (unbleached) 28.0 1,476 INDIA, UNITED KINGDOM INDIA 70; U.K. 28
WHITES (bleached) 40.3 3,154 INDIA, JAPAN INDIA 23; JAPAN 13
PIECE DYED 24.8 2,506 UNITED KINGDOM, JAPAN, U.K. 44; JAPAN 23
INDIA INDIA 13
PRINTS 31.0 4,198 JAPAN, NETHERLANDS, JAPAN 39; NETH 32
UNITED KINGDOM U.K. 23
COLOURED UOVEN 22.4 2,305 INDIA, JAPAN INDIA 62; JAPAN 14
The success of the Japanese in the cotton and other 
essential consumer goods trade was in the face of various 
trade barriers and competition against already entrenched 
interests in Nigeria. While the shipping services were 
dominated by American and European lines 32 (see pages 46 
and 47), the United African Company (UAC), G.B. Ollivant, 
John Holt and Company, Compaigne Francaise de L*Afrique 
Occidentale (C.F.A.O.), Patterson Zochonics, S. 
Thomopoulous, Flonis Brothers and Zards as well as the 
Societe Commerciale de L'Quest Africaine (S.C.O.A.), 
controlled the produce trade. In both trading and 
manufacturing, the above firms and especially, the British 
American Tobacco Company and the British Cotton Growers 
Association as well as the UAC plantations, maintained a 
strong presence. While the Indian firms of J.T. Chanrai 
company and Chellaram and Sons were specialist import 
firms, the Lancashire firm of J. Christian and company were 
the giants in textile trading.33 In short, the entire 
import-export trade was dominated by large European trading 
firms especially, the UAC, John Holt, the SCOA and the
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CFAO.34 The UAC alone, according to Hopkins, handled 
nearly half of West Africa"s overseas trade during the 
1930's and dominated the whole of British West Africa.35 
This situation has prompted Crowder to identify as the 
dominant trend in the development of European trade in West 
Africa to be the "concentration of power in the hands of a 
few major commercial houses who created in many parts of 
West Africa a situation of effective monopoly for 
themselves" .36
The state of virtual monopoly that the Japanese were forced 
to deal with was further complicated by British fears of 
Japanese competition and policies initiated to severely 
limit this. To make sure that the Nigerian market remained 
an exclusive preserve of the United Kingdom manufacturers 
and for others elsewhere in the Empire for whom the 
territory had been conquered, in 1920, Britain started a 
process of tightening trade restrictions against Japan. As 
a prelude to tighter control, it announced in June 1920 
that "preferential rates for goods of imperial origin has 
been addressed to all colonies and protectorates, except 
those which are precluded by existing international 
agreements from doing so, and a few others in which 
preference is already in force".37 This measure which was 
forced by the pressures of the Manchester textile 
manufacturers proved both unworkable and ineffective 
against Japanese goods because not only did it conflict 
with Britain"s free trade policy and therefore was resisted
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by merchants since it reduced their sales, but the Nigerian 
consumers preferred Japanese goods which were not only less 
expensive but more adaptable and "tougher for a peasant 
population”.38 Although this measure failed, the colonial 
administration did not relent. It followed it up in 1932 
with the Imperial Preference Code after agreement reached 
at the imperial economic conference at Ottawa, Canada. The 
system was in nature of tariff alterations and imposition 
of quotas, both quantitative and qualitative, on imports 
from other sources outside the sterling area. The 
Preference Code fixed custom duties on British goods 
between 10 and 50 per cent lower than the general level.39
In 1932 and 1933, a quota system was imposed on textiles 
from Japan entering Nigeria. At the end of 1933, Britain 
gave notice to Japan of the termination of the colonial 
treaties (see page 44) between Japan and British West 
Africa signalling the attitude and corresponding economic 
policies to be pursued with Japan from then on. Tighter 
controls and strangulatory measures were not long in 
coming. In 1934 when tariffs on non-British goods were 
raised to 100 per cent40, the quota system limited imports 
of Japanese cotton goods in quantity to not more than 
1,524,503 million square yards between 17th May and 31st 
December.41
In that same year additional import duties were imposed 
on galvanized iron sheets, cement, paint, varnish, shirts,
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singlets, socks, stockings and pullovers of Japanese 
origin.42 As Joan Wheare has observed, the changes from 
"ad valorem" to specific duties which presaged the 
imposition of quotas, was to penalize certain Japanese 
imports of a "cheaper" quality than the corresponding 
British articles.43 That the duties and quotas were put in 
place specifically to penalize Japanese imports which had 
begun to threaten the British position in her colonial 
backyard is incontrovertible. What is difficult to 
understand is the smoke screen that the duties were meant 
to hurt Japanese goods because they were of a so called, 
"cheaper" quality than those of their British counterparts. 
That kind of analysis is needless to say, an "ad nauseam" 
repetition of one of the myths of colonial superiority, in 
this case economic, promoted by the colonial administration 
as one of the justifications for colonialism. Put in the 
colonial context, the Japanese goods were allegedly of 
cheaper quality because Japanese culture was inferior to 
British. Any product originating from such a source was 
therefore automatically inferior.
The real reason for restriction was price. The Japanese 
goods of corresponding quality to British materials were 
less expensive and easily affordable by the impoverished 
masses of the immediate post depression era. As reported 
in the colonial Bluebook of 1933, Japanese textile 
shipments to Nigeria which had risen to more than 11 
million square yards were priced well below British
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textiles.44 Finding no other effective way of curbing this 
threat, the British government hit upon a "final solution”: 
the complete abolition of Japanese imports.
In Nigeria, "doubts were expressed that in conducting a 
tariff war against Japan, the subject races, especially 
those in West Africa, would be the greatest sufferers".45 
In fact, it was generally understood that this was yet 
another device introduced by the colonial government for 
the benefits of their own manufacturers. Even in the 
colony's Legislative Assembly, the members saw this, if not 
for anything else, but as a policy that went directly 
against the spirit of the dual mandate in British West 
Africa. A semblance of policy that the colonial 
administration, especially in Nigeria (where Lord Fredrick 
Lugard had made it a fetish with himself as high priest), 
was trying to project. Support for the bill when it came 
was tepid and it only passed when members were reminded 
that "it is an imperial measure which it is our duty to 
pass".46 This policy proved most effective. By 1938, 
Japanese textile imports had fallen to 3.6 million square 
yards and were less than one-third of the 1933 volume.47
Basil Davidson insists that this act of British 
protectionism leading to the anti-Japanese economic 
measures was part of the domino effect unleashed by the 
economic slump of the late 1920’s and the 1930's since the 
need arose in Britain to salvage whatever was left from the
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colony*s trade to help to cushion its effects. He notes 
however, that the principal effect was to deprive the 
inhabitants of the British colonies of cheap imports such 
as Japanese textiles.48 It is indeed, very true that the 
great slump adversely affected colonial as well as 
metropolitan trade and Davidson*s assessment captures the 
situation most aptly. British West African trade for 
instance, declined from a total figure of £56 million in 
1929 to £29 million in 1931. J. Munro Forbes49 and Coquery 
Vidrovitch also affirm that the great slump "upset economic 
and social conditions throughout the (African) 
continent".50
To the extent that the slump necessitated some form of 
colonial control on British West African trade, these 
observations cannot be faulted. However, mention must be 
made of the fact that this policy pursued in Nigeria was 
only one example of British trade policy. It closely 
followed the deliberate anti-Japanese trade policies 
pursued during this time by Britain in its domestic trade 
and elsewhere in the colonies and the dominions. From the 
studies of K.K. Kawakami, it is clear for instance, that a 
similar anti-Japanese policy was followed in India 
essentially to thwart Japanese cotton-textile supply 
efforts.51 It was also a fall-out from the conference 
between the representatives of the British cotton and rayon 
industries, (the Manchester interest) and Japanese 
representatives in London between February and March
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1934.52 No agreements were reached because, whereas the 
British interests wanted to extend to cover the rest of the 
world any agreement allocating market share made with the 
Japanese, the Japanese interests insisted that such 
agreements be limited to the United Kingdom and the crown 
colonies. It is therefore possible that Britain saw no 
other way of preserving the trade of her own interests than 
to severely limit Japanese imports in the colonies where it 
had the power to impose such sanctions.
This practice continued through the war and after, was 
complemented by even sharper regulations which further 
jeopardised the Japan's position in Nigeria. It is also 
pertinent to point out that for most of this period, 
Nigeria's purchases from Japan remained restricted in total 
value to limits set within the various bi-lateral trade 
agreements entered into between the United Kingdom colony's 
group and Japan. These agreements provided for any serious 
imbalance of trade to be settled in dollars and the 
quantity of goods which Japan could export to the colonies 
to be dependant on the quantity of goods they are able to 
import from the sterling area.53 This proved to be a 
serious handicap for the Japanese trade efforts since they 
were sometimes forced to take in goods they did not need in 
order to meet their obligations.
In 1952, further restrictions were clamped on Japan's 
trading efforts in Nigeria, as in most other parts of the
Sterling Area following an earlier sterling deficit.54 Two 
years later, Japan successfully negotiated an agreement 
with the United Kingdom which substantially increased the 
volume of Japanese imports. (By this time Japan had been 
successfully integrated into the Western alliance). The 
new agreements did not only relax to a considerable extent 
the trade restrictions imposed against the Japanese goods 
but increased Nigeria's allocation of import licences for 
Japanese goods. From this date until February 1st, 1960 
when the colonial government passed legislation permitting 
the importation of all goods except coal, second-hand 
clothing and articles of gold under the Open General 
Licence system, Japanese-Nigerian trade could be said to 
have abandoned the vestiges of colonial control becoming 
increasingly adaptable to the modern era of relations which 
started with Nigeria's independence in October 1960.
An account of the conditions preceding and ultimately 
affecting the post-independence period of Nigeria-Japanese 
relations would be incomplete without reference to the most 
important phenomenon which affected the development of 
relations. Of primary importance to Japan-Nigeria trade in 
the pre-independence period was the remarkable opening and 
subsequent increase in Japanese shipping services to 
Nigeria. Before this period, Japanese ships like those 
which carried out fishing activities off the Nigerian 
coastal waters would occasionally be reported but none of 
these were concerned to deal with trade and no direct
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shipping services were developed. The development of 
direct shipping services was indeed, as Katsuhiko Kitagawa 
has pointed out, very significant but not only in the 
development of Nigeria-Japanese trade? it played a massive 
role in advancing Japan*s trade with the rest of Africa 
also.55
From the trade reports of the colony and protectorate of 
Nigeria and from Charlotte Leubuscher*s study of the West 
African shipping trade and other sources, it is quite clear 
that regular shipping services operated between the two 
countries from 19 3 4 . 56 This remarkable development
apparently results from Japan*s policy of operating 
shipping services directly to the primary producing 
countries which had been vigorously pursued from 1914.57 
Hindmarsh agrees with this assessment and points to the 
effect of the heavy subsidies given to the shipping 
industry by the government.58 It should be noted however, 
that prior to the commencement of the direct shipping 
services to Nigeria, Japanese lines were already active in 
Africa. The Osaka Chosen Kaisha operated a regular 
shipping service with both East and South Africa since 
1926. During this time, most of the Japanese goods 
destined for Nigeria were trans-shipped in Western Europe 
and American ports, mainly, London and New York. During 
this period also, shipping services in Nigeria and indeed 
West Africa as a whole were dominated by European and 
American concerns namely, Elder Dempster Lines, Woermann,
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Deutsch Ost-Afrika, Hamburg-Bremen-Afrika and the American 
East-Africa line from New York.59 In addition, the United 
Africa Company (UAC) and John Holt also maintained small 
shipping services. It was however, Elder Dempster Lines 
that took effective control of shipping services as the 
colonial records show. In the Trade Reports for 1933, it 
was reported that regular mail passenger and cargo services 
were maintained between Nigeria and the rest of the world 
and that Messrs Elder Dempster Lines Ltd., had the large 
majority of ships in all category. The report also 
referred to other shipping services of Italian, Belgian, 
French, Dutch and other nationalities which also made 
regular stops to Nigeria.60
After investigating the state of affairs in Nigeria and 
West Africa, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (Osk Lines) opened a 
new line to Lagos, Accra and Dakar via South Africa and the
"Alaska Maru" was sent on an initial trial run in November
1933.61 The table below gives a rough idea of the state of
the Japanese shipping services and the increase in shipping
tonnage to Nigeria.
Table 1 (iii) JAPANESE SHIPPING SERVICES TO NIGERIA 1934-1939^2
YEAR NUMBER OF NET REGISTERED TOTAL NUMBER OF TOTAL NET REGISTERED
SHIPS TONNAGE SHIPS OF OTHER TONNAGE OF SHIPS FROM
NATIONS OTHER NATIONS
1934 2 9,106 915 1,727,761
1935 -- --
1936 5 22,189 1,049 2,044,596
1937 5 22,826 1,084 2,265,502
1938 5 23,605 945 2,012,498
1939 6 26,294 876 1,790,190
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What immediately emerges from the picture above is that 
even though the Japanese had increased their tonnage, their 
share of the shipping services remained minimal. As the 
table shows, no services were recorded in 1935 and the 
Japanese percentage share of the whole country*s shipping 
service was less than 5 per cent. It was a strong presence 
but which in comparison with the shipping activities of the 
other European and American interest, pales into 
insignificance. As Leubuscher has correctly pointed out, 
the Japanese shipping services heavily subsidized by 
government might have threatened the position of the 
British elsewhere in India, Australia and the United States 
of America but hardly so on the West Africa line.63 
Indeed, they did not threaten the interests of the smallest 
European state participant in the shipping services.
Japan*s shipping services direct to Nigeria were disrupted 
during the period of the second World War but resumed as 
soon as the post war conditions in Japan allowed renewed 
overseas interests. The Nigerian line was resumed in 1954 
but from that date onwards the one-line monopoly enjoyed by 
the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (Osk line) was broken by the 
arrival of other major lines as the Japanese shipping 
services to Nigeria expanded with increased trading. The 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (the K line) and the Mitsui 
line, both of whom were actively supported by Japanese 
businessmen who complained of the costs and long delays in 
trans-shipment from European ports, joined the Osaka Shosen 
Kaisha line.64 Between them, these lines brought 7,996 
tons of Japanese goods to Nigeria in 1954, 104,324 tons in
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195565 and 99,196 tons in 1956.66 The Japanese presence 
was still by no means a massive increment nor did it 
account for any significant proportion of the total tonnage 
entering Nigerian parts. In 1958, for instance, Japanese 
shipping was only responsible for 3.6 per cent of total 
recorded tonnage.67
The Japanese shipping figures taken by themselves would 
represent a minimal percentage of total shipping tonnage 
entering Nigeria*s ports, as we have already mentioned (the 
1939 figure for instance, represent only 1 per cent of the 
total tonnage entering Nigerian ports). The importance of 
the development of this shipping service, however, lay in 
its implications for Nigerian-Japanese trade. The period 
under consideration was one when Japanese maritime trading 
had yet to spread to the far corners of the globe. The 
concentration of trading activities was still with 
European, American and Far-East markets and Africa was by 
no means, well-known or a priority consideration among the 
business circle in Japan. Yet as the figures show, both 
before the war period and after, there was an undoubtably 
increasing willingness among the business interest in Japan 
to trade with Nigeria. The above point assumes even more 
sharper perspective if it is considered that the West Coast 
of Africa where Nigeria is located is about 12,000 miles
away from Japan and that the ships that 
called at Nigerian ports were plying a direct route, using 
the Cape not as a stop point but as a victualling station,
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a convenient half way house before the final destination, 
Lagos, Nigeria. Figures showing the Japanese shipping 
services to Nigeria during this time, should not therefore 
be taken or be seen in direct comparison with the tonnage 
of other Western European and American lines, the 
traditional customers of the West Coast of Africa whose 
contacts dates back to the Atlantic slave trade days and 
even beyond, but for their underlying importance.
A noticeable phenomenon in the trade of this years was the 
lack of reciprocity. As readily seen in Table 1 (iv) , 
Nigeria suffered a large deficit in her overall trade with 
Japan for most of the period under consideration. It would 
then appear that Japan supplied goods to Nigeria while 
demanding few of her products.68 This would however convey 
an erroneous impression for as the colonial governments 
records shows, it was much more profitable for Nigeria to 
sell those products which the Japanese needed to markets 
other than Japan. Indeed, while it was desirable to buy 
from Japan because of the relatively inexpensive nature of 
their goods, it was better to sell to the United States 
where the same products that Japan needed were much in high 
demand and fetched higher prices. Certainly, the question 
of reciprocity and achieving a balance of trade did not 
bother the colonial administration. According to the 
Federal Minister of Trade and Industry in a speech 
delivered to the colony's legislative Assembly;
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"Importation from Japan was not solely because Nigeria 
needed to persuade Japan to buy her own goods but 
because apart from the fact that Japan offers a 
variety of goods easily affordable to the vast 
majority. The two major commodities of conceivable 
interest to the Japanese are cocoa and colombite which 
are presently very much in demand in the U.S. The 
question of one way traffic of trade between Japan and 
Nigeria should not give us any trouble whatever"69
As to those who would argue that such statements above show 
a characteristic devil-may-care nature of colonial 
officials who are satisfied so long as the interests of the 
metropolitan are served, the minister who was making the 
speech during the 1955-56 budget session was Mr R.A. Njoku, 
a Nigerian in the colonial executive.
The main reason, undoubtedly was the above but it did not 
exclude the fact that as a colony of Britain, Nigeria was 
hardly permitted to export agricultural products to other 
countries than to the metropolis70, and agricultural 
products were its main export commodity.
Other areas of cooperation apart from trading relations 
were also developed during this period. Visits were made 
to Japan by both the Eastern region Minister for Industry 
and the Western region*s Minister for Development.71 
However, it was the Japanese, attesting to the increased 
economic importance of Nigeria in their calculations, who 
made the greatest attempts and were more consistent in 
efforts to improve relations between the two countries. In 
1956, they established consular representation with the 
colonial government following this up with expressions of 
concrete economic interest. In April of that year, six
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members of a Japanese trade mission sponsored by the Japan 
External Trade Organization, JETRO, visited Nigeria where 
they held detailed economic cooperation discussion with the 
colony*s Minister of Trade and Industry. In March 1960, 
another government sponsored mission visited the country 
ostensibly to examine ways in which Japanese entrepreneurs 
could cooperate and assist in developing the business and 
industry of Nigeria.72 Expressed not in Japanese terms, 
the real purpose of the last visit was not only to lay a 
solid foundation for their interests but to further explore 
ways of turning the post-colonial economy to their 
advantage since at the time of the visit, it had become 
quite clear that Nigeria would become independent in a few 
months. Encouraged by the relaxation of the various 
restrictive measure imposed by the colonial government, 
emboldened by the Open General Licence system introduced by 
February 1, 1960 and made more competitive by the Open Door 
policy of trade and investments adopted by Nigeria at 
independence, the Japanese had come to assume a position by 
1960, where they would increasingly challenge the dominant 
position of European and American interests in the Nigerian 
economy.
A number of allegations have been made concerning the real 
nature of the Japanese presence in Nigeria and elsewhere in 
Africa during the colonial period. According to one school 
of thought, the Japanese were beneficiaries of European 
colonialism and therefore were by extension, imperialists
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themselves.73 To the extent that the Japanese participated 
within the structures of colonialism in place in Africa 
during this time, the Japanese connection with European 
imperialism is not in the slightest doubt. However, it is 
not true to insist that the Japanese were involved in any 
kind of imperialism in Nigeria or indeed Africa merely 
because they maintained relations with the European 
colonies and benefitted from such intercourse. Japan had 
full diplomatic relations with Britain and Nigeria was part 
of the British empire. There was therefore nothing unusual 
in the relationship with the colonies since it resulted 
from a wider association. At any rate, it is important to 
note that the Japanese supplied the colonial peoples with 
goods they needed, sometimes at even better prices than 
they could get from the colonizing powers. On the other 
hand, they also took goods from them. It is therefore 
difficult to see how this kind of relationship could be 
construed as having imperialistic implications. What is 
beyond any reasonable doubt is that since most of the 
information the Japanese had on dealing with Nigeria were 
received second-hand from sources within the colonial 
administration, this undoubtedly affected their responses 
to Nigerian affairs. Most of this information was 
jaundiced racial vilification and missionary propaganda 
which cast a moral slur on the peoples of the former 
colony. It is plausible that it may have affected the way 
Japan perceives the peoples of the former colony. The 
implications of this effect of colonialism must therefore
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be borne in mind when evaluating the whole post­
independence relations. As Jun Morikawa insists, Japanese 
colonial policy towards Africa has a definite relationship 
with Japanese-Africa relations in the modern period.74
It has been necessary to begin this thesis by detailing the 
developments in Nigeria-Japanese relations in the colonial 
period not only because of the above reasons but also 
because it helps our understanding of the remarkable 
progress made by Japanese trade and investments in the 
post-independence Nigerian economy. We would seek to 
justify such an historical excursion on the grounds, as 
Shaw and Aluko have correctly pointed out, that "a 
political economy perspective on African Foreign Policy 
involves an historical as well as critical and structural 
component” for "such an approach enables contemporary 
relationships and responses to be put into an appropriate 
and extended time-frame.1,75 This work is undeniably an 
assessment of policy and the measure of progress in the 
modern day relationship between a developing and an 
industrial economy.
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CHAPTER TWO 
NIGERIA—JAPANESE TRADE. 1960-1985
As pointed out in the introduction, the dominant 
perspective on the nature of North-South trading relations 
is one which emphasise inherent disadvantages for the 
Southern states. The literature has focused mainly on the 
disabilities facing the Southern states on entry and 
participation in the international market economy. The 
pattern of trade which is based on a vertical structure is 
a central issue in this analysis. As the argument goes, 
the Southern states face the prospect of ever deteriorating 
terms of trade for their primary products since the 
developed Northern states control the international market 
system. Any trading relationship between the two will 
favour the developed states resulting in trade deficits and 
the drain of resources to the latter. The argument above 
seems even more relevant to Japan-Nigeria trade relations 
since an enormous deficit obtains in favour of Japan.
What we have set out to do in this chapter is to closely 
examine the dynamics of this relationship to see whether 
the above model applies. To be able to do this most 
effectively, we have to set for ourselves the task of 
considering the role of trade policies in determining what 
was traded and in what proportions. Since there was an 
effective reciprocal demand (as will be shown in Chapter 
Four), by considering trade side-by-side with policy the
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attempt is to show the reality of trading relations and the 
interplay of several factors affecting the commercial 
relationship between the North and the South.
This approach (considering trade side-by-side with policies 
addressed to the problem of trade) involves a departure 
from the more traditional analysis of trade relations in 
terms of import and export volume, overall increments and 
shifts by ratio and percentages. (This conventional method 
is merely part of our procedure) . The nature of our 
argument precludes such an emphasis on mere statistics.
The attempt here is a first step in the statement of our 
position, which is that obstacles to development lie deeply 
within the structural distortions in the domestic economy 
and is not necessarily the result of exposure to the 
international market. This argument is continued in 
Chapter Four, which is a full examination of economic 
policy.
Briefly, the tasks attempted in this chapter include the 
following:
(a) An examination of the features, trends and noticeable 
patterns of Japan's trade with Nigeria, and
(b) An analysis of the actual commodity trade. This
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includes trade policies as well as charting percentage
increments and underlying movements in index numbers.
Japan-Nigeria trade falls into six clearly distinguishable 
patterns identifiable by periodic shifts in index numbers. 
Accordingly, they have been broken up into six parts. In 
each of these divisions, the actual pattern of trade is 
considered side-by-side with underlying and consequently, 
responsible factors for each pattern. Attempts made 
through changes in existing policy or introduction of new 
policies are highlighted as they affect these underlying 
movements. Despite these sub-divisions, the pattern at the 
end of every decade is very carefully analysed and the 
market conditions inherited in the following decade clearly 
stated. We have also incorporated an assessment of a major 
policy change, that is, the quantitative trade ban of 1965 
as it affected the GATT regime. This helps us to place the 
pattern of trade within the context of the integrated world 
trade system.
Our attempt to examine policies addressed to the solution 
of particular problems will vary in application. On the 
Japanese side, the emphasis is on attempts made to capture 
markets by a combined strategy of exports and investments 
and the reactions to changing conditions in the Nigerian 
economy (continued in Chapter Three). On the Nigerian 
side, the emphasis is on attempts made to increase or 
expand exports in volume and the response to increased
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demand by Japan.
The figures used for this analysis (see Appendix, Fig. 2(i) 
and also Fig. 4) are derived from JETRO's accounts in the 
White Paoer on International Trade. IMF figures, as well 
as statistical derivations from Nigerian foreign trade 
sources are also reproduced side by side with JETRO's for 
clarity. Investment accounts can be supplemented by 
reference to Fig.3(i).
I
JAPANESE TRADE AND INVESTMENTS IN NIGERIA. 1960-1985: THE 
TRENDS. FEATURES AND THE NOTICEABLE PATTERNS
As an aspect of the relationship between a developed and
highly industrialized economy and developing economy,
Nigeriafs trade with Japan, in the whole of the period,
1960-1985, could be said to fit most perfectly into a
vertical structure. This is indicated by the exports of
products of industrial manufacture by the developed economy
and the export of products of non-industrial manufacture,
particularly, agriculturally based products, by the
developing economy.1 The pattern of this trading
relationship is sharply marked by the exchange of
machinery, equipments and other manufactured goods for
agricultural products (processed and unprocessed) as well
as crude petroleum products. This satisfied the needs of
both economies, with their widely different bases, for raw
materials and technology needed for industrial development.
On both sides, the commodities traded are clearly definable
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and with very minor alterations remained fairly consistent 
for most of the period under study. These commodities can 
be broadly summarized under the following categories? 
agricultural products, petroleum products, equipment and 
machinery, as well as manufactured consumer durables. The 
picture above suggests that both countries1 trading was 
dispersed in almost all divisions of the Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC). However, as the 
study will reveal, these commodities traded between Nigeria 
and Japan merely skirt the fringe, and not the mainwaters 
of the SITC categorization.
The exchange of the above commodities are evenly 
distributed between the two countries. Commodities one and 
two products which remained in their natural state for most 
of the periods trade, and which satisfied the needs of the 
industrialized economy for sustainable raw materials supply 
came from Nigeria while Commodities three and four were 
generated by the Japanese economy in line with its highly 
industrialized state.
Another important aspect of this trading relationship is 
that even though all the commodities traded fitted into 
most of the SITC category, with few exceptions, each 
enjoyed different periods of predominance from the other. 
As a rule, especially on the Nigerian side, one commodity 
was traded to a limited extent alongside the other during 
their different periods of dominance. Thus, the sale of
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crude petroleum products which came to predominate among 
trading commodities on the Nigerian side for most of the 
1970s and early 1980s, was massively disproportionate in 
comparison to other commodities which were in the main, 
agricultural and marine products. The exports of these 
commodities was very marginal. They amounted to very 
little, accounting for less than 6 per cent of total 
exports in an average year.
On the Japanese side, the difference in concentration among 
export, mirrored largely the concentration of foreign trade 
for the different regions of the world at the time. It 
also reflected their attempt, after a careful study of the 
Nigerian market, to concentrate on specific sectors of the 
economy at different periods. Thus, in the first decade of 
the trading relationship (1960-1970), textile goods which 
included cotton, rayon and silk fabrics as well as other 
synthetic fibres such as nylon, were responsible for well 
over one-third of the total export trade of Japan to 
Nigeria. In this period, independence had recently become 
a reality for Nigeria and although its government had 
proclaimed its intention to industrialize rapidly (with its 
first Development plan covering the period 1962-1968), both 
the length of time involved, the vicissitudes of the civil 
war which broke out in the early months of 1967, as well as 
other internal difficulties, meant that the old pattern of 
trade, firmly established by several decades of 
colonialism, continued. For the Japanese who, prior to
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Nigeria*s independence in I960, had competed over and 
wrestled the dominance of cotton-textile supplies from 
Nigeria's traditional suppliers (the United Kingdom and 
India), it was an opportunity to consolidate their lead. 
However, since political autonomy brought with it attempts 
to discourage imports of traditional consumer goods, in 
pursuit of a policy of import-substitution, commodities 
like textile goods came heavily under pressure. The 
Japanese, however, demonstrated an adaptive capability in 
their investment by pioneering new industrial complexes for 
textile manufacture in the country.
The supply of machinery and equipment as well as other 
durable consumer goods which overtook the supply of cotton 
textiles and other items such as galvanized iron-sheets, 
traditionally supplied to Nigeria, was also in response to 
further changes in the condition of the Nigerian economy. 
Accelerated in growth by its abundant petroleum resources 
and subsequently by the high demand in the world energy 
market which brought in much needed foreign exchange? and 
guided by ambitious National Development Plans (a total of 
three between 1970 and 1985), the Nigerian economy proved 
only too receptive and willing to accommodate the massive 
importation of Japanese machinery and equipment, especially 
electrical and electronic goods. This oil export aided 
growth and vastly improved the purchasing power as well as 
the standard of living of the vast majority2 and brought 
with it a sudden and almost insatiable demand for consumer
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goods and a period of conspicuous consumption.3 The 
Japanese were very quick to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by these developments especially 
since they possessed an economy geared to production and 
export of those same commodities required by the Nigerian
economy. This ability to supply also extended, most
importantly, to heavy industrial machinery and equipment 
since the Nigeria National Development Plans included an 
ambitious programme for rapid industrialization. These 
demands came in the form of machinery requirements for new 
factories, urban electrification, port facilities, 
fertilizer plants, refinery equipment and demands for other 
new forms of generally complementary technology needed for 
industrial take-off. Accordingly, an overwhelming
proportion of Japanese exports in the period 1970-1980, 
were in these commodities.
One intriguing, albeit absurd feature of the commodities 
traded by both nations, has been the trade in canned fish 
products. The mass movement to urban areas when the
colonial system expanded its process of extraction, had led
in the early independence era to the burgeoning of cities. 
In the post oil boom era this aggregation exploded, and 
left as an economic feature of the country a legacy of 
rudimentary urbanization.4 It may well be that the 
Japanese exploited the failure of the Nigerian economy, in 
seeking rapid industrialization, to provide a solid 
agricultural base capable of feeding the "vast multitudes"
68
for itself, and this theme is explored in a subsequent 
chapter. What is very clear is the fact that Japanese 
trade returns from Nigeria largely increased as a result of 
the massive importation of canned fish. In 1978, the 
Japanese records for International Trade showed an 
increment of 38 per cent in exports to Africa because of 
exports of canned mackerel to Nigeria.5
This product came in two types: Canned Mackerel in tomato 
sauce and Canned Sardines in tomato sauce under the now 
famous brand name "Geisha". It became the popular food of 
the working class, the slum dwellers and the peasantry all 
of whom had converged into the urban centres, as well as 
among students. (As a student in boarding school for most 
of the period 1976-1982, the writer recalls that the 
consumption of this very popular "Geisha" brand 
overshadowed other brands, especially the "Queen of the 
Coast", and became the vogue among students all over the 
country. It was the essential item in everyone*s locker 
and you had not "joined" until you could come up with it 
during afternoon break time). It is worth mentioning that 
only in the mid-1980s did a significant development in the 
local manufacture of canned food products take place and 
assumed real indigenous feature with the "Eja Dadi" brand. 
Until 1984, Japanese exports of this and other food 
products, could still take a significant portion of their 
general imports into Nigeria. It accounted for $1,134 
million, out of the Japanese total figure of $445, 518
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million, for that year.6 As late as 1985, canned mackerel 
and sardine were still being imported from Japan.7
The provision of services, technological and managerial, 
were also an integral and very essential part of this 
trading relationship. Again, the various developmental 
projects outlined in the National Development plans, were 
responsible in a large part for the increased cooperation 
in the service sector between Nigeria and Japan. This 
cooperation took the form of contractual services 
undertaken by the Japanese in Nigeria. It is worth 
observing however, that these kinds of services provided by 
the Japanese only came with increased trading activities 
and largely followed the ebb and flow of the state of the 
Nigerian economy. They were also undertaken by local 
subsidiaries of Japanese companies in Nigeria, and only a 
few cases involved the provision of direct services from 
Tokyo. The projects involved were of the utmost national 
importance. It must also be pointed out that although as 
often when contract services are mentioned, what 
immediately comes to mind is general construction, most 
especially in Nigeria where the word in synonymous with 
extravagant government largesse to fortunate and willing 
customers. The services undertaken by the Japanese in 
Nigeria transcend this conventional wisdom since it 
includes such tasks as architectural design for a new 
federal capital territory and feasibility reports for new 
port complexes, among others.
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Investments for the development of new sectors and the 
strengthening of existing ones have also been an integral 
part of the Japanese trade ventures in Nigeria. These 
investments were usually undertaken as a necessary 
supplement to enable either the local manufacture of a 
Japanese product which commanded and enjoyed a wide demand 
and made in order to further increase the Japanese share, 
or they were made to sustain a monopoly already in place. 
In very few instances, they were made in data based 
companies which provided vital information for both the 
parent company in Japan and its local subsidiary in 
Nigeria, on the state of the Nigerian economy. With 
respect to the above points, the Japanese investments in 
cotton-textile production in the decade 1960-70, as well as 
efforts made to establish local assembly plants for 
Japanese cars and motorcycles, in the 1980s epitomize this 
pattern of trade development (see Chapter Three).
The initiative of trade also stayed with the Japanese 
basically because the promotion of trade with other nations 
is the centre piece of Japanese foreign policy and because 
Nigeria has a large market potential as well as an 
effective purchasing power, making it very attractive as a 
market with all the potential to be exploited by Japanese 
foreign trade. Because of these facts, attempts to foster 
the trading relationship were always made by the Japanese. 
On their side, the Nigerians seem to have been satisfied to 
leave the initiative in trade development to the Japanese,
being merely content to take all they could in imports and 
offer very little in exchange. This is the reason behind 
the inability of the two countries, in the twenty-five 
years of trading relationships, to achieve a truly 
diversified spectrum of commodity exchange. New areas of 
contact were not developed and no attempts were made to 
diversify existing commodity supplies. Perhaps, because of 
the Nigerian inability to diversify the sources of existing 
commodity supplies traditional in the two countries* trade, 
or develop new areas, the Japanese did not make any attempt 
(or were not required), to undertake the local manufacture 
of industrial parts, especially for those industries whose 
raw materials were in abundance in the country, as they did 
in South-East Asia and elsewhere in their global commercial 
empire.
This lack of diversification of commodity exchange is the 
result of Nigeria*s industrial structure and low capacity 
utilisation. Whereas the trading relationship between
Japan and the East Asian NICs for instance, is
characterised by a kind of mutually beneficial
international division of labour in both domestic demand 
and in third country markets8 —  Japan exporting higher 
value added products and importing labour intensive
manufacturers —  the pattern with Nigeria is completely 
different, as we have mentioned earlier. The difference in 
pattern is predicated upon the difference in industrial 
policy. Whilst these NICs had pursued a very active
72
export-oriented industrialisation, the help of 
international capital movements had been enlisted for 
domestic production in Nigeria since the emphasis here was 
on Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policy. As 
would be expected, any analysis of the Japan-NIC 
relationship would invariably include changes in the 
industrial bases of exports, adjustment mechanisms and 
emphasis on domestic policy responses in both areas. The 
relationship with Nigeria does not allow us this luxury. 
Here, because of the differences above, our analysis has 
remained most basic as there is nothing in the vertical 
structure to warrant such interpenetrative analysis.
The balance of trade has also been in Japanese favour in 
all, except for two of the twenty-five years of trading 
relationship between the two nations. It is true of 
course, that Japan maintains a very favourable balance of 
trade with almost all nations with which it has commercial 
intercourse. It should therefore not come as a complete 
surprise or even, be cited for serious consideration as one 
of the features of the trading relationship. However, what 
sets Nigeria far apart from the case of other nations 
trading with the Japanese are two exceptional features. 
One is the inability of the Nigerian trade to expand either 
vertically or horizontally as is clearly evident from the 
tables used for subsequent discussions. The consistency in 
the export of unfinished raw material goods to Japan is the 
result of the above but also demonstrates an unwillingness
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to salvage something meaningful from the Japanese trade. 
It indicates an almost defeatist resignation and acquiesce 
to fate and fact of the Japanese economic power. This may 
yet turn out to be a gross understatement if the following 
is taken into consideration. In I960, cocoa beans, palm 
products, cotton seed, crude rubber, raw cotton and iron 
and steel scrap were its principal exports to Japan. In 
1985, the last date of the period under study, raw 
materials, cotton, crude and partly refined oils took four 
out of the five trading commodities recorded as exports to 
Japan9 (the other being marine produce). This meant that 
very little, if anything at all, had changed in the 
character of Nigeria*s export trade to Japan.
The second exception to the rule followed by most other 
economies trading with Japan, but which, however, was the 
result of the inability to develop new exports or expand 
existing ones has been the enormity of the trade deficit. 
Seen in direct comparison with the trade deficit of other 
nations, especially that of the United States of America 
which is expressed in billions of dollars ($42,008,140 
billion Japanese exports, $29,764,554 billion US exports in 
1981, $69,797,986 billion, and $30,596,388 billion
respectively in 1985) the Nigerian case would pale into 
insignificance especially since the worst year of Japanese 
trade in 1981 produced a deficit of just over two billion 
dollars. However, any "exchange-of-apples-for-oranges” 
argument such as this would only consider the enormous
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scale of US-Japan trade and the Nigeria-Japan trade to 
which it would most disproportionately compare and 
immediately grasp the gravity of the situation, which is 
most extraordinary. The difference is very simple to 
grasp, the United States1 trade with Japan runs into 
billions of dollars. Nigeria's trade with Japan even in 
their best year, 1974, has accounted for just a few 
hundreds of million dollars. Yet Nigeria maintains a 
deficit in billions of dollars with Japan. The effect of 
this imbalance has been very central to the development of 
relations and attempts were made to redress it through the 
imposition of selective quotas and trade bans from 1963-67 
and later in the early 1980s. Since these restrictive 
measures were not followed up with appropriate balance of 
trade measures or as the later ones, generally unenforced 
and disregarded, they did not in any way radically alter 
the trade arrangements leaving trade generally unaffected, 
and the imbalance larger than ever.
Apart from the consistent trade imbalance, another 
remarkable feature in the trend of Nigeria-Japanese trade 
is that it has followed closely, the general trend of world 
trade. Thus, the years 1974 and 1976 when world trade 
recorded increments of 3.5 and 11 per cent respectively and 
the period between 1977-79 when its annual average growth 
rate was in excess of 5 per cent, were accordingly the high 
points of the Nigeria-Japanese trade. Also trade was very 
good in 1980 when growth in world trade was at 1.5 per cent
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and even in 1981 when it began to show visible signs of 
decline but nevertheless remained constant at 0 per cent.10 
The years in which trade declined as in 1975 when world 
trade fell 3 per cent following the first oil shock, and in 
1982 when it stayed down 2 per cent, again owing to the 
second energy crisis, were the years in which trade 
declined for both sides. They were also the period when 
Nigeriafs export figures increased dramatically. As for 
the years 1982-85 when the trade of both nations declined, 
these were also the years, according to one analysis, when 
world trade registered its poorest performance since the 
end of the second world war in 1945.11 Generally, apart 
from 1974 when trade was reversed to Nigeriafs favour 
following the fluke of sudden increments in world petroleum 
prices, Nigeria-Japanese trade has followed the ebb and 
flow of the international market economy.
Having made the above general observations, let us proceed 
to isolate the actual patterns of trade. For simplicity, 
they have been divided into different years as their 
characteristics converge.
II
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EARLY ANNUAL TRADE BETWEEN NIGERIA AND
JAPAN. 1960-1962
The concentration of the commodities traded in the year
1960 was a reflection of the old pattern of colonial trade.
This is especially as regards the political control of the
economy since Nigeria only became independent in the last
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quarter of the trading year, on October 1, 1960.
On the Japanese side, the total export figure of $75,214 
million represented an increment of 58 per cent over the 
previous year, 1959.12 The exports of textile products, 
"mainly cotton fabrics, spun rayon fabrics and clothing" 
rose by 58 per cent because of the remarkable advance made 
by the Japanese in the exports of cotton-textile products 
(see Chapter One) which accounted in a large measure 
towards the overall increment. Nigeria for its part 
recorded a trade figure of $8.2 million. This represent a 
huge deficit of over $67 million but was still an increment 
of 18 per cent over the previous year's trading figure.13 
At the end of this trading year, (which is the beginning of 
our period of study), both nation*s showed an overall 
percentage of trade increment, even though it was very 
modest on one side. However, unlike the Japanese figures, 
in which increments were due to efficiency of the 
production machinery, the rise in Nigeria's exports was a 
result of quantitative increases and was "attributable to 
the enlarged shipments of cotton-seeds, ginned cotton, oil 
seeds and cocoa beans".14 This point is very important for 
it would become the general feature in both countries1 
trade for the rest of the period.
The percentage of 58 which was achieved by the Japanese was 
due in large part to their ability to take advantage of the 
opportunities for massive importation provided by the last
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act of British imperialism in Nigeria. On February l, 
I960, the British government passed a measure that 
permitted the importation of all goods except coal, second­
hand clothing, gold or articles manufactured wholly or 
mainly of gold. As Olufemi Ekundare15 has correctly 
observed, by the end of 1960, a position of almost complete 
liberalization of imports into the Nigerian market was 
reached and only goods from Eastern Europe remained under 
quantitative restrictions. Goods from Japan therefore 
enjoyed virtually unrestricted entry under this Act, which 
was known as the "Open General Licence” with the exception 
of singlets ostensibly, as Ekundare points out, because the 
colonial government wanted to protect a local singlet 
manufacturer, which was a British enterprise. It was not 
therefore surprising that Japan's share of Nigeria's 
imports accounted for 25.7 per cent (United Kingdom 43.6 
per cent, Netherlands/USA 10 per cent). Traditional 
Japanese supplies such as galvanised iron sheets which 
accounted for 58 per cent of total galvanised iron imports 
by Nigeria16, took a significant portion of the Japanese 
trade figures. It was however, Japanese rayon piece goods 
which took up 95.4 million square yards out of the total 
Nigerian imports of 100.5 million square yards17 that 
benefitted the most from this liberalization. The Japanese 
also took further advantage of the Open General Licence 
Scheme to horizontally expand their commodity trade. In 
that year, the Nigerian Trade Journal, the official 
magazine of the country's Ministry of Information, recorded
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the introduction of several new models of automobiles 
including compact cars but made specific reference to 
"sleek Japanese designs (which) made their debut",18 The 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
(MITI), in line with the meticulous calculations and 
planning that characterizes its control of Japanese export 
trade, signalled the direction to be followed by the 
Japanese in their post-independence commercial interactions 
with Nigeria. In its predictions for the Nigerian market 
for that and subsequent years, it observed that "Nigeria 
which became an independent nation in October 1960, is the 
largest country in Africa, both in population and area, and 
is a large market for Japanese goods".19 This prediction 
would form the attitude and determine the aggressiveness 
with which the Japanese approached competition for the 
Nigerian market. It would further determine the 
concentration of investments in particular sectors of the 
economy. It was however a policy which the Japanese did 
not abandon until a later period for immediately before 
independence, MITI sent out a mission on economic and 
technical cooperation in March 1960 principally to examine 
ways in which Japanese entrepreneurs could cooperate and 
assist in developing the business and industry of Nigeria. 
This was supplementary to the visit four years earlier (see 
Chapter One) of six members of a Japanese mission sponsored 
by another government organization, the Japan External 
Trade Organization, JETRO, which held detailed discussions 
with the officials of the Nigerian Ministry of Trade and
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Industry. It was the first time concern for the issue of 
trade imbalance was raised by Nigerian officials.20
The various efforts made by the Japanese government were 
also to a less significant degree reciprocated on the 
Nigerian side. Here efforts were made to safeguard 
external trade, and especially the Japanese trade where 
deficits existed on a scale that were not reproduced by any 
other nation. In December 1960, barely three months after 
independence, some stringent import policies were 
introduced to safeguard international trade. These efforts 
came in the form of raising duties to restrict imports in 
order to ensure that valuable funds needed for new 
developmental projects were retained. The measures also 
provided further incentives for export products while 
enhancing existing ones. It is not difficult to see that 
the new rules were designed to achieve two primary 
objectives. First, it was to circumvent the Open General 
Licensing System inherited from the colonial 
administration. This could not be abrogated outright since 
there was an understanding with Britain on the issue of 
such drastic changes. Most importantly, as a new nation, 
Nigeria could not make drastic changes in economic policy 
because of the need to maintain the confidence of its old 
investors and to seek favour with prospective ones. Again, 
the new regulations were directed specifically at the 
Japanese since it was clear that even at this early date, 
the government was only too aware of the need to redress
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the trade imbalance, an anxiety that had came to the fore 
four years earlier. The intended impact on the imports of 
Japanese goods emerges when one considers that it eroded a 
concession previously granted Japanese imports by the 
colonial adminstration.21
Japan*s export to Nigeria in 1961 amounted to a total of 
$72.8 million, which despite the new import duty 
restrictions represented a 3 per cent increase. On the 
other hand, Nigeria*s export figures in the trade with 
Japan showed a significant improvement. At $9.5 million, 
it was a figure which was still nowhere near that of the 
Japanese, but was nevertheless a 16 per cent improvement 
over the previous year.
The highlights of the trading year were the noticeable 
decline in the value of Japanese cotton exports. This was 
attributed to the decline in the purchasing power of the 
Nigerian consumers occasioned by the fall in the world 
price of cocoa, the decreased production of palm kernels 
and most especially the fact that too many contracts had 
been concluded with Nigerian traders by Japanese 
businessmen, in the preceding year 1960, in disregard of 
actual consumption.22 It must however be emphasised that 
this decline was not an absolute one. It was only relative 
to the high trade figures hitherto recorded by the export 
of Japanese cotton goods to Nigeria. The point cannot be 
over-emphasised for Nigeria still ranked third accounting 
for 7.3 per cent out of all shipments of cotton goods from 
Japan to all parts of the world.23
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The imports of machinery and equipment also began to make 
an appreciable headway as the nation began to increase its 
demands. At the end of this year, Japanese supply had 
increased by 3 per cent over the previous year and this was 
the result of anticipated technological and infrastructural 
requirements needed by the nation for economic growth and 
development. This was soon to be articulated into definite 
policies and incorporated in the First National Development 
Plan which took off the following year. The Japanese share 
of Nigeria's total import trade despite the modest 
percentage increase (3 per cent) was still very high at 27
per cent.24 (United Kingdom 38.8 per cent, USA 10 per cent
and West Germany 14 per cent) . This figure made up a 
paltry 0.2 per cent of total Japanese export trade25, a 
percentage figure (for imports) it would maintain in 
varying degrees below and slightly above in subsequent 
years. In this same year (1961), the first Japanese local 
investment in Nigeria was made by Nishizawa, "a medium
sized trading company from Osaka”. It was in textile
production and it was significantly Nigeria's first modern 
and fully mechanized textile factory. The company, Afprint 
Ltd, was solely concerned with textile manufacturing.
The 1962 trading year was remarkable only because of the 
decrease in trade for both countries. For the Japanese, 
(the total of $64 million represents a fall of 12 per cent) 
the fall was still marginal and very relative. On the 
Nigerian side, the decrease from the comparatively marginal
figure of $9.5 million to $5.2 million was very serious. 
In percentage figures, it was a 45 per cent fall below 
196l.26 This overall decrease in total trade on the 
Japanese side, was the result of the sweeping changes in 
tariff structure which came into effect in March. This 
measure, like an earlier attempt in 1960 was not 
specifically aimed at Japanese products but since a large 
percentage of Nigeria's supplies of consumer goods came 
from Japan, it ultimately affected its imports. The new 
tariff measures not only reduced demand in commodities such 
as rayon and cotton piece goods but also affected 
automobile trade, the supply of which had continued to 
accelerate from modest beginnings. Also, some of the 
consumer goods hitherto imported from Japan were now 
increasingly, manufactured locally (by the Japanese) and 
this further affected the level of imports. On the 
Nigerian side, the decrease in export earnings was due to 
factors that were extraneous to those directly affecting 
its trade with Japan. It was attributed to the adverse 
situation in the world commodity market resulting in low 
prices for its products. Its principal export commodities 
such as cocoa, palm kernels and vegetable oils, continued 
to suffer from price fluctuations in the world market.27 
Overall, the Nigerian import trade accounted for 1.3 per 
cent of Japan's total export trade, down from 1.7 per cent 
in the previous year. The decrease in Nigeria's exports 
also meant a reduction from 0.2 per cent to 0.1 per cent in 
the total import trade of Japan.28 It must be emphasised
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however, that the overall decline which characterized the 
two nation's trade in this year was not peculiar to their 
trade. From the Nigerian standpoint, the year 1962 was one 
in which overall its international trade fell. Japan 
continued to maintain its second position after the United 
Kingdom, in Nigeria's import trade. Again, the decline in 
Japanese exports was only relative to consumer goods. 
Nigeria's importation of machinery and equipment as well as 
metal and metal products of Japanese origin continued to 
rise. (See Appendix, Fig.2; relevant years).
Once again, Japanese investments were recorded in textile 
manufacturing in Nigeria. Nishizawa, made further 
investment when it set up the Northern Textile 
Manufacturers, the largest integrated blanket manufacturing 
plant in the world.
What could be said at the end of the early post­
independence trade in the three year period between 1960 
and the end of the trading year 1962, was that it was a 
period when both nations were still taking tentative steps 
in building up a meaningful commercial partnership. For 
Nigeria, there was a need to balance its demand for both 
Japanese consumer goods and heavy industrial manufactures. 
The first National Development plan had just been launched 
and there was a desire to ensure that excessive demand, 
especially for Japanese consumer goods did not seriously 
interfere with attempts at local production. In other
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words, it was faced with the dilemma of balancing imports 
against the protection of infant industries. At the same 
time, it had to seek new ways to increase production and 
encourage Japan to take in more of its export materials in 
order to achieve an even balanced trade. It was a problem 
which would continue to bedevil Nigerian-Japanese trade 
relations from independence until the end of the period 
under study. Broadly, between 1960 and 1962, was a period 
of exploration to the solutions to this enigma, while the 
period 1963-65 was one of discovery —  of decisions 
stringent and discriminatory as they might be —  in order 
to address and possibly redress the problem arising from 
the Japanese trade. Together the six years from 1960 to 
the end of 1965 were years of seeking a viable synthesis 
between exports and imports in general, of finding an 
acceptable "modus operandi" in the continuing trade between 
both nations.
The following analysis addresses another sub-division in 
the pattern of trade. Broadly, these were the years of 
decisive action in tackling the problems posed by the 
Japanese trade, (1963-65). They are taken up together for 
the purposes of analysis since they possessed common 
characteristics. Where necessary, dissimilarities in 
various years are pointed out since the various years 
cannot be absolutely identical in their relationship to 
each other and in their importance to the development of 
Nigeria-Japanese trade relations. New investments will
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also be highlighted as they reflect the attempts made by 
the Japanese to overcome the measures taken by Nigeria.
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NIGERIA-JAPANESE TRADE 1963-1965: THE YEARS OF CONFLICT
AND CONFRONTATION
Trade flows between Nigeria and Japan continued
uninterrupted and until 1965, they witnessed a steady
increase. In both 1963 and 1964, the trade of both nations
increased and it was not until 1965 when the stringent
anti-Japan trade ban was imposed that trade declined and
even then, did so only relatively on the Japanese side.
In 1963, the total trade figure of $74 million, very nearly 
the amount recorded in 1960 when imports were liberalized 
but still an all time high for the years preceding it, was 
an increment over the 1962 trade figure by 16 per cent. 
The steady progression in the value of trade which jumped 
to $80 million in 1964 was also a remarkable 7.3 per cent 
increment over 1963. In both years, Japan continued to 
hold on to its large share of Nigeria's import market, 
second only to the United Kingdom.29 Even though trade 
with Nigeria witnessed an increment in both years over the 
figures in preceding years, in comparison to their effect 
on Japanese total trade figures, they remained not only at 
an absolute minimum but were static in relation to their 
impact in the previous years (the 1963 figure, for 
instance, amounted to no more than 1.4 per cent and 0.1 per 
cent respectively of total export and import trade of
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Japan30). In the later year, 1964, two more local 
investments were added by Japanese companies to double the 
number of Japanese companies already in operation in 
Nigeria by this date, to four. The new additions were 
significant because they were made for the local production 
of the other commodity in the two major commodities 
traditionally predominant in Japanese trade with Nigeria; 
galvanized iron sheets. Interestingly, two of the five 
Japanese companies involved in these two ventures? the 
Yodogawa Steel works and the Nippon Kokan, were specialist 
steel firms. The companies, Galvanizing Industries (Nig.) 
Ltd, and Pioneer Metal Production Company Ltd, both based 
in Lagos and exclusively concerned with the production of 
galvanized iron sheets, were no doubt, a careful attempt to 
mitigate the effects of the trade restrictions, especially 
those specifically directed against Japanese products 
already in place by this date.
On the Nigerian side, the three years between 1963 and 1965 
were ones which seemed to proclaim a new willingness to 
tackle the issue of the ever increasing disparity in the 
trade accounts of both countries. In each of these years, 
its Japanese trade witnessed a modest growth. Modest is the 
right word, however: in none of the years did trade reach
$10 million. In fact, the accumulated total for the three 
years barely exceeded $20 million, a figure less than one- 
third of the Japanese 1962 figure (when trade was said to 
have declined 12 per cent).
87
The total Nigerian trade figure in 1963 was $6.8 million, 
an increase of 30 per cent over 196231, and $7.4 million in 
1964, an increment of 8.7 per cent over 1963.32 In 1965, 
this trade further climbed to $9.3 million, an all-time 
high for the three years and an increment of 26 per cent 
over the previous year but which was still not very 
significant in comparison with the corresponding figure of 
$59 million recorded by the Japanese for that year. Even 
then, the Japanese ^ figure is a decrease of 26 per cent due 
to the restrictive measures.33
As clearly evident in the foregoing account, especially in 
considering the fact that when added up together, Nigeria*s 
account from Japanese trade in the three years, 1963-65, 
was still less than one-third of the Japanese figure in a 
single year 1962 (when its trade declined 12 per cent over 
the previous year*s figures) Nigeria was running an 
enormous deficit in the Japanese account. In fact, even in 
1963, the Japanese deficit had already become a serious 
cause for concern in Nigeria.34 At this date for instance, 
its total trade deficit stood at $37 million and the 
deficit with Japan at $49 million35. This figure 
outstripped Nigeria*s deficit with other nations with which 
it had trading relations put together by about one-quarter. 
Although attempts were made to shore up the export of its 
primary commodities, resulting in the rise of exports of 
vegetable oils and raw cotton, to Japan, the overall export 
picture hereto remained largely unchanged. This was even
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in the face of tremendous efforts made by the country to
increase both its export productivity and capacity. (This
resulted in 1964, to over 60 per cent of the total world 
♦
output of palm-kernels produced for export coming from 
Nigeria.36) The country had therefore no option it would 
seem, but to impose restrictive measures, both qualitative 
and quantitative, on Japanese imports.
As a prelude to more severe limitations on Japanese 
imports, Nigeria revised its imports system in relation to 
Japan, introducing an individual licencing system from 
September 1963, in place of the General Licensing System. 
Special import licences were now required to import cotton 
fabrics, textile fabrics, cordage, cable rope and twine, 
fishing nets, cargo nets, blankets, travelling rugs, 
coverlets and clothing from Japan.37 However, these 
measures were not sufficient to drastically improve the 
trade conditions existing between Nigeria and Japan for 
neither at the end of the 1963 trading year nor the first 
quarter of the 1964 trading year indicated any significant 
changes in the trade account. The restrictive measures 
which were already in place were therefore tightened and 
widened to embrace other more stringent measures. 
Accordingly, from May to December 1964, import licences for 
Japanese textiles were issued only to applicants who had 
exported Nigerian produce to Japan during the year.38 In 
July, specific import licensing was introduced as a 
requirement for the importation of Japanese goods listed in
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the Open General Import Licence (Japan) No. 3 of 1959.39 
These controls were further tightened in September when 
further specific import licence became a requirement for 
the importation of Japanese blankets and citrus fruits.40
Although the Toyobo company and eight other spinning firms 
from Japan joined in a large capital ratio investment (44.9 
per cent) to establish a local textile industry in April 
ostensibly to overcome the effects of the restrictive ban 
on cotton textile trading, (bringing to three the number of 
Japanese cotton-textile industries in Nigeria), it failed 
to pacify the hostile mood already in place in Nigeria 
against Japanese cotton-textile and other imports. The 
creation of this company, Arewa Textiles in which UK and US 
firms also participated was an initiative that was too 
little, too late. Following the various attempts at 
limiting Japanese imports, a selective import ban was 
clamped on the Japanese. The various import restrictions 
in place and the dates of their imposition are as 
follows:41
a) Overall suspension of establishment of letters of 
credit —  August 13.
b) Raised tariff on printed cotton and the like —  August 
19.
c) Import ban on all Japanese merchandises excluding 
textile products for which specific licence (SL) had 
already been issued —  August 25.
d) Switch to an import quota system for all Japanese 
merchandise —  October 25.
There is little indication to suggest that there were any
immediate effects of these restrictive measures. The 
comprehensive import restrictions merely reduced the volume 
of Japanese imports. It did not radically alter the trade 
accounts to the point of adjusting the deficit to any 
significant degree. Indeed, at the end of this year (1965) 
the trade deficit with Japan was "still highest for any 
country with which Nigeria is a trading partner”.42 It 
also did not alter the percentage share of Nigeriafs 
exports to the total trade of Japan which remained at its 
previous insignificant level of 0.1 per cent.43 The 
noticeable decrease in the volume of Japanese imports of 
galvanized iron sheets, one of Japan’s principal and 
indeed, traditional imports was due in part, to the 
completion of the two Japanese joint ventures. These were 
the Galvanized Industries Ltd? and the Pioneer Metal 
Company Ltd both of which had gone into operation in May 
and September 1964.44 Since the Japanese had resumed local 
production, the need to bring in this commodity as further 
exports did not arise and this would indeed explain the 
drop in the volume of galvanized iron products. The same 
explanation would also account for the drop in cotton 
textile imports. Before 1965, the Japanese had already two 
textile manufacturing plants with tremendous capacities 
already engaged in local production of textiles (see 
Fig.3(i)). It may be argued that the reduction was due to
i
this fact but in large part to increased local production 
from indigenous sources. It is true that there were many 
cottage industries engaged in textile production and that
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in some parts of Nigeria, the use of hand looms for textile 
production stretches back into history. It is also true 
that Nigeria has possessed textile factories since 1949.45 
However, none of these efforts were capable of coping with 
demand which had doubled after the war when nationalism 
brought with it a reversion to traditional costume (see 
Chapter One) . With the new rush to urban centres after 
independence, demand leapt in geometrical progression and 
even more modern tastes were introduced. (Ragnar Nurske's 
demonstration effect1'46) . The Japanese companies had the 
capacity to fill this demand. For instance, the Northern 
Textile Manufacturers Ltd? is the largest integrated 
blanket manufacturing plant in the world.
It could indeed, be cited as the effect of the measures 
that it forced the Japanese hand in setting up local 
industries during this period, 1963-65, when import 
restrictions against Japanese products reached a climax. 
These three industries had a significant impact on the 
local production of products considered traditional in 
Japanese exports to Nigeria: cotton textiles and galvanized 
iron sheets. It may well be true that Japanese foreign 
trade officials, responding to the pervasive mood of post­
independence nation building,quickly capitulated and set up 
local industries. Seen from the standpoint of Nigerian 
policy makers, it would point to the astounding success of 
one of its first trade policies. However, if we were to 
consider other external factors acting quite independently
of this policy, this success may be qualified.
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From studies dealing with the modes and patterns of 
Japanese world trade and investments, especially from the 
work of Higashi and Lauter47, it can be seen that these 
particular investments follow closely the policy of 
resource related investment pursued by Japan from the early 
1960s worldwide. (See Chapter Three).
Again, if one looks at Fig.3(i) which deals with a 
comprehensive list of Japanese companies in Nigeria, one 
notices that prior to 1964 and 1965, (the dates when the 
particular restrictive bans were placed on Japanese 
imports) there had been two previous investments, in 
textile manufacture, in 1961 and 1962. It is therefore 
difficult to be certain that the setting up of the three 
industries were definitely as a result of the Nigerian 
attempts at curbing Japanese imports. What is very likely 
from the rapid succession of the investments —  between May 
1964 to April 1965 —  is that the ban accelerated a process 
already slowly unfolding. It seems unlikely that the 
Japanese Trade Ministry determined its policy of local 
investments in Nigeria as a result of the ban.
Japan's immediate reaction to this trade ban and what could 
have been the beginning of a possible trade rift is evident 
in an incident which took place in 1965 when it was first 
imposed. The Nigerian Produce Marketing Company, the
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authority responsible for the co-ordination and management 
of the country*s agricultural produce, offered 5,000 tons 
of ground nuts and 10,000 bales of cotton unit for sale to 
the Japanese. After much reluctance, the latter offered *'a 
ridiculously low price on the excuse that she had to pay 
high cost in transporting the products to Japan1*.48 Again, 
this could have been purely a question of costs considering 
the insatiable needs of the Japanese economy for raw 
material supply and this is a possibility we are most 
likely to follow in further analysis. It does not however, 
escape our observation that this particular action seems 
too much of a coincidence to be true and looked rather like 
a retaliatory trade action.
Both countries are signatories to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . A question that must be posed 
therefore is whether the various singularly restrictive 
measures and especially, the 1965 trade ban, violated the 
international body's regulations and trade stipulations? 
This is very important since in trade with each other, the 
two countries are not operating independent of the 
international market system. It is also important to the 
development of relations, both commercial and political, 
between the two states.
Quotas, as Rangarajan has observed, "are the grossest form 
of violation of the principles of free trade" and as such, 
"are prohibited under GATT, "a force in favour of the
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conduct of trade in a completely non-discriminatory 
manner1'49 except when export quotas are agreed upon 
multilaterally under a commodity agreement in order to
stabilize the market or imposed temporarily and non-
discriminatorily to counter acute balance-of-payment 
difficulties.50 Specifically, Article XI prohibits the 
imposition of quantitative restrictions on imports, while 
Article XVII is firmly against any selective application of 
quotas. However, the GATT regulations allows for a few 
exceptions. Under Article XIX, GATT permits any government 
to impose safeguards without its approval if it determines 
that an unforseen surge in imports is causing serious 
injury to domestic industrial production. It also allows 
for the maintenance of import restrictions in the special 
case of promoting economic development under Article XVIII.
These exceptions, it must be stated, do not seem to cover 
the Nigerian action because under GATT regulations, any 
restrictions imposed for a specific reason such as balance- 
of-payments difficulties must not be selective but applied 
to all participants in the trade with equal measure. At 
the time of the imposition of the restrictive measures,
Nigeria did not face "acute balance-of payments
difficulties" and the trade ban was also selectively 
applied to Japan exclusive of other nations with which it 
had commercial contacts.
The question of violation, further assumes a different kind
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of dimension: that of moral responsibility.
Understandably, this is a point that cannot go unqualified 
in the political economy of international relations but 
nevertheless, is of great significance in this 
consideration. This responsibility is owed largely to the 
fact that Nigeria not only championed the duty free entry 
for tropical products, a proviso that was added to GATT 
regulations in 1966, but from independence in 1960, had 
stood firm to prop up the effectiveness of GATT not only as 
a major tool regulating international commercial relations 
but also as an alternative to the other European systems.51
It cannot be denied that Japan was selected as a scape-goat 
for the general difficulties encountered by the Nigerian 
government in attempting to formulate an effective economic 
policy. Japan could not be blamed in any way for Nigeriafs 
inability to expand exports to match its imports from that 
country. Nor was it to be blamed for Nigeria's lethargic 
export promotion policy and the bankruptcy of the 
leadership of a polity beset by competing interests and 
factions, each with it's own objectives. However, the 
trade ban is clearly demonstrative of a phenomenon all too 
evident in international relations? the willingness of
nations to solve their own problems at others expense
wherever they can get away with it. That is, when
unilateral action is adjudged to involve few political 
costs. (It is academic but nevertheless, interesting to
speculate on whether Nigeria would have been equally
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willing to impose the ban on the United Kingdom, the 
European Economic Community or the United States of America 
if the trade balance had been similar to that with Japan). 
The action was a hangover from a recent colonial past: the
dead hand of the British colonial commercial prejudices 
against Japan. As was shown in Chapter One, there are many 
examples of prejudice against Japanese goods and 
competition. The trade ban should be seen not only as a 
result of inherited prejudice but also as a study in 
misplaced aggression.
The above observations should be qualified, however, in one 
respect. The Nigerian actions in imposing a selective ban 
on Japanese goods was an example of a widespread tendency 
at the time for countries to pursue private and exclusive 
trade policies. As Spiro*s52 study has shown, it was an era 
when despite GATT, several nations negotiated voluntary 
export restraint agreements usually on a bilateral and
secret basis. These agreements ushered in a new, albeit
sophisticated protectionism. The real ”sin of commission" 
may therefore be that while other nations pursued subtle 
and "state-of-the-art" exclusions, Nigeria's was crude, 
brazen and not well refined. However, for a new nation
taking tentative first steps in the international market
economy, such excesses may be pardonable.
The last year of this period, 1966, stands out only because 
of its importance in determining the immediate effect of
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the Trade ban of 1965 on Japanese imports. As anticipated 
in the restrictive measures imposed on Japan, Nigeria's 
exports shot up from its 1965 figure of $9.3 million to an 
unprecedented high of $14 million which dwarfed the 
previous year's figure by 47 per cent. It now seemed 
likely that the trade gap with Japan would soon be amenable 
to control. It appeared so, especially in comparison with 
the Japanese figures which took a dive of 33 per cent to 
record an all-time low on its post independence records, to 
stand at $40 million.53 Coming immediately after the 1965 
action, the fall in Japanese exports seemed to point to the 
success of the policy. The gap between the $40 million 
Japanese export figures and the $14 million of Nigeria's 
exports was still substantial however. The imports of 
Japanese cotton-textiles also continued a downward trend 
but the basic composition of trading commodities as well as 
the percentage value of the Nigerian trade to the overall 
export trade of Japan remained at its insignificant level 
of 0.1 per cent. However, the percentage value of Nigerian 
exports to the total Japanese import trade dropped 
significantly from 1.4 per cent in 1963 for instance, to 
0.4 per cent.54
The next period, 1967-70, would have been crucial for our 
assessment of the overall effect of the ban on trade and 
other activities. As it turned out, it was a period when 
all trade activities went into a general decline.
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IV
NIGERIA-JAPANESE TRADE. 1967-1970: THE YEARS OF 
UNCERTAINTY AND IMMOBILITY
If the intensified restrictions on Japanfs export trade
were necessitated by the overwhelming desire to achieve an
even balance of trade in the years to follow, the civil war
which started in the second quarter of the 1967 trading
year and lasted until the first quarter of the 1970 trading
year, effectively undermined all such efforts. The war saw
the introduction of punitive blockades against ports in the
Eastern region as well as other economic restrictions. The
wartime controls both economic and political not
unexpectedly marked the beginning of a further but steady
downturn in the trade of both nations. This was to become
the overall trend of the trading relationship in the period
1967-70. As it turned out, the marginal gains made with
the imposition of the trade restrictions in the 1966
trading year merely proved to be a temporary remission from
an unfortunate asphyxiation; a condition that was in parts,
self-inflicted. If Nigeria recorded slight increments in
trade value in any of these years, it was because the
commodities which it produced were fetching better prices
in the world market. In very rare cases, particularly at
the height of the war, it came as a result of the increased
volume of commodities commandeered for export to finance
the war effort. On the whole, the nation did not achieve
what it had hoped to do, that is, the expansion of exports
in volume while reducing the corresponding trade of the
Japanese. This was also the result of another self induced
strangulation: the civil war.
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In the four years under study, it was Japan which reeled 
from the wounds inflicted by the double barrelled attack 
from restrictive measures and the civil war. On the whole 
its trade declined. Some of the figures recorded in these 
years were the worst ever in its Nigeria trade. 1967 and 
1968 for instance, were its worst years in the whole 
history of the country's post-independence trade. A 
remarkable feature of these two years is the severe 
contraction in Japanese commodity supplies.55 The figure 
for 1967 was $38 million, not only a 3.1 per cent drop from 
the previous year, but the worst ever figure to be recorded 
in the seven years of post-independence trading with 
Nigeria.56 This was partly due to the war but was also the 
result of further import curbs which were clamped on 
Japanese imports in September of that year. The Nigerian 
authorities did not attribute this policy to the 
vicissitudes of the war. According to a Federal 
Commissioner, the curbs were imposed because "Japan has 
fully exploited the goodwill that exists for her in Africa, 
and in Nigeria this has built up grievances against her"57.
As 1967 was disappointing, 1968 was disastrous for Japan. 
For the first time the Japanese lost the initiative in the 
two nations' trading relationship. That year, it 
relinquished the favourable trade balance which it had 
enjoyed since the beginning of its trading relations with
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Nigeria in the late 1920s. With Japanese exports down to 
an all time low of $13 million, (a phenomenal fall of 65.8 
per cent below the previous year), imports from Nigeria 
were valued at $15 million.58 Another remarkable feature 
of the Japanese trade in 1968 was the decline of Japanese 
textile exports by 84.8 per cent.
In both years the percentage value of the Nigerian trade to 
total Japanese exports and imports figures further 
depreciated. In 1967, the Nigerian trade made up 0.4 and
1.0 per ceiit of Japan*s exports and imports59, while the 
1968 figures represent 0.1 per cent as percentages of both 
total imports and exports.60 Seen from this standpoint, 
the decline was noticeable but the magnitude of this 
decline can be better appreciated when considering the fact 
that Japanese exports made up only 3.72 per cent61 of the 
Nigerian import trade in 1968. This was a massive drop 
from the towering heights of 25.7 per cent in 1960 and 27 
per cent in 1961, percentage figures that were constantly 
maintained in varying degrees of the same height until this 
year. The percentage of Nigerian exports taken in by the 
Japanese even crawled up to a height of 1.77 per cent which 
was an improvement from its constant value of 0.2 per cent.
As the trade situation worsened for the Japanese, Nigeria 
was increasingly making more demands that required the 
Japanese to make more sacrifices and lose even more ground. 
In 1967 when further restrictions were placed on Japanese
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imports, the Federal Ministry of Industry requested a 
visiting Japanese mission to "provide assistance towards 
the development of small scale industries in the country, 
with particular reference to technical advice and training 
of personnel".62 Clearly, the Japanese were under a lot of 
pressure. The Director-General of the Economic Affairs 
Bureau of Japan*s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tiyluko 
Tsurumi, captured the general mood when he noted that 
Japan*s imports from Nigeria rising steadily would lead to 
a desirable balance of trade between the two countries. At 
the same time he observed that it was a matter of great 
regret that quantitative restrictions were imposed on the 
importation of Japanese goods into Nigeria.63
It is worth commenting on the rise in the Japanese exports 
of synthetic fibre fabrics, general machinery and 
especially steel sheets which was noticeable in 1967 in 
spite of the general contraction of Japanese exports. In 
1969, after Japan had successfully weathered the storm, the 
supply of these products soared by 95.9 per cent over the 
level in 1968 and accounted for a significant proportion of 
much of the 29.7 per cent increment in general exports in 
that year.64 The increments in both of these years were 
accountable to increased demand for steel products 
occasioned by the civil war as well as, to Japanese 
supplies of new machinery and steel accessories to local 
Japanese ventures. Some of these firms like Pioneer Metal 
Products Company and Galvanizing Industries Ltd; are
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engaged in the production of galvanized iron sheets.65 The 
increase in supply of this commodity to Nigeria in 1969 was 
due to the above factors but more significantly, was part 
of a general resurgence of Japanese imports which jumped to 
$29 million, representing a two-fold increase over 1968, 
its worst trading year.66
Another noticeable feature of the difficulties of Japan*s 
Nigeria trade arising from the quantitative restrictions 
and further compounded by the exigences of the civil war 
was the noticeable absence of new Japanese ventures. From 
April 1965 when the Japanese set up the Arewa Textiles 
until February 1969, there was no single Japanese 
investment in Nigeria. In that year, despite the civil war 
and the discriminatory import duties imposed against them, 
the Japanese set up a plant for the local assembly and 
sales of home electrical appliances at Ibadan, in the 
Western region. The company was a subsidiary of Sanyo of 
Japan and was named Sanyo (Nigeria) Ltd. The whole venture 
was valued at £2 million.67
In the three years of trading relations before the end of 
the civil war in 1970, Nigeria*s exports to Japan witnessed 
modest increases. In 1967, its exports increased 18 per 
cent over 1966 to stand at $18 million. This was the 
country*s best export performance in trade with Japan since 
independence. Significant advances were also made in 1968 
and even though the figures recorded for this year, $15
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million represented a 10.3 per cent decline from the 
previous year, it was still important? for the first time 
Nigeria was able to achieve a favourable balance of trade 
position with Japan. Seen in this context, the various 
efforts made to curb Japanese import had achieved a measure 
of success. However, this conclusion depends on the
adoption of a very narrow perspective. This is because it 
is not entirely correct to suppose that the drastic fall in 
Japanese exports to $13 million, was due to the import ban. 
In fact, more than anything else, it was due to the 
involuntary restrictions imposed by the civil war. It is 
most significant that even Nigeria's trade figures which 
were for the first time above that of Japan also were a 
drop of more than 10 per cent below the previous year's 
figures. The pattern for the following years further 
suggests that the effect of the restrictions was indeed 
minimal. As Nigeria's 1969 figure of $13 million shows, 
Nigeria's trade generally was in no better shape in these 
years than before the imposition of quotas. In fact, the 
10.7 per cent decrease below the 1968 figure meant a 
resumption of the pre 1966 position even taking into 
account the effect of annual inflation in each of those 
years. What is remarkable perhaps in the three year period 
was the beginning of the exportation of petroleum products 
to Japan. In 1969, crude oil exports to Japan amounted to
47,000 kilolitres worth $643,00068 and this set the pace 
for future trading on the Nigerian side.
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As the period of uncertainty and immobility in the Nigeria- 
Japanese trading relationship drew to a close in 1970, a 
number of significant developments were apparent. These 
set the pattern for subsequent years trading. First, 
Japanese exports began a steady pace of post-war growth. 
At $62.9 million in 1970, it was an appreciable total 
increment over the 1969 figure of $29 million. On the 
Nigerian side, trade dropped a further 0.8 per cent to 
$12.8 million69, a fall which could be attributed to the 
difficulties of post-war reconstruction. A factor that was 
responsible for the phenomenal rise in the Japanese trade 
accounts was the remarkable resurgence of textiles as a 
major trading commodity. In this year, textile imports 
recorded a 94.2 per cent increment over the previous year's 
figure to account for $8.2 million out of the final figure 
of $62.9 million. Machinery and equipment sales were also 
on the rise. At $23.7 million out of the Japanese trade 
figure, it was an increment of 89.3 per cent over the 
previous year. The increase in Japanese demands for raw 
materials led to a 72.6 per cent increment for goods 
recorded under that title during the trading year and this 
was in line with revitalized efforts made to consolidate a 
co-ordinated policy of maximizing raw materials supplies 
from Nigeria and from the rest of Africa.
First in the series of these attempts, a Japanese mission 
undertook a three week tour of Nigeria and eight other 
African states in February 1970. The mission was led by
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Fumikiko Kono, chairman of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. 
(It also visited Kenya, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Senegal, 
Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania and Congo). At the end of this 
tour, the mission referred to the continent as "a treasure 
house of natural resources" and proposed an active 
promotion of technical co-operation and development of 
Africafs vast natural resources for the mutual benefit of 
both Japan and the African nations. More important was its 
observation that "with our dependence on raw materials 
being what it is, imports of such natural resources are 
vital to our economic well-being".70 To further strengthen 
its position, the Federation of Economic Organizations, 
Japan*s most important business organization, set up a 
special Africa Commission, while the members of the 
Japanese Diet (parliament) established an "association for 
economic co-operation and development in Africa".71 Also, 
in deference to Part IV added to GATT articles in 1966 
(which made it possible for industrialized countries to 
give tariff preference to developing countries without 
granting other preferences to other developed nations) and 
in order to remove existing bottlenecks that might hamper 
the acquisition of natural resources, Japan introduced a 
system of preferential tariffs to boost the competitiveness 
of goods from the continent. The policy was to pave the 
way for the smooth flow of raw materials but the efficiency 
of preferential tariff rates, according to one writer, was 
a lesson which the Japanese could have learnt from 
Nigeria.72 In Nigeria, this hunger for raw materials led
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to a Japanese 100 per cent capital ratio investment in the 
Japan Petroleum Company (Nigeria) for the exploration of 
petroleum and gas resources.^ To achieve a proper 
understanding of the nature of the economic relationship 
between Nigeria and Japan in the decade following 1970, it 
is necessary therefore, to concentrate on this Japanese 
hunger for natural resources.
Meanwhile, in Nigeria, a number of significant changes in 
economic policy occurred which would ultimately affect the 
two nations trade. First, with the end of the civil war, 
the 2nd National Development Plan took off. The likelihood 
of achieving an even balance in the trade with Japan seemed 
to be embodied in the external economic policies of the 
plan. It declared that "the main objective of external 
policy for the plan period would be to promote the
country's trade with, and investment from, the outside
world on mutually beneficial basis".74 The Marketing 
Boards which had been established in the 1940s to manage 
the export trade, were reformed or re-organized. Before 
this development, the Marketing Boards were divided into 
the State Marketing Boards responsible for the purchase of 
all the scheduled crops within their territories and their 
transportation to the ports; and the Nigeria Produce 
Marketing Company Ltd, a monopoly jointly owned by the 
state marketing boards responsible for the final shipment
and overseas's sale of commodities. The Central
government's role was restricted to the prescription of
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grades and standards for produce purchased by the Marketing 
boards, a function it exercised through the Federal 
Inspection Service of the Ministry of Transport.
These efforts were geared not only to the achievement of a 
favourable balance of trade, in the Japanese and other 
nations' trade, but primarily to correct some inherent 
contradictions between a policy that was determined to 
increase export productivity and other economic policies 
that debilitated it. This was because the decentralization 
of authority for export production which left the federal 
authority with mere supervisory roles had led to a 
situation whereby ”80 per cent of Nigeria's exports were 
being controlled by an organization which the Federal 
government responsible for external trade policy did not 
control".75 As the 2nd National Development Plan further 
admitted, the activities of the Marketing Boards were being 
remote-controlled from powerful political and commercial 
interests in Europe and especially London.76 In the light 
of these considerations, the Federal government undertook 
reforms of the marketing boards in this year with a view to 
increasing producer incomes, producer prices and exports.77 
The reforms introduced were? the abolition of the two-tier 
system of produce taxation (export duty and produce sales 
tax)? de-emphasis on trading surpluses as the objective of 
price fixing and the centralization of the price-fixing 
process. It was hoped that the perfection of state control 
of this all-important economic activity would revitalise
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exports as well as redress the huge imbalance with Japan.
Beyond the grandiose plans and the pious hopes was a 
sobering reality: the near collapse of the Agricultural-
based economy. Agricultural commodities which a decade 
earlier, were accountable for 90 per cent of Nigeria*s 
export receipts, had narrowed down to 30.2 per cent by this 
time.78 The policy changes were therefore imperative.
SOME NOTICEABLE FEATURES AND AN EVALUATION OF POLICY IN THE
DECADE. 1960-1970
A breakdown of trade figures between 1960 and 1970 shows 
that the index of Japanese exports to Nigeria with a base 
of 100 in 1960, stood at 105.7 in 1964, but at 86.6 in 
1970. Nigeria's exports to Japan stood at 90.2 in 1964 and 
rose to 157.4 in 1970. See Table 2(iv). Nigeria's figures 
were however increments against absolute minimums as the 
trading accounts indicate. During this period also, 
imports in general79 and particularly Japanese imports 
began to undergo important structural changes. The demands 
for heavy machinery and equipment arising from the 
requirements of the First National Development Plan (1962- 
68) projects necessitated the import of intermediate 
products, machinery and transport equipment. Thus, 
Japanese exports of Machinery and electrical goods stood at 
$8,630 million in 1960 and $27,356 million in 1964. In 
1968 due to the war it dropped to $9,458 million. By 1970,
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it had jumped to $40,982 million. Nigerian demands for 
food and other durable consumer items also arose as 
urbanization became a marked feature of Nigeria*s post­
independence economy. Despite the various import
restrictions and the civil war, the Japanese were able to 
entrench themselves solidly in the Nigerian import market. 
What was more, they did not lose the initiative in the 
supply of traditional commodities but put themselves in a 
solid position to exploit new demands. The Nigerian 
failure to make any significant in-roads in supplying the 
Japanese economy had led to evident frustration resulting 
in the imposition of restrictive import duties and quotas. 
This was against the backdrop of on-going attempts to re­
structure the economy and provide a solid industrial base 
for it.
What is difficult to understand is the purpose the Nigerian 
policy-makers had hoped to achieve with the ban, especially 
since the policy did not contain a corresponding export 
policy particularly addressed to solving the Japanese 
problem. Singularly vindictive and generally ineffective, 
it was instructive only as an example of how not to pursue 
trade equilibrium. Tempered only by a measure of 
understanding and an unjustified feeling of debt by the 
Japanese to an economy which failed to change its moribund 
colonial structure and emerge from the economic backwaters 
into the open sea of international market economy where 
nations are made, the trading relationship was sustained.
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The futility of the ban in the development of this trading 
relationship is further evident in the fact that it merely 
served to lower Japanese exports for a short time, and even 
then, not to any significant degree. Apart from providing 
the Japanese with space to reassess and rebuild their 
position and ensure even greater deficits in the years to 
follow, the attempt was further a massive act of ill- 
advised policy coming at the time that it did. First, the 
first National Development Plan 1962-68 was well underway 
and the nation needed Japanese co-operation more than ever. 
Essential consumer goods as well as products of heavy 
industrial manufacture were needed from Japan whose 
products were not only as efficient as any others in the 
market but more adaptable and less expensive. As we shall 
see in a later chapter, there was also a willingness for 
Japanese technical expertise to accompany the industrial 
machineries where the need arose.
Secondly, the ban looks like a default in policy rather 
than a solution because it whittled away resources that 
would have been spent to develop exports, in the form of 
higher costs of importation elsewhere. A parallel would 
inevitably be drawn between this policy and a similar one 
pursued by England against France when both nations found 
themselves in similar circumstances, in the late 17th and 
early 18th centuries. England had imposed very high 
tariffs on French goods which practically amounted to 
prohibition. As Adam Smith demonstrated, England lost
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because it imported the relatively cheap French goods at a 
higher cost elsewhere. Smith explains that "though the 
value of the annual importations from any one country be 
greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual imports 
would be diminished, in proportion as the goods of the 
particular country of the same quality were cheaper than 
those of other countries”.80 The principle here is that of 
comparative advantage which guarantees economics of scale. 
As we have shown, Japan provided these goods at relatively 
cheaper rates than any other country. What was more, the 
capacity to sustain such an exchange was evidently not 
lacking. Foresight would then prove to be the greatest 
handicap of the Nigerian policy makers since apart from a 
loan of $10 million dollars which was pledged by the 
Japanese, the exercise achieved nothing else. It merely 
diverted attention from the serious problem of declining 
exports.
Although trade for both sides grew at a leisurely pace 
especially in the last quarter of the decade, the 
relationship did not break nor suffer from any significant 
drawbacks. In fact, both the evidence of the progressively 
steady rise in the general level of trade as well as other 
developments suggest the beginning of a robust 
relationship. In 1967 for instance, Nigeria participated 
in the International trade fair in Tokyo81 and at the end 
of the civil war, Japan gave a grant of $1 million to 
Nigeria for the rehabilitation of refugees.
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On both sides the structural changes which became more 
evident in 1970 changed the nature of the trade. On the 
Japanese side, from consumer durables to heavy industrial 
products and on the Nigerian side, from agricultural 
commodities to energy sources. Investments were also 
indicative of the healthy state of the trading 
relationship. At the end of the year 1970, five more 
investments were added to the already existing ones 
bringing the number to a total of thirteen. The 
significant investment in the trading year of 1970 which 
signalled the direction and concentration of the Japanese 
trade henceforth was the Japan Petroleum company for the 
exploration of Petroleum resources, as well as Tayomenka 
Nigeria Ltd, which was specialized in data collection. Two 
more companies were added to the already existing plants 
for textile manufacture; the Woollen and Synthetic Textile 
Manufacture and the Bhojsons Industries Ltd. The 
remainder, Nigeria Net and Twine Industry was to promote 
the fishery industry a trade from which the Japanese would 
soon benefit.
If the 1960s witnessed the gradual restructuring of Japanfs 
economic relations with Nigeria, in the 1970s the 
relationship not only blossomed, but expanded in geometric 
progression. As the years 1967-70 were the years of 
uncertainty in Nigeria-Japanese trade, the years, 1971-76 
were ones in which trading contacts once established were 
cemented with effortless ease. It was the beginning of the
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modern phase in Nigeria-Japanese trading relations which 
spans the decade 1971-82. 1971-76 were therefore years of
acceleration, while 1977-82 were years of sustained growth.
V
THE MODERN PHASE OF NIGERIA-JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS
a) THE FIRST PHASE 1971-1976: THE YEARS OF A GRADUAL
PROGRESSION
In 1971, the Preferential Tariff Scheme adopted by the 
Japanese in 1970 designed to benefit a wide range of 
commodities from developing countries82, took effect. It 
was on this promising note that another decade of trading 
relations started. It was also the beginning on the 
Nigerian side, of the overwhelming predominance of 
Petroleum exports. While for Japan*s trade, the year was 
also clearly marked as bringing the imports of machinery 
and allied products into predominance to finally overtake 
cotton textiles and other consumer goods. Out of the 
Nigerian total trade figure of $27.1 million (phenomenal 
for that country but not clearly significant in comparison 
with the Japanese figure of $96 million, a 52 per cent 
increment over 1970)83, crude oil exports accounted for 
$12.8 million.
A noticeable feature of the 1971 trading year was the large 
increment in Japan*s importation of machinery which rose 
48.1 per cent, and automobiles which recorded a sharp 
increase (up 2.7 times)84. These increments were due to
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the large demands occasioned by the needs of post-war 
reconstruction in Nigeria and the new prosperity slowly 
being brought in by oil exports.
The Japanese importation of automobiles was significant as 
the Table below shows.
FIG. 2 <ii) JAPANESE IMPORTS OF AUTOMOBILES 197185
UP TO 2,000 cm3 CAPACITY OVER 2,000 cm3 BUSES TRUCKS AND MOTORCYCLES
(360 - 2,000 cm-5)
NO = 3506 1977 6 1034 8168
The increments were indicative of the Japanese intention to 
tap into a clearly evident area of increasing demand in the 
years to come. To satisfy the growing demand and to fully 
entrench themselves in the field, the Japanese applied to 
the government of Nigeria for authorization to build 
factories for the production of trucks and cars on a 
completely-knocked-down-basis.
Further investments were made in the textile industry. C. 
Itoh in partnership with another Japanese company, Hirata 
Spinning and a French multinational company, C.F.A.O. 
started the venture, Ninetso Nigeria Ltd, in September.86 
Further visits were also made to assess the potentials of 
the Nigerian market. In the second week of November, a 10- 
man Japanese trade delegation led by Mr Shinobu Ichikawa 
visited Nigeria with the dual purpose of ascertaining the
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future possibility of joint ventures and to indicate 
Japan*s interests in the marketing of Nigeria*s oil 
resources. As evidence of a blossoming relationship, the 
Federal government through Mr R A B Dikko, the Federal 
Commissioner for transport, gave the delegation a firm 
assurance of full co-operation.87
The years 1972-76 closely followed the pattern established 
by the 1971 trading year. What sets them apart from the 
1971 model was not the increased volume of trade which both 
countries witnessed, but the widening gap of the trade 
imbalance. In 1972, Japan for the first time reached the 
$100 million mark as its final account climbed to $126 
million, a 31.3 per cent increase over 1971. This was 
higher than Nigeria’s account of $80 million, an 
unprecedented account and a 194.7 per cent increase.88 
These figures, as we have observed, followed closely the 
pattern established by the 1971 trade but they were further 
remarkable in many ways.
First was the resurgence in the imports of textiles and 
synthetic products, traditional Japanese export commodities 
which had remained in the doldrums in the Japanese trade 
owing to factors that were both internal and external. As 
clearly evident in figure 2 these products did account for 
a substantial portion of the Japanese total export trade. 
At $33.4 million, a 25.9 per cent increase compared to 
1971, it was a remarkable resurgence indeed. However, in
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line with the trend already established, the imports of 
machinery accounted for 46.2 per cent of total exports.
There has been no reasons advanced anywhere to explain the 
sudden increment recorded in the Japanese textile supply 
and research to try to account for this particular 
development has so far not yielded a satisfactory 
explanation. However, a credible explanation may be that 
during the civil war, local production of textiles was 
disrupted, and the demand occasioned by ever increasing 
post-war needs far outstripped the capabilities of the 
local firms which, at any rate, were still desperately 
trying to rebuild, to re-instate and increase pre-war 
production levels. The Japanese were well placed to gain 
from this because this was an area of traditional leverage. 
The point above is further highlighted by the fact that the 
1972 textile figures exceeded any previous average for that 
commodity since the beginning of the civil war in 1967.
Another point worthy of mention is the phenomenal rise in 
Nigeria's crude petroleum exports. The demands of post-war 
reconstruction and the increasing demands for energy 
sources in the international market meant that this 
commodity's assured consistency of production and a 
capacity to double output, would dominate Nigeria's export 
trade in most of the years under consideration. Signalling 
the trend, Petroleum exports to Japan rose sharply by 500 
per cent during this year and accounted for $70 million out
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of the total trade figure of $80 million. Indicative of 
the role it would increasingly play in this trade, Japan's 
deputy Vice Foreign Minister, Takeshi Yasukana was 
appointed to take special charge of resource affairs in the 
specialist "International resources division" set up in 
1972 by Japan's Ministry of Economic Affairs Bureau to 
handle questions concerning overseas resources.89 This 
Japanese effort complemented previous attempts at securing 
Nigeria's and other African resources and formed part of a 
new foreign policy of "resource diplomacy".
There was no local investment by Japan in 1972 but in 1973, 
1974 and 1975, some investments were undertaken and these 
would reflect later on the constitution of Nigeria's
exports and Japan's policy of resource diplomacy. There 
were investments in the fishing industry (see Chapter
Three).
The year 1973 marked a watershed in Nigeria-Japanese trade 
relations for this was the year following the oil crisis 
when Nigeria was drawn sharply to the centre of Japanese 
attention. It was remarkable because prior to this 
development, Nigeria had been no more than another 
promising market for products of industrial manufacture in 
the Japanese projections. As sometimes with relations 
among nations, factors external to those they are concerned
to deal with, change the course of events and brings an
irreversible break with the past. Writing in 1916, J.B.
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Bury had referred to this kind of independent causal chain 
as the effect of chance, or the famous crux of "Cleopatra's 
Nose", in history.90 Rostow simply calls this "exogenous 
events"91 and it would seem that the sudden twist in 
Nigeria-Japanese trade relations beginning in 1973 can only 
be explained with reference to this phenomenon highlighted 
by Bury and Rostow. The advantage came too late in the 
trading year to reverse the fortunes of trade or even to 
help to achieve the much needed balance of trade position 
from one nation's point of view. While this did not happen 
in this year, it occurred in 1974 and corrected for the 
second time, the uneven balance of trade held in the 
Japanese favour.
In both years, the remarkable feature of trade was the 
unprecedented rise in Nigeria's export figures and the 
dominance of petroleum products which by far outstripped 
other commodities taking an unprecedented lion's share of 
exports: $187,844 million out of the total export figure of 
$189,010 million in 197392 and $434,735 million out of the 
1974 trade figure of $448,864 million.93 With 95 and as 97 
as percentages of total export figures respectively, it no 
doubt signalled the beginning of a new era in Nigeria - 
Japanese trade.
Since 1974 was a veritable exception in the trade of both 
nations it has drawn quite a few comments. In all the 
records, there is an overwhelming agreement on the oil 
crisis as the sole responsible factor.94 There is, indeed, 
hardly any doubt that Japan increased its purchases of
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Nigeria’s petroleum resources to offset the fall in supply 
elsewhere, as clearly evident in the records detailing 
trading contacts in both years (see Fig.3(iii)). However, 
the extraneous oil crisis and the favourable balance of 
trade it brought for Nigeria were the only remarkable 
events in the trade of the two years. In real terms, it 
masked the nature of the trade: the one-product
predominance in the Nigerian trade. This contained the 
seed of future decline in the Nigerian trade as the world 
oil trade stabilized. The latter point is very important 
because it would become the overwhelming feature of the 
Nigerian trade. The prospect of consistent decline was 
already evident.
It is also evident that there was no noticeable decline in 
the Japanese exports of heavy and chemical industrial 
products, essential machinery and equipment. The supply of 
these products in fact increased, as well as the value of 
their total trade from $141,147 million in 1973 to $284,867 
million in 1974.95
The Japanese response in their bid to correct the adverse 
position took various forms. On the one hand, "resource 
diplomacy” brought with it new agreements and strengthened 
old ones, ensuring them of a steady and alternative means 
of supply independent of Nigeria’s sources. On the other, 
it joined a meeting of the United States of America, Canada 
and the European Economic Community (except France) in
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February 1974 to find common solutions to the sharp 
increase in oil prices that was not only responsible for
the loss of initiative in the Nigerian trade in 1974, but
was also slowing the growth of its domestic economy. The 
conference agreed to work closely to assuage the effects of 
the oil crisis by putting into effect a number of measures 
which included a reduction of demand, the development of 
new energy supplies and finding new ways to meet the
financial trauma resulting from the sharp price 
increases.96
Since Nigeria was a member of the oil cartel, OPEC, it 
appeared that the Japanese participation in what was, after 
all, an anti-OPEC stand, would seriously jeopardize the 
trade between them. This was not the case, however, 
because neither was Nigeria's post-war economy in any shape 
to shoulder the effects of any retaliatory action, which 
Nigeria in any case would have been forced by the
circumstances to apply to other participants in the 
conference (nearly 70 per cent of its customers). Nor was 
such an action necessary since increased oil shipments were 
more than desirable in the effort to maintain a favourable 
balance of trade position. Accordingly, reaction was mute. 
It did not make any pronouncement on the Japanese 
involvement or indeed, on any of the rest. Generally, 
according to Aluko, it seemed to share the view of 
President Boumediene of Algeria who deplored the conference 
as "a bid by the United States to establish a protectorate
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over consumer as well as producer countries.”97
Apart from this incident, precipitated by the trauma of 
increased oil prices, the years 1973 and 1974 could safely 
be said to fit into a pattern with the general trend of 
Nigeria-Japanese trading established from 1971. This is so 
because neither the demand nor the supply side of either 
side's trading betrayed signs of any structural changes. 
While Nigeria continued to desire in ever increasing 
numbers the products of Japanese industrial manufacture, 
Japan on the other hand seemed ever desirous of Nigeria's 
raw materials. The only thing that changed in the trade of 
1974 was price, and the final figures appeared the way they 
did because of market forces acting independent of the two 
nation's trade. Since the increments were not the result 
of a carefully activated trade manoeuvre, it did not in any 
way affect the pattern of the two nations' trade, and 
quickly lapsed into history as one of those fortuitous 
accidents in relations between nations.
As quickly as the unfavourable balance of trade brought 
about by the oil crisis appeared in 1974, it was corrected 
in 1975 by the Japanese, who resumed their overwhelming 
initiative in the trade of the two nations. What made the 
Japanese export trade of this year truly revitalized was 
not only that it "recorded a continued high growth of 2.1 
fold compared with the preceding year" to attain a new 
height of $585.3 million98, but both the exports of
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machinery and iron and steel continued with the upward 
trend. While imports of machinery increased 54.9 per cent, 
iron and steel was up 60.9 per cent above the previous 
yearfs figures. These increases were accountable by the 
large demands occasioned by the feverish pace of 
industrialization in Nigeria, for these were the years of 
the oil boom. However, the general trend of trade 
increments noticeable in the Japanese export trade of this 
year may be attributed to an important development which 
took place in the last quarter of the trading year. This 
was the Nigerian withdrawal of the invocation of Article 35 
of GATT against Japan extending to her a most favoured 
nation (MFN) status.
Indeed, the Nigerian - Japanese trade could be said to have 
finally reached the age of maturity in this year as further 
investments both in new sectors and others to strengthen 
old areas of concentration followed. While four Japanese 
companies went into the traditional areas of iron and steel 
manufacturing and the processing and sales of canvas, Toyo 
Glass went into partnership with Metal Box Overseas to set 
up Metal Box Toyo Glass (Nigeria) Ltd? a venture that was 
Metal Box's first step into glass-making."
The trend of ever-increasing exports was continued by Japan 
in 1976 and even though trade actually fell 2.0 per cent 
below the last year's figure to stand at $573.8 million, it 
still maintained a clear advantage with a trade surplus of
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$465.1 million. The imports of machinery continued its 
steady increases through the trading year, recording a rise 
of 10.1 per cent over the preceding year to account for 
61.7 per cent of total Japanese imports.
If the two years of trading in 1975 and 1976 produced an 
overall increase in the value of Japanese imports resulting 
in higher accounts, it was indeed, the opposite on the 
Nigerian side where trade went into a steady decline after 
the remarkable developments recorded in 1974. In 1975, 
trade fell 37.9 per cent from the previous year's figure of 
$448,865 million to $278.5 million; and in 1976, it
declined a further 61 per cent to stand at $108,731
million.100 Although the amounts recorded in both of these 
years' trading were revolutionary in comparison with the 
pre-1972 figures, in real terms, it did not represent any 
more than a lateral expansion of exports. Crude oil 
exports for instance accounted for 92.6 per cent of the 
1975 figure and trade further declined in 1976 when oil 
exports were down 65.8 per cent as the Japanese energy 
market stabilized. The only noticeable increase in 
commodity exports was the 39.9 per cent increment recorded 
in foodstuff exports in 1975 and it is not difficult to 
understand why. In September of the previous year, Taiyo 
Fishery had entered into a joint partnership with Ibru
Seafoods to set up the Osadjere Fishing Company which
specialized in shrimp trawling and the freezing and sales 
of marine products.101 This was the first of such large
scale local fishing operations in Nigeria.
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Following the evident consistency of trade decline which 
promised to get worse as the needs for Nigerian oil 
resources became less in Japan, the Nigerian government 
once again introduced further incentives for export 
production. It announced increases in producer prices in 
the 1975 budget and to protect the country*s reserves from 
fluctuating international currency values, it redistributed 
its reserves formerly held mostly in Pound Sterling, into 
a number of other convertible currencies including the 
Japanese Yen.102 This was the situation existing at the 
beginning of the second phase in the years of increasing 
trade, 1977-1982, which is considered below.
VI
THE MODERN PHASE OF NIGERIA - JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS
b) THE SECOND PHASE 1977-1982: THE YEARS OF ACCELERATED 
GROWTH.
If the period 1971-76 were the years of the "drive to 
maturity" to apply Rostow*s terms in another context, the 
years 1977-1982 were the age of "high mass consumption" in 
Nigeria-Japanese trade relations. In general, the period 
followed very closely the pattern of the one preceding it 
in terms of increased importation of Japanese machinery and 
equipment as well as investments. What sets it apart, 
however, was the rate of growth of the volume of imports 
and the feverish pace of investments. It was also the
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period when Japanese trade attained the one billion dollar 
mark. To offer the above as the general characteristics of 
the period would not be altogether complete. This is 
because growth was one-sided and trade on the Nigeria side 
did betray symptoms of gross decline. A phenomenon that 
became more acute as the trade of the opposite side leaped 
in geometric progression. However, this slack export 
growth should not mask the overwhelming evidence of grossly 
inverted trade between the two nations, since this was a 
period in Nigerian history when it generally demanded more 
than it supplied in the realization of the new industrial 
programmes pursued under the national development plans.
This period of trading relationship witnessed unprecedented 
demands for heavy and chemical industrial products as well 
as machinery and equipment. The trend began early in the 
period. In 1977, the Japanese trading account reached the 
record figure of $1,009,534 billion.103 Out of this figure 
the sales of chemical and industrial products accounted for 
$885,765 million, while machinery and equipment worth 
$647,824 million were sold. It was Nigeria's worst trade 
deficit since independence and the low figure of $20,290 
million that it recorded signalled the shape of trade to 
come in the following years. That Nigeria was reduced to 
this position in its Japanese trade was primarily due to 
the Japanese stoppage of its oil imports having weathered 
successfully the storm of the energy crisis. It then 
signalled the domination of a product other than crude oil
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in Nigeria*s exports: marine produce. In this year,
exports of foodstuff including shrimps, prawns and lobsters 
accounted for $15,663 million out of the total figure of 
$20,290 million. It was the beginning of a new low in the 
Nigerian export figures and this was of grave significance 
because the marine products were generated by the Japanese 
in Nigeria (see Chapter 3).
A number of comments have been made regarding the towering 
proportions of the trade imbalance of this year and opinion 
voiced run the whole gamut of emotion from "rape" to "rip- 
off".104 What is important, however, is not misplaced 
sentimentality expressed over purely economic exchange but 
that the deficit served to epitomise the lack of restraint 
in managing an economy geared to massive imports without 
promoting a correspondingly higher value of export trade. 
It was a period when Nigerian policy-makers lay secure in 
the abundance of foreign exchange from the supposedly 
infinite oil reserves and the consistency of its prevailing 
exorbitant market Value as not to sufficiently review other 
export commodities and bring them on par with oil export 
earnings.
No doubt jolted back, for a time, to reality by the huge 
trade imbalance with the Japanese, a number of measures 
were taken to stem the one-sided flow. Since the various 
restrictive measures introduced in the 1977 budget which 
was aimed at improving the country's balance of trade
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position had proved inadequate to stem the Japanese flood, 
the policy was taken up and further expanded in the budget 
of 1978 and 1979. By this time however, the state of 
agricultural exports were almost of a non-salvageable 
proportion. Although in proportion, it had fallen to 30.2 
per cent in 1970, by 1977, it was only responsible for 4.5 
per cent of the total export trade. The re-organisation of 
the marketing boards in which enough hopes had been placed 
to lift the nation*s declining agricultural exports had 
failed. The Federal Government therefore decided to 
abolish the boards outright and in their place were 
established seven national commodity boards. The statutory 
functions of these boards included among others, to 
encourage production and organize the marketing of all the 
major agricultural commodities. This effort was
complemented by the "Credit Guarantee Scheme” set up to 
underwrite loans granted to farmers by banks in respect of 
certain crops, mainly export crops? namely, cocoa, rubber 
and palm-oil. It was a loose form of government relocation 
of export production to private capital initiative. In 
real terms however, agricultural productivity in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms, the regulation of 
export prices, as well as the direction of export trade 
were still tightly in the grasp of the government.
The Japanese position in the face of these changes was to 
heighten efforts geared to increasing local participation 
in the form of private capital investments. With eyes
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still firmly focused on the rapid industrialization and
developmental efforts of the country, the flow of the new
investments were widely spread. First Nichimen Corporation 
left Lagos, the traditional foothold for Aba, one of the
busy commercial centres of the East to set up Metcome
(Nigeria) Ltd? engaged in the processing and sales of steel 
products. An effort complemented later in the year by Kobe 
Steel and Mitsubishi Corporation who joined in a venture in 
the Standard Industrial Development Company for the 
manufacture of steel tubes. Mitsubishi Electric and 
Mitsubishi Corporation also followed with Melco (Nigeria) 
Ltd? a company specializing on the sales and installation 
of heavy electrical Machinery and Equipment. A further 
foothold was gained in the chemical equipments sector of 
the Nigerian economy by Sekui Chemical and Nichimen 
Corporation with joint investments in Elson (Nigeria) Ltd? 
for the marketing of PVC pipes and polyethylene films.105
The standard that was set in the 1977 trading year was 
carried on in 1978 and although the Japanese account 
dropped by 5.6 per cent largely because of the reaction
against the colossal imbalance of 1977, it still towered at
$953,431 million.106 This reaction took the form of 
restrictions which largely affected Japanese imports of 
automobiles which dropped from the figure of $406,081
million in 1977 to $350,457 million in this year,
machinery and equipment also dropped from their previous 
figure of $647,824 million in 1977 to $603,273 in 1978.
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These were however very relative to previous figures as 
well as in comparison to Nigeria*s figures which, as the 
exports of mineral fuels, crude and partially refined oil 
continued their absence from the export trade, was 
drastically reduced to $7,529 million. Out of this figure, 
the export of shrimps, prawns, lobsters and cocoa accounted 
for $3,897 million.107 With consistent export decline, the 
imbalance had become a problem of immense proportions.
The increased volume of the Japanese trade which accounted 
for 11 per cent of Nigeria's total imports and 0.4 per cent 
of exports108, was not the dominant character of the trade 
of these years. It was rather, increased investments, the 
level of which was pushed into new heights. In all, six 
new investments were added to the already existing twenty- 
two to bring the total to thirty-one in eighteen years. 
They were also as diversified as that of the previous years 
and new sectors covered include civil engineering works 
where Sumitomo Electric Industries undertook a 40 per cent 
capital-ratio investment in Sei Nigeria Ltd. Further 
Sumitomo investment in the form of Sumitomo Electric and 
Sumitomo Corporation combination materialized in the 
Nigeria Wire and Cable Company for the manufacture of 
electric wires and cables. Sumitomo also participated in 
yet another venture signalling its intention to sustain a 
long interest in the Nigerian economy when it came up with 
a data-based company, the Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha (Nigeria) 
Ltd. This last undertaking complemented similar efforts
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for the establishment of marketing survey and data 
collection companies in Nigeria made by other Japanese 
multi-nationals? Mitsui and company and C. Itoh and 
Company. Mitsui by setting up MBK (Nigeria) Ltd, and C. 
Itoh by setting up C. Itoh and Company (Nigeria) Ltd. 
Earlier in the year, Kawasho Corporation in partnership 
with a third country had set up the Rolled Steel Products 
Company in an area of traditional Japanese concentration in 
Nigerian investments? the manufacture of galvanized iron 
sheets.109
The following two years, 1979 and 1980 were important in 
the trade of this period because they were the years when 
Nigeria resumed gradually its exports of petroleum products 
to Japan. However, in comparison to the 1973 and 1974 
levels, the figures fetched by the marketing of oil in the 
two years were very modest. In 1979, it accounted for 
$25,198 million out of the total export figure of $42,467 
million110 while cotton, non-ferrous metallic ores, oil 
seeds and shea nuts classified under raw materials made up 
for $10,479 million and shrimps, prawns and lobsters for 
$5,055 million. In 1980, oil earnings further increased 
because of a number of successful attempts made by Japan to 
secure its supply from Nigeria. In that regard, contracts 
for the supply of oil were made with Nigeria and the first 
two by Idemitsu Kozan and Maruzen oil was expected to bring 
in a daily $500,000 in export earnings in the first half of 
the year.111 The contracts proved successful in bolstering
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Nigeria*s export figures but the set target was not 
completely achieved. At the end of the year, earnings from 
oil exports which totalled $104,643 million was largely 
responsible for Nigeria*s total trade figure of $120,175 
million. As was customary in the preceding years, the 
exports of marine products, namely shrimps, lobsters and 
prawns made up for $3,665 million while raw material 
exports amounted to $3,573 million.112 Trade had 
significantly remained structurally unchanged.
In both of these years, Japanese trading figures remained 
virtually at the spectacular mark of over one billion 
dollars made in 1977. In 1979 total trade figures amounted 
to $806,889 million, down 15 per cent from the previous 
year. By 1980 however, following the token efforts made to 
reciprocate trade by concluding contracts with Nigerian oil 
producers, the figures jumped once again, to the height of 
$1,493,602 million.113
The Japanese had once again concluded another decade of 
trading relations having successfully amassed huge 
surpluses from the Nigerian account. As evident from the 
Japanese trading accounts of both years, the imports of 
Metals, Heavy and Chemical industrial products, Machinery 
and Equipment as well as other commodities that were all in 
high demand by a nation experiencing an unexpected rapid 
industrialization and high level of growth brought about by 
increased earnings from petroleum products, continued to
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make astronomical gains. What is not immediately evident 
from these representations as well as from other figures 
preceding the trading year 1979 and 1980, were the overall 
expansion in the sales of other consumer durables, 
especially, audio and video equipment. In 1979, for 
instance, the Japanese Ministry of Trade sources recorded 
an increment of 61 per cent in the sales of video recorders 
and 93.3 per cent in television sales to Africa.114 
Overall sales to Nigeria accounted for a very high 
proportion of these sales percentages because these were 
the years when ownership of either of the two commodities, 
almost exclusively imported from Japan, was a mark of 
furtherance of social status. As evident from the Japanese 
records of the Nigerian trade for that year (see Fig. 2) the 
sales of these two commodities were very well pronounced. 
In each of these years, the Japanese continued to 
consolidate their position with new investments. 
Significant in-roads were made mostly to complement old 
efforts in the engineering services sector. Accordingly, 
three out of the four investments recorded in this year 
were in this field:- Sumalco Ltd, for the installation of 
electric wires and cables? Fujikara Cable Works, for 
communications and electrical power engineering, and Taisei 
West Africa for civil engineering construction and 
machinery procurement. The remainder, Nisho Iwai (Nigeria) 
Ltd, was in the old area, trading, as was the singular 
investment in 1980, Nigeria Textile Products, in textile 
manufacturing.
The increased demand for Japanese goods are best
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represented by the volume of automobile imports in 1980, 
despite latest restrictions on vehicle importation. The 
figures below 115 show the number of Japanese automobiles 
by classification imported by Nigeria in the first half of 
the 1980 trading year, January to June.
TABLE 2
(ill) PASSENGER CARS TRUCKS BUSES TOTAL
9,841 10,175 14,623 34,639
One only needs to compare this figure to the total number 
of Japanese automobiles imported into Nigeria in 1971 (see 
Table 2 (ii)) to comprehend the degree of increased demand. 
In July of this year, the vice-president of Nigeria, Dr 
Alex Ekwuene spoke of the "great scope for partnership 
between Nigeria and Japan".116 The final figures at the 
end of the trading year proved that 'partnership* which 
would suggest a proportionate trading relationship between 
two equal partners was still largely illusory, primarily 
because, as Joe Garba correctly observed, even though the 
United States trade deficit with Nigeria had reached eleven 
billion dollars by 1980, it was still second to that of 
Japan.117 Ekwuene's comment, with the benefit of 
hindsight, is largely one of unjustified enthusiasm but it 
is very important as it underscores the mood behind the 
lackadaisical export policy pursued by Nigeria in respect 
of the Japanese trade.
The last two years of the period under consideration,
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(1977-1982), were also marked by heightened trading and 
investment activities. Japanfs Nigeria trade in 1981 not 
only increased by nearly 50 per cent but accounted for 
23.68 per cent of Japan's total Africa trade.118 This 
confirmed Nigeria firmly as Japan's second largest market 
and trading partner after South Africa. Its export 
earnings from Nigeria which stood at $1,493,602 billion in 
the previous year, leapt to $2,158,826 billion in 1981. 
Representing a significant increment in trading accounts of 
44.5 per cent, it was the highest figure to be recorded by 
the Japanese since the beginning of the trading relations 
with Nigeria in the late 1920's. Nigeria's total earnings 
also witnessed a significant increment of 183.2 per cent 
from $120,175 million to $340,369 million.119 The value 
added in the Nigerian account notwithstanding, it 
represented the highest deficit with Japan of all African 
countries.120
Japanese imports of machinery and equipment which over the 
years have recorded consistent increments, reached an all- 
time height in this year when it jumped 175.1 per cent over 
the previous year to account for $1,526,691 billion out of 
a total account of $2,158,826 billion. The exports of 
transportation equipment also gained by 209.2 per cent to 
stand at $1,025,540 billion out of which sales of motor 
vehicles accounted for $711,909 million. On the Nigerian 
side, exports changed very little in volume and remained 
static in horizontal movement. The exports of petroleum
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products significantly boosted by last year*s contracts 
accounted for $331,191 million out of the total earnings of 
$340,369 million. Prawns, shrimps and lobsters continued 
to make an impact, taking a 161.7 per cent jump to $6,567 
million. As raw other materials* export took a 61 per cent 
dive to $2,178 million, it shows, most significantly that 
in real terms, Nigerian export performance was 
deteriorating, not improving.
The vertical increments and the decline of agricultural 
exports not only demonstrated the fragile base of Nigeria's 
exports but most importantly, it confirmed that so long as 
the Japanese were willing to import Nigerian oil, they were 
unhindered in exploiting to the full the capacity of 
Nigeria's market potential. The figure of nearly two 
billion in trade deficits also denotes the final conquest 
of the Nigerian Market by the Japanese, a position secured 
by loans and with other types of foreign aid. This 
position continued in 1982, at the end of which Japanese 
earnings remained at the now consistent level of over one 
billion dollars ($1,209,057 billion) while that of Nigeria 
slid down to a comparatively ridiculous figure of $8,002 
million.121 The decline of 56 per cent in the trading 
figure of the Japanese was a relative decline which was 
well outstripped in intensity by that of Nigeria. From 
$340,369 million in 1981 to $8,002 million in 1982,it was 
not so much the percentage scale of the decline as its 
significance in the Nigerian-Japanese trade relations.
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This low figure was the result of the disappearance of 
petroleum from total exports. Japan had halted the 
importation of oil from Nigeria in 1981 because its 
corporations refused to pay the premium when Nigeria's oil 
prices reached $40 per barrel. As the trade situation 
worsened, the exports of shrimps, prawns and lobsters came 
to dominate total exports accounting for $5,795 million out 
of the total figure of $8,002 million. This was the 
beginning of the end for Nigeria's exports to Japan since 
Nigeria showed no interest in developing non-oil sectors. 
This prospect of consistent decline would become the marked 
feature of the following years' trade until the end of our 
period, 1985.
In the two years 1981 and 1982, a significant development 
which was further accentuated by new investments was the 
increase in the imports of Japanese motorcycles. The 
growing demand for motorcycles among the peasants and the 
working-class community translated into another area of 
concentration of both exports and investments in local 
industry by the Japanese. Motorcycles, which are used for 
both leisure and commercial purposes in Nigeria, became an 
area where the Japanese, with the benefit of specialization 
of manufacturing exploited to the full. In January 1981, 
Honda Motor Company, which had been making enormous sales 
in Nigeria since the early 1970s, opened a Motorcycle 
assembly plant in Lagos and in the following year 1982, 
Yamaha Motors and Mitsui and Company combined to open
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Yamaha Manufacturing (Nigeria) Ltd, for the same purpose. 
Even while the first local production effort by Honda was 
going on in 1981, Motorcycle imports accounted for $119,844 
million.122 Apart from textiles, the production and sales 
of motorcycles then became another area of unrivalled 
domination in the Nigerian market by the Japanese. Today, 
an overwhelming number (about 99 per cent) of motorcycles 
in use in Nigeria are of the Japanese model. The trade 
brought in what could be rightly referred to as the 
motorcycle revolution in Nigeria.
Japanese motorcycles which replaced the bicycle as the most 
simple mode of transportation have both social and cultural 
significance in Nigeria. In some traditional communities, 
it has replaced the use of Raleigh bicycles as evidence of 
self-actualization and economic clout at communal rites of 
passage. Arriving first in small engine types like the 
Honda Benly, it expanded to include powerful models like 
the Yamaha CB200 and the Honda CD195. Among the ladies in 
Eastern Nigeria, Yamaha*s C50*s have since replaced the 
Mobylette as the dominant form of social acquisition. 
Particularly in Nnewi, it is an essential ingredient in 
almost every compound. Its socio-economic utility have 
since increased and with the present economic difficulties 
faced by Nigeria, it has overtaken the common Peugeot taxi, 
as the dominant form of transport in many states. (In 
Cross-River and Akwaibom States, the ratio of motorcycles 
to cars in public transport is about fifty to one). In
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Igboland, an area of very large industrial and commercial 
activity, (the largest of such concentration in Africa), 
they are commonly received as gifts. One of the legacies 
of the Japanese trade is indeed the veritable social 
revolution123 it brought with the exports of motorcycles.
Leaving this revolution aside, let us return to the pattern 
of trade which was now in consistent decline for both 
sides. Accordingly, we enter into the last period in our 
analysis which was marked by declining exports.
VII
ECONOMIC SLUMP AND THE DECLINE OF TRADE 1983-1985; THE
SURVIVING TREND
The three year period, 1983-1985, were the years not only
of the decline of Nigeria-Japanese trade, but of the
beginning of a pattern which has survived to become the
dominant characteristic of present trade. The three year
period were the worst years in Nigeria's export trade with
Japan since its independence in 1960. This followed not
only the slump in petroleum prices, but the complete
disappearance of crude oil from the trade with the
Japanese. At $6,706 million in 1983, $7,012 million in
1984 and $5,832 million in 1985, Nigeria's total export
figures represent in their totality, the complete failure
to diversify or expand exports in the twenty-five years of
trading relationship. On the Japanese side, the reduction
in export earnings reflected the general trend in Nigeria's
external trade and is in no way an exclusive phenomenon.
139
The Japanese export earnings decreased as the volume of 
commodities traded contracted. In 1983, the trade figure 
of $567,805 million was a decrease of 47 per cent below 
1982, while the $445,518 million accumulated in 1984 
represented a further fall of 78.5 per cent below 1983. In 
the same vein, the trade figure of $342,029 million earned 
in 1985124, the last date in the period under consideration 
was a decrease of 23.2 per cent below the previous year.
Another significant development in the trade of these years 
was the change in the nature of Japanese investments and 
the disappearance altogether of new ventures. This change 
from the fairly diversified trend of investments noticeable 
in Japanese Nigerian ventures since November 1961, to a 
concentration on construction sector oriented investments 
is only remarkable as an attempt to adapt to the effects of 
the downward turn in the Nigerian economy. Thus Chiyoda 
Chemical Engineering of Japan which opened its Nigerian 
office in 1983 as well as Toda Construction^ effort in the 
same year were all for the execution of previous contracts 
(see Fig.3(i)). Chiyoda, which most noticeably epitomises 
this trend, did so to complete the biggest Japanese 
contract ever in Nigeria —  the construction of the Kaduna 
Petroleum refinery and petro-chemical plants, which was 
then the largest in Nigeria. The only noticeable exception 
was Matsushita Electric*s partnership with UAC of Nigeria, 
(part of the giant European multinational, Unilever) in 
setting up National Panasonic (Nigeria) Ltd, ostensibly to
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tap the still booming audio and video equipment trade in 
Nigeria. (It is noteworthy that National brand of
electronics are the most widely used brand in Nigeria).
Since this 1983 investment, no Japanese investment was
recorded until the end of the period, 1985. This trend, a 
complete departure from the trend in Japanese investment in 
Nigeria, most clearly demonstrate the adaptive capability 
of the Japanese foreign trade.
The ever widening difference in the trading accounts of the 
two nations in the twenty-five years under study was
largely one of diversity of economy. The result of a chasm 
between the failure of policy that resulted in static and 
non-expansive exports built largely upon a fragile single 
commodity; and a dynamic forward looking export-orientated 
economy. It was not simply the difference between a 
dependent and a highly industrialised economy. Rather, it 
shows one nation*s inability to develop its resources and 
articulate its interests. We do agree with Professor 
Nurkse that the attraction of advanced living standards, 
(which is a major reason for Nigeria*s increased demands 
for Japanese consumer goods which accounted for the huge 
trade deficit) is an obstacle to the late-comers in 
economic development.125 This demonstration effect, or the 
'Backwash theory' in Gunnar Myrdal's analysis, is a valid 
explanation. However, planning for economic growth is 
merely postponing present consumption for the future. It 
is only appropriate policies and the discipline exercised
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in their execution that can guarantee a leap to a developed 
system. Trade policies should therefore strike a balance 
between demand, especially for non-capital goods, and 
supply for economic development. Very often the 
discrepancy between excessive demand and expenditure on 
luxury consumer goods, and savings and available income for 
capital growth causes a major problem, and leads to 
asymmetry in trade, as we have shown.
Some may argue that this is not the case in Japan-Nigeria 
trade in the period and that the overwhelming feature of 
the relationship was a clear example of the willingness of 
the developed economies to exploit the weaker economies of 
the globe. The deepening poverty in much of the developing 
nations makes this position one which cannot be ignored. 
The debate engendered is continuous and very central to our 
analysis. The issues involved are treated especially in 
Chapter Four and subsequent chapters of this thesis.
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CHAPTER THREE
JAPANESE FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY.
1961-19831
As set out in the introduction, it is possible to determine 
the contribution of a developed economy to the growth 
process of a developing economy by the use of such 
indicators as investments. Such forms of capital transfer 
are indispensable to the capital accumulation process in 
Southern economies. In "new states" like Nigeria where 
external contacts often preceded independence, it is 
possible to isolate the contribution of any one nation. 
This task may be possible through examing data indicating 
the amount of injected capital, the ratio of investments 
compared to imports and other invisible earnings and the 
contribution to infrastructural developments in the form of 
capital projects, and so on. But since serious structural 
distortions exist in the host economy, the use of the first 
two indicators is severely handicapped. In this case, the 
developed economy's contribution to infrastructural 
developments, especially those which directly impinge on 
national growth plans, may serve as the only basis for any 
meaningful assessment of this contribution.
These parameters indicated above, will be applied in our 
assessment of Japan's contribution to the growth and 
developmental efforts of Nigeria. Without question, ours 
is a very incomplete analysis. Any reasonably complete 
model would need additional variables to account for such
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a contribution to the growth process.2 However, the primary 
focus here is on investments and the transfer of technology 
through such contractual obligations that are related to 
developmental plans. This contribution is suggestive of 
the benefit of the guest economy's specialisation. But 
since many other economies fall into the same category, it 
is more indicative of the willingness of the industrialised 
economy to provide services at more competitive rates while 
extending to the host the benefits accruing from its 
industrial specialisation. It thus helps to conserve the 
scarce resources of the host economy and at the same time, 
provides it with technological knowledge. These
considerations are very important, and are the standards of 
judgement to be used in our analysis.
I
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CAPITAL TRANSFERS IN NORTH-SOUTH 
RELATIONS: JAPAN AND NIGERIA. 1961-1983
It is conventional economic wisdom that private foreign
capital investment is regarded as one of the yardsticks for
measuring the degree of economic cooperation and national
transformation in North-South relations. Such investment
in Southern economies is usually related to the politics of
North-South trade. Investment is therefore not only
important because of these underlying factors but also
because, as we have pointed out, they are indispensable to
the capital accumulation process in developing economies.
Perhaps because of these considerations, the issue is not
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free of controversy. On one hand, the belief is that such 
international income transfers merely serve as an effective 
way of draining resources from developing economies. On 
the other, the possible disruptive effects of the outward 
flow is used to suggest otherwise.
The participation of Northern economies in the growth 
process of the South is further affected by the state of 
international relations which sometimes creates a highly 
unfavourable environment for investors. This objection to 
foreign capital movements may take the form of stringent 
legislation to restrict immigration and other forms of 
foreign economic participation. There are various examples 
of these kinds of controls in many marginal economies but 
they were mostly apparent in the trade and industrial 
policies of the centrally planned economies. In Bertil 
Ohlin's view, legislation imposing restrictions on 
immigration and international capital movements naturally 
exercises an enormous influence on economic development.3
In the Southern states as elsewhere, the types of policies 
chosen in response to foreign capital transfers depend very 
largely on developmental strategy and market philosophy.4 
Restrictions and other regulatory barriers may be offset by 
favourable conditions like low labour costs (see 
Goldsbrough1s analysis.5) Generally however, Southern 
governments have tended to pursue liberal economic policies 
and have sought to attract capital from abroad mostly to
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finance much needed infrastructure. As these investments 
involve the transfer of a package of resources, technology 
and managerial expertise, they may indeed exercise an even 
greater impact on the recipient countries* productive 
capabilities.6
In the North, capital transfers to the South usually depend 
on the risk factor. It goes without saying that 
profitability is the overwhelming motive. The
attractiveness of location is also an important 
consideration. However, profitability in such investments 
depends to a large extent on the existence of a stable 
economic environment. In order to increase the
attractiveness of developing economies to foreign capital 
and encourage private investments, some Northern 
governments have developed risk-offsetting incentives. In 
Japan, insurance options cover such risks.
In Nigeria-Japanese relations, the latter*s investments 
have played a key role in the development of relations 
between the two nations. This is as a result of favourable 
economic conditions virtually guaranteeing recoupment of 
investments by such Northern ventures. These conditions 
include the large market potentiality of the Nigerian 
economy. The demands of the vast population (about 88 
million) far outstrip the capabilities of local production, 
thus ensuring that foreign companies engaged in the 
production of necessary consumer goods readily find a
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market to absorb their supplies. JETRO conceded this point 
at Nigeriafs independence in 1960 when it projected that 
Nigeria would provide a ready market for Japanese goods 
(see page 78). Another crucial factor that has determined 
the flow of investments from Japan is what we may refer to 
as the petro-dollar factor. Nigeria is the sixth largest 
producer of petroleum resources. The two world energy 
crises, 1973 and 1979, benefitted Nigeria? there was now an 
abundant availability of foreign exchange necessary for the 
procurement of infrastructure goods. As Japan is heavily 
dependent on imported raw materials, not merely oil, the 
availability of Nigeria*s raw materials also greatly 
affected capital movements in form of private investments. 
Japan at this period needed to diversify its sources of raw 
materials.
Since 1960, the Nigerian government has also pursued an 
open-door policy with respect to foreign trade and 
investments.7 It has followed this up with the provision 
of attractive tax and tariff incentives.8 Japanese and 
other foreign firms investing in Nigeria thus enjoy a major 
advantage. A principal benefit accruing to those engaged 
in the manufacture of consumer goods for domestic 
production is the fact that many of their products fall 
within the protection of infant industries scheme under the 
import-substitution policy of the Nigerian government.
Since Japan pursues an active foreign investment policy
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with insurance policies to cover investments in developing 
economies while favourable conditions indicated above have 
existed in Nigeria, investments have flowed freely to the 
latter between 1961-1983. As Japanese trade contacts 
preceded the attainment of political autonomy in 1960, some 
investments, especially those undertaken during 1960-1970, 
were necessary to protect a monopoly of trade already in 
place. Such investment was also necessary in order to 
circumvent the strictness of colonial and immediate post­
independence protectionism. In other words, some of these 
investments were tariff-hopping industries.
In any study of Japanese investments in Nigeria, especially 
from the point of view of the importance of North-South 
cooperation, attention must be focused, whether one makes 
a qualitative or quantitative assessment, on the business 
environment in Nigeria. From the discussion above, it 
would appear that conditions for investment were almost 
ideal. However, this is not completely true. For a start, 
Africa is viewed in Japan as a bad risk.9 Conditions also 
existed in Nigeria which may have discouraged investors. 
The political arena is one of recurrent instability. The 
threat of a military coup d'etat and dictatorships has been 
an inherent, almost endemic prospect. The economic 
policies of the military usurpers as well as those of the 
civilian governments when they have been privileged to 
exist, have amounted to no more than a pot-pourri of 
ideologies ranging from left of centre utopian socialism to
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anarchic capitalism of the far right. They have never 
converged into a sustainable national policy.
The chaotic effect on foreign capital movements cannot be 
over-emphasised: the framing of necessary economic
policies such as tariff and investment laws tend to be 
dictated by the erratic whims and selfish caprices of the 
particular groups in power. Corruption, of a form truly 
unique in character, has also been the hallmark of the 
various administrations and it is not unusual to find 
officials blocking business opportunities for want of a 
"facilitating fee".10 Bertil Ohlin's point that "direct 
foreign investment in new facilities in a country with a 
relatively inefficient and not quite honest administration 
is less attractive than a country where there is less risk 
of arbitrary or Negative* intervention by the 
administration"11, is very appropriate and must be taken 
into account in any analysis, especially of the context of 
North-South relations.
II
THE PATTERN OF INVESTMENTS 
Japanfs foreign capital participation in Nigeria started 
immediately after Nigeria's independence. First on the 
investment scene was Nishizawa, a medium-sized 
merchandising firm from Osaka and a specialist in African 
trade. Its operations took off with ten Lagos based 
staff.12 Having pioneered the way, other companies
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followed and the tide of investments soon rose rapidly. 
These investments were part of a carefully planned economic 
strategy, well co-ordinated and brilliantly executed, 
designed to ensure the maximisation of both capital returns 
and especially the dominance of particular sectors of the 
Nigerian economy. They were to ensure the smooth and an 
uninterruptible flow of raw materials needed by the 
Japanese economy. This latter consideration flowed from an 
aspect of foreign policy towards Africa which was actively 
pursued from the early seventies as part of resource 
diplomacy. Investments were also made in local substitutes 
for Japanese imports since the protective import 
substitution policy of the Nigerian government meant a 
decline in direct imports. The availability of cheap 
labour not only made this an attractive option but 
guaranteed economies of scale for international 
competition.
The investments follow the easily discernible pattern of 
Japanese foreign investments identified in the work of 
Chikara Higashi and Peter Lauter.13 According to this 
study, in the period 1960-1970, Japanese investments were 
resource-related. Where manufacturing investments were 
made, the motives were to circumvent protectionist import 
substitution policies. From the 1970s, the study 
continued, most investments in developing countries went 
into manufacturing since the success of the systematic 
resource and energy conservation policies pursued by the
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Japanese government had ensured that a stable supply of 
resources was no longer a dominant concern.
Japanese investments in Nigeria have also reflected Japan’s 
industrial priorities in different periods. Again, this is 
because over the years the types of industry overseas in 
which Japanese interests have invested have reflected the 
development of Japanese industry, as another study has 
shown.14
Thus, in the decade 1960-1970, Japanese investments were 
primarily to further the age-long domination of supply of 
two commodities' in Nigeria's import market. These 
commodities, namely cotton textiles and galvanised iron 
sheets represented at first, the dominant concentration of 
Japanese trade in Nigeria as they were in other places in 
the Japanese world trade at this period. Over time, they 
successfully came to dominate the supply of these 
commodities. As we have shown several times in preceding 
chapters, both the colonial administration and the new 
post-independence government had shown a willingness to 
severely limit Japan's exports of the aforementioned 
commodities. To circumvent the strictness of
protectionism, to reduce production costs as well as to 
satisfy the Nigerian governments proclaimed desire for 
technology transfer, the Japanese found it more profitable 
to engage in local production. The most important 
consideration was that of cost benefit. In Nigeria, there
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was an ample, and what was judged to become a constant flow 
of local raw materials. It seemed that the rewards of such 
a situation were not far from Japanese calculations. Of 
the thirteen investments between 1960 and 1970, an 
overwhelming concentration (eight) were to safeguard these 
two products (see Table 3[i]).
The best illustration of the attempt to start producing 
certain commodities locally in order to overcome existing 
barriers imposed by the dual effects of import restriction 
and external competition could be seen in the establishment 
of textile plants. Starting with the first local 
investment, AfPrint (Nigeria) Ltd, in 1961, the Japanese 
rapidly threw a net around the industry incorporating five 
other firms. These firms were the Northern Textile 
Manufacturers set up in August 1962 and the Arewa Textiles 
established in April 1965. Others included the Nigeria 
Teijin Textiles Company, Woolen and Synthetic Textile 
Manufacturing, and Bhojsons Industries, all established in 
1970. Both the percentage ratio of capital invested (see 
Table 3[i]) and the production capacities of the various 
plants underscores the intention of the Japanese to 
dominate the market. The Northern Textile Manufacturing 
Company, for instance, is reputed to be the worldfs largest 
integrated blanket factory. By 1981, its production 
capacity had reached three million blankets per annum.15 
AfPrint also undertakes production on a grand scale. It 
produces and prints local designs on about three million
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metres of fabric every month.16
This pattern has been also followed closely by investments 
in the galvanised iron sheets industry. C. Itoh and 
Yodogawa Steel Works* Galvanising Industries Ltd, as well 
as Marubeni Corporation and Nippon Kokan*s Pioneer Metal 
Products dominated local production.
A noticeable phenomenon in the trade of the period is the 
decline in the imports of these two products from Japan —  
textile goods and galvanised iron sheets (see trading 
accounts in Chapter Two). The fall in textiles and 
galvanised iron imports which dominated Japanese exports 
prior to this date is indicative of a trend and some 
scholars like Ogunremi and Falola17, as well as Agbi, 
attribute this to a rise in indigenous production. Thus, 
to Agbi, the imports of Japanese textiles which fell as low 
as 84.8 per cent in 1968 were the result of the rapid rise 
in domestic output.18 However, both the evidence at our 
disposal and the circumstances of this period do not 
support this interpretation. Rather, they point to the 
fact that the Japanese were producing more of these 
products locally rather than exporting them to Nigeria 
direct.
Other extraneous factors also call the interpretation into 
question. First, the period under consideration was that 
of the Nigerian-Biafran Civil War, 1967-1970. This was a
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period in which all imports went into general decline. It 
is difficult to imagine any sudden jump in local 
production, especially at such short notice given the 
disruptive effects of the war. Further, with very few 
exceptions only cottage industries with exceedingly limited 
production capacities existed at this time. The new 
Japanese plants were Nigeriafs first truly modernised 
industrial machineries capable of sustaining production to 
any large scale. The pattern of Nigeria*s industrial 
growth also does not show evidence of any dramatic growth 
in both textiles and galvanised iron plants? both 
technologies which the nation did not possess at this time. 
Any sudden increment in textile output is also incompatible 
with the remarkable resurgence in Japanese exports 
witnessed after the war. Indeed, as Ojo confirms, 
Nigerians themselves were active —  increasing their 
ownership in the manufacturing sector which was virtually 
nil in 1960 to 30 per cent in 1967 —  but foreigners 
dominated the coveted import substitution industries and 
indeed, commerce as a whole.19 The argument by Agbi and 
others above is therefore not plausible. In Nigeria, 
textile output was almost entirely Japanese in origin.
These developments in Nigerian textiles and galvanised iron 
sector are not difficult to follow. They are clearly in 
line with the pattern in Japanese overseas investments in 
the period, 1960-1970. At this period, textiles and 
machinery industries including machine tools, electrical
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appliances and transportation machinery accounted for more 
than 20 per cent of all investments.20
The Japanese dominance of these two sectors was as 
remarkable as it was successful. With further investments, 
the lead of the 1960s was reinforced and the circle 
completed. By 1981 even though the total number of all 
firms engaged in textile manufacturing had risen to 12921, 
and the number in metal processing and fabrication to 
15222, the market was still overwhelmingly dominated by 
Japanese firms. In textiles for instance, the largest 
manufacturer of local fabrics, apart from the expensive 
Hollandais type still imported, are the Arewa, Afprint and 
General Cotton Mills? all Japanese owned or partly 
subscribed. The name of these plants, like UniLever's Omo 
synonymous with detergents, have become synonymous with 
textile fabrics. Afprint, for instance, operates the most 
popular textile market held every Tuesday at Isolo, Lagos. 
The event is usually like a weekly fair.
A similar pattern of concentration on particular sectors of 
the Nigerian economy was followed by Japanese investments 
in the period, 1970-1980. As we have pointed out earlier, 
this was a period when the Nigerian economy experienced 
rapid growth aided by oil exports. It therefore attracted 
the notice of foreign investors. Japanese investments were 
concentrated in the local assembly and sales of steel 
products, electrical equipment and machinery, and on data- 
based companies. This pattern was again, in keeping with 
the concentration of investments at this period in Japanese
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overseas ventures elsewhere. At this time, investments in 
machinery and industry accounted for 40 per cent and 
textiles less than 5 per cent of all Japanese foreign 
investments.
The investments in the manufacture of steel products were 
meant to supply the ever increasing demands for steel bars, 
steel tubes, steel rods and other secondary steel products 
like flats and wires for construction purposes. The 
electrical equipment plants were also set up for this 
purpose but more importantly to guarantee supply to the 
various electrical projects in progress during this period. 
(See later part of this Chapter) . Four marketing survey 
and data collection firms were established as information 
bases and supplied their parent companies with vital 
information pertaining to the state of the Nigerian 
economy. They further served to help MITI and its 
specialised organ, JETRO, formulate a relevant approach to 
the Nigerian market.
In the period 1981-83, the concentration of investments 
were in the local assembly of automobile machinery. As the 
trade figures show (pages 114, 133), the Nigerian imports 
of Japanese automobiles had experienced a positive trend, 
leading to sustained growth in car and motorcycle imports. 
As with textile exports in the 1960s, the exports of cars 
and motorcycles was met with various restrictive import 
measures and significantly this resulted in investment in 
local assembly plants. The need to establish local 
production however, brought the Japanese for the first
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time, into open competition with West German and French 
automakers who had dominated these markets. Thereafter, 
there began what has passed into Nigerian history as the 
politics of local assembly plants.
Since it is not the purpose of this thesis to wade into the 
murky waters of Nigerian policy making, or the reasons that 
made one nation's expertise more acceptable than the other 
even when it was more expensive to acquire, it will suffice 
here to say that Japanese applications to set up local 
assembly plants were rejected.
Having met without success in the bid for independent local 
assembly plants, Japanese firms went into partnership with 
already existing plants for the production of light trucks. 
These investments are not reflected in Table 3, since they 
were made as part input in other foreign firms. These 
efforts include? the Mitsubishi two tonne trucks assembled 
at the British Leyland plant, Ibadan? Toyota's two tonne 
pick-ups produced at Austria's Steyr-Daimler-Puch plant at 
Bauchi? and Isuzu Motor trucks produced at America's 
General Motors and the UAC (Unilever) of Nigeria's Niger 
Motors at Apapa. Nissan Motors Company and Nichimen 
Company have also a joint partnership for light truck 
production as does Toyo Kogyo Company (Mazda) and C. Itoh 
and Company.
Major investments were also recorded in the construction
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industry in the period under study. As mentioned earlier, 
investments in steel production and sales of electrical 
equipment were ostensibly to guarantee supply to the 
Japanese and other interests engaged in construction 
activities. These construction firms followed in the wake 
of the period in the Nigerian economy when such services 
were in very high demand and took a disproportionate share 
of all economic and commercial activities. They were 
mostly to complete part of the projects envisaged under the 
National Development plans. These projects mostly involved 
firms engaged mainly in civil engineering and general 
construction works. As directly evident in the trend of 
this period, the largest Japanese interest in Nigeria was 
the Chiyoda Chemical Engineering and Constructions local 
subsidiary, Chiyoda (Nigeria) Ltd. This was set up in 
order to undertake the construction of what was then, 
Nigeriafs largest petroleum refinery plant at Kaduna.
Investments in textile manufacturing and galvanised iron 
sheets production were continued in an attempt to 
consolidate earlier gains. The concentration of
investments in the whole of the period, 1961-1983 could 
therefore be said to be in four major areas? textiles, the 
production and sale of steel products, electrical equipment 
and machinery and the construction industry. The period 
also saw the establishment of assembly plants, mostly for 
the manufacture of motorcycles, trucks, outboard motor 
engines and buses. The concentration of all capital
169
transfers on these sectors were tied closely to the 
progress of the domestic economy. As the annual growth 
rate maintained steady increments —  the result of the 
relative boom brought about by the explosion of petroleum 
prices —  the largely agriculturally based ecnonomy needed 
technological expertise in the form of industrial machinery 
and equipment. These needs were there well before the 
sudden explosion of oil earnings in 1973, and were 
articulated in the First National Development Plan, 1962-
1968. What made the new development remarkable was that 
while that of the earlier period was an affirmation of a 
desire to modernise the economy, a phenomenom ever too 
readily seen in the policies of "new” states, the demands 
of the new period were backed by an effective purchasing 
power. The buoyant economy meant that institutions as well 
as individuals could more increasingly afford products of 
Japanese industrial manufacture, thus boosting demand. It 
also meant a rise in the construction sector demands and 
the establishment of Japanese service oriented companies.
It may be said, therefore, with a high degree of certainty, 
that Japanese investments were dictated by the state of the 
Nigerian economy which in turn determined both the 
distribution and the scale of investments. There were no 
attempts to develop new sectors in order to enhance the 
diversification of the Nigerian economy and help to provide 
for it a solid base for development. There were no 
considerations for investments in non-self liquidating
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sectors as the Japanese merely extended investment to cater 
for demand in consumer goods. There were also no attempts 
to develop new sectors as a base for global trading.
These investments were crucial to the development of 
certain sectors, and had an appreciable influence on the 
cumulative process of national growth, but the overall 
volume might have been insufficient for Nigeria*s 
development needs. From Japan*s Ministry of Finance 
figures, at the end of our period, there were 89 cases of 
investment estimated at an overall value of $157 million.23 
This figure represents an insignificant 0.1 per cent of 
current Japanese foreign investments. In terms of the 
progression of these investments and in direct 
international juxtaposition, the figures available show no 
tendency towards improvement. In 1969, there were 12 
recorded cases, worth $9,419 million. In 1982 there were 
83 cases at an estimated value of $156 million. While the 
progression between 1969 and 1982 is a per unit increment 
of 120 per cent, on the basis of calculation of monetary 
value, the latter period shows a decrease of about 7 per 
cent. This is not difficult to follow, as we have shown in 
previous analysis, the increments correspond to the period 
of rapid growth in the Nigerian economy. The rate of 
investments dropped following the latter trend of recession 
in the corresponding period.
Our second conclusion can best be drawn by comparing six
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representative developing nations. The table below (Fig. 
3[ii]) shows these figures in monetary, unitary and 
percentage values.24
Country Number of Monetary Percentage
Cases of Value Value of Total
Investment Investments
Liberia 740 $ 3,010 billion 2.2
Zaire 56 $ 282 million 0.2
Singapore 2042 $ 3,065 billion 2.2
Indonesia 1494 $ 9,218 billion 6.6
Panama 3059 $11,146 billion 8.0
New Zealand 246 $ 476 million 0.3
Thus, it is easy to see that Nigeria*s share of investments 
compares poorly with similar cases in other developing 
countries. It may be argued that some of the countries in 
the table above are classified as Newly Industrialising 
Countries, and by extension, possess more efficient 
productive systems. But Nigeria might seem to have 
deserved more investments because Japan*s trade and other 
returns from Nigeria would make up the difference in these 
terms.
Nigeria*s share of investments, however, follows closely 
the African pattern. In 1973, JETRO published its first 
whitepaper on international trade showing Japan's total 
investments in Africa during 1950-1970, at just over $92 
million. Of this figure, $58.6 million represented 
investments in mining.25 By the end of our period, 1985, 
the situation had changed very little. Japan's Ministry of 
Finance figures show 1,226 cases of investments worth
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$3,951 billion or 2.8 per cent of total overseas 
investments.26 Of this amount, investment in Liberia*s 
shipping took the lion*s share.
On the question why Japanese investments have remained 
relatively small in proportion to total overseas 
investments, the reason traditionally offered, as indeed 
for the rest of Africa, is the lack of political stability. 
Others include, the lack of financial experience required 
for the management of such ventures, the shortage of 
quality labour and the basic lack of infrastructural 
facilities; all which make investment a high risk.27 
Still, others point to Nigeria, and indeed, Africa*s lack 
of political leverage over Japan, the exceedingly limited 
knowledge about the continent in Japan, and the lack of a 
long standing historical relationship between the two 
countries.28 Geography is seen as a further limiting 
factor.29
The above explanations are excuses and not reasons, as we 
have shown, the post independence relationship was marked 
by a high level of activity. Especially, after 1974, 
Nigeria with its well developed tertiary educational system 
was in a position to offer qualified manpower as required. 
Other developments have also taken place within the context 
of the overall national development plans thereby removing 
several of the obstacles. Distance can only be considered 
in relation to trade since such remoteness between
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production and consuming centres are physical facts which 
have other repercussions.30 It cannot however, be offered 
as a reasonable explanation for the paucity of investments 
since the increasing globalisation of the world's 
commercial empire would make it untenable.
Apart from political instability which cannot be ignored, 
the real reason can be grasped from this reply by Mr 
Tsutsumi, Vice-leader of the Japanese Trade Mission at the 
17th International Trade Fair in Algiers, 1980. Answering 
the question whether Japan would invest more in Nigeria, he 
replied that "Japan's business main concern is business 
risk".31 Whether this was a risk arising from the factors 
cited above, or any other, the message was clear; the 
provision of a stable economic environment is central to 
international income transfers. As we have stated earlier, 
it was clear that conditions in Nigeria were far from 
ideal.
The above observations merely represent the features of 
Japanese investments. The debate over the issues involved 
belong to another theme and are treated in the next 
Chapter.
Ill
NATURAL RESOURCES AS A CRITICAL DETERMINING FACTOR IN 
JAPAN'S CAPITAL TRANSFERS. 1970-1983
One area of investment which clearly shows the need by the
Japanese for the acquisition of critical raw materials
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resources has been the energy sector. The absence of vital 
energy resources in Japan meant that petroleum and allied 
products which Nigeria produces in abundance not only 
attracted investments but also defined the nature of 
trading relations from the 1970s.
The lack of basic raw materials is a perennial problem 
facing the Japanese economy. As David Morris has observed, 
Japan is dogged by a dearth of domestic raw materials which 
leaves it 100 per cent dependent on imports for iron ore, 
tin, nickel, manganese, chromium, bauxite and oil. It is 
also dependant on external sources for 90 per cent of its 
supply of copper? about 70 per cent for lead and tungsten 
and 60 per cent for zinc. As a result of this, the 
securing of stable, diversified mineral and fuel supplies 
understandably forms a major plank in its international 
economic strategy.32
In the light of this critical need for energy sources, its 
"Economic and Social Development Plan, 1967-71", clearly 
defined the strategy. It proclaimed that;
"in order to modernise the industrial structure and to 
strengthen the international competitiveness of 
enterprises, it is necessary to secure a steady supply 
of cheap energy which is the basic material for all 
industry and for the peoples's livelihood.1,33
While Japanfs "New Economic and Social Development Plan, 
1970-1975", continued to emphasise the need for a steady
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supply of raw materials and especially, energy sources, it 
made special reference to the "maldistribution of the 
worldfs natural resources". It further lamented the 
"dominance over the resources by mammoth enterprises".34
This need for raw material resources is most critical in 
the energy sector. The rapid demand for energy in the wake 
of an unprecendented growth rate led to increasing 
dependence on imports, particularly oil. In the decade 
1960-1970, due to increased industrialisation the economy 
experienced nearly a three-fold rise in energy consumption. 
The rate of petroleum to total energy needs rose from an 
average base of 37.6 per cent in 1960 to 75.3 per cent in 
1971.35 As with the development of other natural 
resources, the Japanese turned from an earlier contentment 
with long term purchase deals to direct involvement in new 
overseas resource development.36 This change of policy was 
part of a new resource diplomacy37 as a result of the re- 
evaluation of foreign policy in the light of the energy 
crisis.
Japan's most critical energy need is for oil. 99.8 per 
cent of it is imported, representing 70 per cent of total 
primary energy supply38, (compared with 46 per cent in the 
United States, 50 per cent for West Germany, 43 per cent in 
the United Kingdom and 60 per cent for France) . Because of 
this, all available resources were deployed to secure its 
supply. As Yuan-Li Wu's study39 shows, the growth of
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Japan's oil industry was very rapid. While only four 
exploration firms were established between 1958 and 1965, 
an additional three were added in 1966 and five more in
1969. In the years immediately following the take-off of 
the new industrial policy, that is 1969-1974, the growth 
acquired a certain momentum and at once rapidly 
accelerated. In this period, new oil companies averaged 
between six and eight annually. A decisive step that 
boosted this development was MITI's decision in 1967 to 
form the Japan Petroleum Development Corporation (JPDC). 
This corporation was designed to help finance overseas 
ventures by syndicates of private interests through 
participation in risk capital and loan guarantees. Once 
the government took this initiative, it opened the way for 
the participation of the major financial and multinational 
groups. Companies like Mitsui, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi 
were drawn in and the growth of the industry was definitely 
assured. These giant financial houses acted as holding 
companies and direct operators of their own projects and 
this accelerated the development to no mean extent.
The need for these efforts made by the Japanese government 
and private interests had become most urgent and the need 
to diversify supply sources even more so. As Valerie 
York40 has shown, Japan imported about 40 per cent of its 
oil needs from Arab countries before the 1973 energy 
crisis. This did not only leave it particularly vulnerable 
but politically, it had been obliged to compromise its
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policy of "sekei bunci"? that is, separating trade from 
politics.41
By 1974, there were already six Japanese oil exploration 
firms in Africa. The Japan Petroleum Company (Nigeria) 
formed in 1970,42 and other activities by Mitsui Sekiyu 
Kaihatsu (Mitsui Petroleum Development Company) which 
secured a licence for off-shore drilling were the direct 
results of these efforts. These developments are important 
because until 1970, Japan*s crude oil imports from the 
whole of Africa were virtually nil. The first major 
shipment of African crude oil was therefore in this year 
when 2,772,000 kl of oil was shipped. This figure 
represented a paltry 1.3 per cent of Japan's total oil 
imports.43
At first, the intention was that the 100 per cent capital 
ratio investment in the Japan Petroleum Company (Nigeria) 
would form the primary basis for oil shipments from 
Nigeria. Mitsubishi oil company then made an arrangement 
to purchase 1.2 million kl of oil annually over a five year 
period from September 197l.44 The explorations which began 
in February 1972 were also designed as an effective 
insurance against possible fluctuations in oil supplies 
from other sources in Nigeria. The activities of the oil 
company, were most remarkable and firmly attest to the need 
by Japan for critical energy supplies from Nigeria. By 
1974, the company had sunk seventeen wells, some of them
between 2,600 to 2,700 metres below the seabed.45 
Unfortunately, only five of these wells met with any 
significant success and it became clear that the bulk of 
petroleum imports from Nigeria would have to come from 
other sources.
The situation above was further compounded by the sudden 
oil crisis of 1973. (This earned Japan the nickname 
"fragile blossom"). Imports of Nigerian crude oil
increased dramatically. The table below shows the value 
and Japan's percentage share of Nigeria's oil exports, 
between 1971-1985.46
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Fig. 3(iii)
Year Value (N million) Percentage Share
1971 9.0 1.0
1972 50.5 4.3
1973 94.5 5.0
1974 231.8 4.3
1975 157.7 3.3
1976 25.5 0.4
1977 — —
1978 — —
1979 0.8 ($ million) 0.002
1980 6.9 ($ million) 0.02
1981 148.5 1.4
1982 — —
1983 — —
1984 — —
1985 __
Note: Where no representations are made, it means that
no transactions took place in that year.
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As clearly evident from the figures above, the years 1973, 
1974, 1975 and 1981 were the peak periods in the Nigerian- 
Japanese oil trade. These years were essentially those in
which it was vit,:.al for Japan to make purchases of Nigerian
!
crude in order to help efforts geared to the recovery of 
its battered energy market. Since Japanfs primary concern 
was procuring oil, purchases took more than a proportionate 
share of all purchases in the trade of these years. The 
1973 figures represent 90.8 per cent of Nigerian exports 
while those for 1974 account for 96 per cent. For Japan, 
the 1972 and 1973 figures represent 2.4 and 2.7 per cent of 
total oil imports.47 Although the percentage figures in 
these years (of Japan1s total oil imports) were still very 
low it was a very high increment considering the value of 
oil imports prior to this period. It also represented a 
major increment in total earnings for Nigeria. The 1974 
shipment, made up of 6,005 barrels, was valued at $168
million.48
By 1977, the world energy market had stabilised and
Japanese firms found it more profitable to import from
traditional sources. Oil imports from Nigeria were
terminated until the demands by Nigeria to bridge the ever 
increasing trade gap and the second energy crisis forced 
Japan to re-negotiate supply sources. In order to overcome 
these difficulties, two companies, Idemitsu Kozan and 
Maruzen oil entered into contracts with Nigerian suppliers 
in 1980. This step was calculated to bring in a daily
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average of $500,000 in total earnings for Nigeria in the 
first half of the year. It must be emphasised however that 
Japanfs interest in Nigerian crude oil has not always been 
primarily that of a final consumer. "Oil produced is not 
destined for Japan's oil refineries but as a "swop" for 
other international oil producers more conveniently located 
supplies", as one study has demonstrated.49 This 
underlines the basic nature of Japan's overseas resource 
development strategy —  security of supply.50
Another sector which followed closely in line with resource 
related investments was the fishing industry. The rise in 
Nigeria's exports of foodstuffs —  shrimps, prawns, 
cuttlefish and lobsters —  which came to predominate as 
agricultural export productivity declined was the result of 
another carefully planned Japanese strategy. To ensure the 
availability of raw materials for the enormous Japanese 
fishing industry, large scale fishing activities were 
organised to secure catches off Nigerian coastal waters. 
As often to overcome difficulties arising from local 
legislation, the investments were based locally. It must 
be noted that Japanese firms have been fishing in Nigerian 
coastal waters since the 1940s.51 However, no serious 
attempt was made to sustain fishing as a major local 
industry or as a base for the procurement of raw materials 
resources until 1973.
In this year, the EKO (local name for Lagos) —  Nippon
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Fishing Company was formed. In 1974, Tokyo launched four 
new fishing trawlers for this company52, signalling the 
line to be pursued by Japan with reference to the fishing 
industry. This attempt was followed by further investments 
in the Osadjere Fishing Company for trawling, processing 
and freezing of marine products. (It is worth mentioning 
that the local holder in this company, Ibru Seafoods, is 
the largest producer of fish and fish products in Nigeria). 
The Japanese interest follows from the natural environment 
disposition that makes Nigerian coastal waters rich in 
shoals of mackerel and especially the Crustacea family —  
prawns, shrimps and lobsters. Products originating from 
these fishing activities were then processed and shipped to 
Japan in form of Nigerian exports. Prawns, lobsters and 
shrimps being mainly for re-export.53 In Japan, they were 
put to industrial use and with little transformation 
packaged into tins and brought back to Nigeria as exports. 
In 1978, Japanese exports to Africa increased 38.1 per cent 
because of large increases in tinned mackerel exports to 
Nigeria.
It is true of course, that the Japanese companies could not 
by themselves alone account for total shrimp, prawn and 
lobster and other fishery products emanating from Nigerian 
sources and taken in by Japan as imports. (By 1981, the 
total number of all companies engaged in this activity had 
risen to thirty) . However, it is important to note that 
Nigeria has no large-scale indigenous commercial fishing
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culture. Japan, on the other hand, has a highly developed 
fishing industry whose interests are deployed all over the 
world to harness specific catches. It is also worth noting 
that only the Japanese companies and a small number of 
other itinerant fishing trawlers, mostly from the former 
Soviet Union, undertake large scale industrial fishing
ventures here. Most of the local companies are engaged in 
food processing activities and even where their interests 
are occupied by commercial fishing, they are usually
organised as small scale business ventures selling to the 
big firms or to the local markets. Like other investments 
in textile manufacturing and steel production, the 
importance of the investments in the fishing industry does 
not lie in their number or their domination of the fishing 
industry but in their significance to the development of 
the trade between both nations.
From 1973 to 1985, Nigerian export figures indicated that 
a significant proportion of earnings resulted from the
exports of fishery products. Since the Japanese dominate 
fishing in Nigeria and generate most of the export 
products, it follows that in those years when these
products dominated or took a significant proportion of 
Nigerian exports (and the years were many) Nigeria in 
absolute terms did not record exports to Japan, save in a 
technical sense. As we have shown, this was a function of 
the failure of the domestic economy. (See Chapter Four). 
This failure is further symptomatic of the limits of the
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vertical structure in North-South trading relations: 
peripheral production weakens the advantage of 
participation in international division of labour.
IV
JAPANESE PRIVATE CAPITAL AND NIGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT PLANS.
1977-1982
In 1977, the government of Nigeria formally requested the 
government of Japan's help in realising the objectives set 
forth in its Third National Development Plan.54 The 
selection of capital projects below is designed not only to 
highlight the extent of this contribution but also to 
emphasise the level of collaboration between both nations.
In the development of Nigeria's primary export product, 
petroleum resources, the credit belongs to Japanese firms 
more than any other. They virtually account for the 
successful attainment of the nation's petroleum resources 
development strategy. These efforts began in 1977. As 
part of the Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the 
national company responsible for oil production and 
marketing invited Chiyoda Chemical Engineering and 
Construction to handle a contract for the design, 
engineering, procurement, construction and the 
commissioning of a 100,000 BPD grass roots petroleum 
refinery at Kaduna. The contract for the refinery,
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Nigeria's third and largest, designed to increase the 
refining capacity of the country by 62.5 per cent, was 
worth $900 million.55 After completing this refinery, the 
company was awarded another contract for the construction 
of gas and power plants at the same site. It currently 
holds the contract for the supply of spare parts, plants 
maintenance and the training of staff at the refinery.
Another major refinery, the Warri refinery was also 
completed with the company's assistance. It was
responsible for the construction of the plant's H.C.C. 
unit. Marubeni Corporation also installed a gas turbine 
power station for the NNPC at the same site. This plant 
has the same formation as NEPA's Delta IV project at Warri. 
(See below).
The Construction of Nigeria's largest and most modern 
refinery, NNPC's Port Harcount refinery, was further 
undertaken by two Japanese firms? JGC Corporation and 
Marubeni Corporation. This 150,000 BPD plant is the latest 
in Nigeria's efforts at the diversification of petroleum 
resources. Since Petroleum resources account for about 96 
per cent of Nigeria's total exports, these projects are 
highly strategic and contribute to the growth of the 
national economy. They have also been indispensable for 
the effective use of petroleum resources and the cross- 
linkage of national resource development. NAFCON's 
fertiliser complex phase 1 (see below) for instance,
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utilises the Port Harcourt refinery products. Its 
development, almost exclusively by the Japanese, is 
therefore a measure of the contribution of the developed 
economy to the growth process in the South.
Japan's contribution to the development of electricity 
supplies for Nigeria is also indicative of the extension to 
the South, of the benefits of industrial advantage. Again, 
almost exclusively, this cooperation started in 1978 when 
the first in what was to become a major involvement began. 
In that year, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries won a $7.5 
million contract to supply the National Electric Power 
authority (NEPA) with power station floodgates. Mitsubishi' 
Electric also secured a similarly valued contract for 
transformer supply. In 1980, Mitsubishi Corporation was 
contracted to construct six new power sub-stations in the 
Oshogbo and Lagos areas. This deal was valued at £11.6 
million. The breakthrough for these firms however came in 
1981 when Marubeni Corporation together with Hitachi and 
Bouygues secured government approval to build a 1,200 MW 
thermal power station at Igbin, Lagos state. At an 
estimated cost of $818.2 million, this plant, was the 
biggest in West Africa. The Japanese firms secured this 
contract against competition from eleven other 
international companies which included General Electric of 
the United States and Siemens of West Germany. The 
consortium of Marubeni Corporation, General Electric and 
Taisei Corporation also won the contract for the
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construction of Nigeria*s Delta IV gas turbine power 
station at Warri. This contribution to Nigeria*s urban and 
rural electrification project is a continuous one. 
Maruberi Corporation is the principal supplier of 
transformers for NEPA's various distribution systems. 
Their assistance is crucial and bears directly on national 
development as a stable supply of electricity is an 
indispensable factor of growth. (The World Bank World 
Development Report gives an adequate illustration of the 
effect of the lack of this vital infrastructural 
requirement.56) This assistance should be further
appreciated when considered that the installed capacity of 
the Egbin and Warri plants will cover almost all the 
domestic demand for electricity supply, according to the 
projections of the federal government.
In the field of communications, Japan's assistance has also 
been as vital as in the fields highlighted above. In 1968, 
Nigeria first solicited help for the realisation of its 
telecommunications programme.57 For the take-off of this 
system, Nippon Telecommunications Company was chosen as 
consultant with a $16.5 million project. Marubeni 
Corporation then secured government approval for installing 
a $72.7 million valued microwave communications network in 
the southwest (Sumitomo Electric carried out wiring and 
construction while Nippon Electric undertook the 
manufacturing and installation of equipment.) Nisho-Iwai 
was also chosen to build a co-axial cable between Lagos and
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Kaduna.
The development of steel mills is central to Nigeria*s 
development programmes. In this direction, Japanese help 
was also important. In 1978, Kobe Steel Corporation and 
Nisho Iwai were chosen to complete a rod and bar rolling 
mill at Katsina. The cost of the project was valued at £77 
million.
It is however in the development of Nigeria*s agriculture 
that the effect of this cooperation have been most readily 
felt. This is because of the nature of the projects and 
the direct involvement of the Japanese government. As we 
have demonstrated, the discovery of crude oil led to the 
neglect of agricultural production and consequently, to 
high expenditure on food importation. From the mid 1970s, 
the nation designed programmes for sustained food 
production in order to correct this anomaly. As part of 
this programme, two Japanese firms; C. Itoh and Taisei 
Corporation, were contracted to develop 5,000 hectares of 
paddy fields in the lower Anambra River in Anambra State.58 
(Nippon Koei was in charge of engineering). The Import- 
Export Bank of Japan, EXIM, provided part funding for this 
project which was valued at $61.6 million. This EXIM led 
project is an illustration of the involvement of Japanese 
banks in foreign policy and overseas investment pointed out 
by Spindler.59
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Japanese firms were also heavily involved in the 
development of the agro-allied sector. As part of 
Nigeria*s agricultural policy is the provision of subsidies 
to farmers in the form of free fertilizers, it has over the 
years spent a lot of scarce resources on this importation. 
An indigenous fertiliser plant was therefore regarded as 
imperative for the realisation of the policy of increased 
food production. To this end, the National Fertiliser 
Company was formed and a chemical fertiliser complex 
envisaged at Onne, Rivers State. To bring this project to 
fruition, the help of a consortium of three Japanese and 
two American firms were sought. Joined with MW Kellogs and 
Jacobs Engineering (USA) were Marubeni Corporation, 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Nisho Iwai Corporation. The 
Japanese share of this project was worth $100 million.
The importance of these two projects in the agricultural 
sector cannot be overemphasised. The Anambra Irrigation 
Project (which includes a rice milling factory) is not only 
Japan's biggest project to date, but more importantly, it 
makes it possible to harvest rice three times annually. 
The NAFCON project is being developed for the export 
market.
Other Japanese firms60 were also as part of Nigeria's 
nation building process. Some of these efforts are not 
mentioned owing to constraints of space but such 
selectivity identifies only those projects which contribute
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to the growth of the national economy. This would help us 
fulfil the objective set out at the beginning of the 
thesis; that is, to determine the contribution of Japan to 
the economic growth and development of Nigeria.
These Japanese contracts61 do not in any way represent an 
unusual event. At this time, governmental largesse was a 
free for all affair. In fact, several other companies from 
other nations also won similarly valued contracts for 
projects ranging from utopian satellite stations to a 
never-realised metroline system. Indeed we do not wish to 
attach any significance to the qualifications bearing on 
contract awards, the politics of which was part of an 
intricate system of patronage and runaway corruption. The 
significant consideration is that some of the Japanese 
projects —  the steel rolling mill, the refineries and the 
Onne fertilizer complex —  were projects on which the 
success of the National Development Plans hinged. That the 
Japanese firms completed all projects on time and at 
initial cost estimate helps to underline this commitment to 
Nigeria*s national development. This is because it has not 
been the usual practice of foreign firms in Nigeria. Many 
other projects of like importance assigned to other firms 
were never completed. Often, these firms plead spiralling 
costs and indulge local officials in an orgy of bribery 
allowing them to delay the projects ad infinitum. The 
Ajaokuta Steel rolling mill, still uncompleted after more 
than a decade and the abandoned Lagos Metroline project are
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but a tiny fraction of the number of these uncompleted or 
abandoned projects. An exception to rule, the Japanese 
practice is not only highly commendable but exemplary of 
the way in which an industrialised country's commitment can 
help a nation's developmental efforts.
V
NATIONAL TRANSFORMATION. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND 
THE SUCCESS OF JAPANESE FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENTS
It is difficult to advance full reasons without appropriate 
statistical data (the availability of which is as yet 
currently short on hard and reliable information) to 
explain the overwhelming success of Japan's financial 
interests and business activities in Nigeria. The 
difficulties arising from such an exercise are onerous. 
The predicament results from such questions as, "what 
constitutes the measure of this success?" and, "against 
what is this success measured?". Answers to the above may 
be only approximate. However, an approach which we would 
like to follow in the light of the interests of all foreign 
ventures, is one which would serve as a yardstick for 
measuring the level of commitment to the local economy. 
Success in the context of international competition is also 
an important consideration. A study of Japanese interests 
in Nigeria brings out the following characteristics.
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Pioneering efforts. A factor closely allied to the overall 
success of Japan in the world economy is that business 
interests in Nigeria often pioneered the opening of new 
sources of raw material supplies. They also revolutionised 
existing fields with modern technology. Where essential 
raw materials are lacking, they usually coordinate other 
interests around the globe to make them locally available. 
Mitsui, for instance, has a factory making Coca-Cola 
bottles. The acquisition of caustic soda, an essential 
component was not only problematic but very expensive. It 
was also very difficult to transport from traditional 
sources in the United States. After years of careful 
investigation, it discovered other sources in the 
continent. Consequently, it pioneered the development and 
the regular shipment of caustic soda from Kenya to Nigeria 
around the Cape. It has thus solved the problem of 
external sourcing of this material which is also used for 
other industrial purposes.
Another important factor has been the keen attention paid 
to the specific needs of the local market. They were often 
able, no doubt in the latter period (after 1970) helped by 
the various data collection companies, to assess prevailing 
local tastes and to match their production to suit this 
exactly. The remarkable success achieved in the marketing 
of textile products clearly illustrates this point.
Textile products are in great demand in Nigeria partly
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because of cultural variety (over 250 ethnic groups), as 
well as the large population. Bafts and drills, unbleached 
and bleached; drills dyed in piece; prints and coloured 
woven materials are the types generally in need. After 
independence cotton prints began to predominate popular 
tastes. In the North, the unbleached grey baft is the 
material most commonly used for traditional "riga" and 
"babariga” (long flowing gowns). While in the South, among 
the Yorubas, it is used in the important indigo-dyeing 
industry which produces an apparel fabric commonly known as 
"adire".62 In the colonial period, the bleached bafts and 
drills which made up the largest category of textile 
imports were used for shirts and other household purposes.
As post World War II nationalism gathered pace, there was 
a reversion to traditional wear63 and this required more 
yards of clothing than European style designs. While the 
United Kingdom manufacturers could not meet these demands 
(the colonial government expressed regret over this64) , 
alternative sources from Latin America were too expensive. 
Japan was able to exploit this situation by supplying the 
types of materials needed with the specific requirement and 
at relatively lower prices (see page 36) . Spurred on by 
the 1954 agreement, it was able to sustain mass exportation 
of this product. It was then able to displace Britain as 
the major supplier of piece goods. At Nigeria's 
independence their share further increased. With the new 
local plants set up in deference to the post independence
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policy of import substitution, this lead became almost 
unassailable. As we previously noted, the supply of 
textile materials is still firmly with the Japanese 
interests and their names have become synonymous with the 
products they sell.
Perhaps, the real impact of the Japanese textile ventures 
is the revolutionary effect on domestic production. In 
1962, according to Hopkins,65 only about 8% of textile 
products intended for local consumption were produced by 
traditional hand weavers. By 1980, the year of the latest 
Japanese venture, Nigeria had not only become self 
sufficient in textile production but could export to 
neighbouring markets.
Another aspect of this success is the willingness to train 
and use local manpower resources at all levels. These 
companies often send Nigerians for training in Japan. 
Since the Nigerian government pursues a policy of 
indigenisation of manpower, the companies are seen as 
desirable friendly companies which exercise conscientiously 
their corporate responsibilities to the host nation. A few 
examples will suffice.
When Chiyoda secured the contract for the Kaduna refinery, 
it opened a technical training School for Nigerians on the 
site. According to the records, this School produced a 
thousand capable welders, boiler makers, pipe fitters,
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instrument fitters, electricians and other technical 
staff.66 To execute its contract, Kobe Steel trained 94 
Nigerian inspectors at its steelworks and other facilities 
in Japan. This training of skilled local manpower helped 
the company complete the Katsina Steel Rolling Mill ahead 
of schedule. Apart from using these skills to these 
Companys* advantage, these individuals had acquired life­
long skills. This may not seem important but it will be 
better appreciated when considered that in the execution of 
contracts by foreign firms, this is the exception not the 
rule. Other foreign companies especially Western European 
firms prefer to use their nationals, except for manual 
jobs. The belief by Nigeria that in such technical 
cooperation lay the hope for the acquisition of much needed 
technological skills is therefore amply justified by the 
Japanese.
Another case complements the above. After the completion 
of the Lagos Thermal Power Station, Hitachi left behind one 
of its staff, Mr Hayashi, who worked as the construction 
manager, to design and implement an effective technical 
training programme. The scheme designed was so successful 
that presently there is no single Japanese engineer on the 
staff at the station. For his success, the community 
recommended Mr Hayashi for a chieftaincy title. "Chief 
Hayashi" became the first Japanese chief in Nigeria.
Another employer, Mr Hideo Uchiyama of Suzuki Motor Company
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attached to Bolous Enterprises Ltd (Suzuki*s local plant) 
as factory manager, is a further example of Japanese 
efforts at improving local technical expertise. The 
longest serving employee of all Japanese local interests, 
Bolous* unique "Nagara System'* which he instituted is now 
a byword for quality control. The Ministry of
International Trade and Industry have since honoured Mr 
Uchiyama in recognition of his efforts at technology 
transfer.67
A further example highlights this commitment to developing 
highly qualified manpower resources. When the Northern 
Textile Mills was set up in 1962, there were thirty-five 
Japanese nationals working as advisers and technical 
assistants. The holding company planned this as 
transitional phase and accordingly it received Nigerians 
for training in Japan. Progressively, the company became 
truly indigenised and by 1982, not a single Japanese person 
could be found in the textile plant.68 This is generally 
the practice followed by all the Japanese ventures in 
Nigeria. It is a refreshing example of a developed 
country's commitment to help the industrialisation efforts 
of a developing nation and a relevant attestation of North- 
South cooperation.
As mentioned earlier, this is an exception to the rule 
followed by Western European and American business 
interests in Nigeria. These firms are very much addicted
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to a policy of "ourselves alone”. The case of the French 
firm, Michelin, epitomises the point. This company has a 
tyre manufacturing plant at Port Harcourt. Following the 
complaint made by some local employees, its activities were 
investigated. It was found that not only was there an 
entrenched "Europeans only" policy but there was in 
existence at the plant, a French version of apartheid. The 
report concluded that there was a definite pattern of 
discrimination against local expertise and that the company 
had by far exceeded its expatriate quota.69
UniLever*s UAC of Nigeria, the oldest commercial enterprise 
and once the government of Nigeria, is also not free of 
such practices. They have a policy of retaining the office 
of the vice-chairperson exclusively for European officials. 
In most cases, these persons act as "defacto" chairperson 
building up local power bases for themselves. Some of them 
have even taken local chieftaincy titles.70 Their position 
in the company is further strengthened by the fact that the 
office of the Head of Finance is also UniLever controlled. 
The Board of Directors is also usually weighted to their 
favour and not to local investors. The company admits that 
this is essential to protect the interests of its largest 
investor, UniLever, and insists that their records in 
developing local manpower by far surpass their major 
competitors, all European firms.71 Indeed, this is true. 
The records of the SCOA, CFAO and John Holt, among others, 
leaves nothing to be desired. Summed up by U. Joy Ogwu, it
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was simply the case that Japan has sought to provide for 
Nigeria technological support which the greater Western 
powers like the United States and Britain have been 
reluctant to supply.72
Attention to detail is another reason why the Japanese 
ventures have succeeded. Often they study the problems 
encountered by previous suppliers as well as other 
competitors and spend a considerable time searching for 
suitable local agents. Their automobile and motorcycle 
trade is one area which bears this out. As we have shown, 
most of their distributors and link firms were already 
established manufacturers like British Leyland. As in 
other areas, they cut production to suit local tastes, 
often selling mass useable brands at relatively cheaper 
prices. The case of Datsun's Panel Van and the Volkswagen 
Beetle illustrates this point. When the panel van was 
introduced, the selling price was lower than the popular 
Beetle and the sales of the latter dropped. The company 
(Volkswagen of Nigeria) then complained to the government 
and the importation of the panel van was banned. The 
reason was that Volkswagen needed no local competitor since 
it had a local assembly plant in which the hope for the 
development of Nigeria's indigenous car lay. These hopes 
have since turned out to be another "mhlakaza delusion". 
Volkswagen has terminated the production of the "love bug" 
in Nigeria. Before this, the initial price of Nl,500 had 
jumped to about N45,000 making its claims to the peoples'
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car simply ludicrous. Even with this unfair competition 
arising from the advantage enjoyed by Volkswagen and 
Peugeot in their local plants, the Japanese employed other 
means and persisted. As we have shown, their car imports 
increased dramatically. In fact, their buses monopolised 
mass transportation in the period 1975-1985. The Nissan 
types, Urvan and the "E" series displaced the American Ford 
buses and until the end of our period, very much 
predominated.
Efficient after sales and spare parts service secured both 
this market and the electronics market. In electronic 
sales, as in other parts of the world, the name Japan has 
become synonymous with the products. Indeed, the general 
idea of a Japanese in Nigeria is one who has all sorts of 
electronic gadgets coming out of his ears. Their penchant 
for the sleek and portable with affordability further 
advanced this superiority over other designs. A specialist 
electronics market at Alaba, Lagos State, is the fair for 
Japanese electronics. Backed by an efficient after sales 
service they are quick to respond to adverse situations. 
All the major electronic companies have major technical 
departments in Lagos. Hitachi1s Technical Department and 
National Panasonic are the best examples of this back-up 
service. The latter has excellent mobile after-sales 
service provided for by the UAC of Nigeria*s Perabeam. The 
reasons behind the advantage enjoyed by these products have 
been attested to.73 Nigerians, like many others around the
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globe, simply found the blend of quality with state-of-the- 
art design and low cost, irresistible.
This success is however not unqualified. In the sale of 
automobiles they have sometimes employed underhand methods. 
They sometimes collude with unscrupulous local agents to 
cut the grounds from under the feet of their competitors, 
circumvent regulations and enhance their position. In 
1978, for instance, the total number of Japanese cars 
imported was 46,132. From the government records, this 
figure far exceeded the total number of vehicles from all 
sources approved for importation.74 It would seem that the 
Japanese were prepared to use all means possible, including 
smuggling, to secure the market for themselves.
This would also appear to be the case in the galvanised 
iron sheets sector. In 1982, some manufacturers belonging 
to the galvanised iron sheets manufacturing association, 
(GISMAN) claimed that the Japanese firms were involved in 
a deliberate policy of smuggling. This concerned the 
illegal importation of more than 200,000 tons of iron 
sheets estimated to worth N100 million.75 As the claim 
goes, this activity took place over a two year period, 
1980-1982. The government ignored this claim and neither 
of its specialised agencies nor the department of customs 
and excise investigated it.
Since the latter case passed without proof, it may well be
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suggested that it is an example of a familiar ruse used by 
local manufacturers to undermine foreign competition. 
However, the fact that both cases are related (smuggling) 
seem to suggest a definite pattern of the use of all means 
possible to guard a position of strength. Be that as it 
may, it is not our intention to attach any significance to 
these episodes in our analysis. This is because this was 
a period in Nigerian history when such practices were the 
norm as the economy operated on a catch-as-catch-can basis. 
The cement and car glut of the Nigerian ports is an 
adequate illustration.76 If indeed the Japanese were 
involved, they were simply following a market trend.
These firms also failed to demonstrate a sense of corporate 
social responsibility. It seems that the belief was that 
once the company had met its legal requirements, it was 
free to proceed with its activities without other 
responsibilities. In the twenty-five years under study, 
nearly all the Japanese firms failed to show any 
sustainable interest in the development of the community 
through sponsored educational and social programmes. Often 
devoted purely to business, they fail to interest 
themselves with the social responsibility aspect of their 
contract. To illustrate, none have a university 
scholarship programme either for the children of its staff 
or for the general public like that of the UAC of Nigeria. 
Unlike UAC also, they do not have a graduate recruitment 
scheme designed to take fresh graduates directly from the
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university and spend a considerable amount on their 
training in order to prepare them for management. They 
also very rarely sponsored sports and other social 
activities.
As Yuan-Li Wu77 has observed, "some Japanese firms seem to 
be of the opinion that the paramount concerns of the host 
countries where Japan hopes to find oil are the extent of 
participation and the manner in which profits will be 
shared, the investment obligations of the oil companies and 
the magnitude of the 1 signature bonus'". A parallel could 
be drawn between this practice and that of the Japanese 
firms in all sectors of the Nigerian economy. This is 
however not entirely their fault since local investment 
laws, in order to attract foreign investments are 
deliberately made lax. Hannah Arendt had referred to the 
"New imperialism" of the 1870s as a "process which 
possessed its own inherent insanity". The period 1973-1982 
was a comparable one in Nigerian history when investors 
were free to do as they liked as the economy came under a 
saturnalia mood of sorts. Any charge of the lack of the 
exercise of corporate social responsibility should do well 
to recognise this governmental nonchalance in enforcing its 
own rules and regulations.
As Kiyoshi Kojuna has observed, "the main role of direct 
foreign investments is to transplant superior technology
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through training of labour, management and marketing from 
advanced industrial countries to lesser developed 
countries".78 Seen from this perspective, Japanese 
investments have immensely helped Nigeria's development. 
As we have shown, they did not only provide ample 
employment opportunities, developed managerial capabilities 
and improved skills, but their efforts were also 
indispensable to the development of certain sectors of the 
economy. Despite the short-comings highlighted above, 
their overall conduct undoubtedly provides one of the few 
examples of the use of foreign investments by developed 
countries to the benefit of developing economies. It is a 
shining example of North-South cooperation and embodies the 
hope for the future of North-South relations. Their huge 
and continuing success is as a result of their appreciation 
and general acceptance by the people. They are looked upon 
not as the Western European and American firms with one 
clearly definable objective, the maximisation of profit, 
but as truly committed to national development.
In the 19th century, the Lebanese drove both European and 
African small-holders out of business in Sierra Leone 
because "they could go anywhere and undersell anyone".79 
At first a trickle, then a stream and finally a small 
river, but never really a flood, Japanese trading and 
investments in Nigeria was the 20th century version of this 
entrepreneurship.
204
NOTES
1. It is not a misuse of term to speak of Japanese foreign 
capital and then start off with a discussion of private 
investments. This is because in Japanese overseas 
ventures, private capital and government are inextricably 
linked together. As Albrectcht Rothacher summed up, 
"government and business are linked in every aspect of 
business abroad". See, Albretcht Rothacher, "the
formulation of Japanese foreign policy", Millennium. 
Journal of International Studies, London School of 
Economics, Spring 1981, vol. 10, no. 1 (pp. 1-13) . See 
also Spindler in note 59 below.
2. Part of the problems involved are also acknowledged
elsewhere. We have used some of these phrases to define 
our terms since they relate directly to our own problems. 
For further study, see, Gustav F. Papanek, "Aid, Foreign 
Private Investments, Savings and Growth in Less Developed 
Countries", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 81, no. 1 
(Jan/Feb 1973), p. 121.
3. Bertil Ohlin, Some Insufficiencies in the theories of
International Economic Relations (Princeton University: 
International Finance Section, 1979), p. 5.
4. David Goldsbrough, 'Foreign Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries: Trends, policy issues and prospects' in Toivo 
Miljan (ed) The Political Economy of North-South Relations 
(Peterborough Canada: Broadview Press, 1987), p. 220.
5. ibid. p. 224.
6. ibid. p. 220. Further benefits of foreign investments on
developing countries' economy can also be found in Kathryn 
Morton and Peter Tulloch, Trade and Developing Countries 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 1977), p. 214 ff.
7. See page 237.
8. As above.
9. Hideo Oda and Kazuyoshi Aoki, 'Japan and Africa: Beyond the
fragile partnership' in Osaki and Arnold, o p . cit.. pp. 
153-68.
10. Such practices are the norm and not an aberration in 
Nigeria. Until the abolition of import licences, for 
instance, they were bought and sold in a type of open 
market for importers irrespective of the need for their 
usage.
11. Bertil Ohlin, o p . cit.. p. 7.
205
12. Martin Roth, 1Japanese investment expands*, African 
Economic Digest. May 1982, p. 40.
13. Chikara Higashi and Peter Lauter, The Internationalisation 
of the Japanese Economy (Boston, Massachussets: Kluwer 
Press, 1987), p. 200.
14. West African Magazine. 29 November 1983, p. 2752.
15. African Economic Digest, ibid.
16. ibid.
17. G. O. Ogunremi and Falola, "Nigeria-Japan Trade 
Relations. ..'*, p. 39.
18. S.O. Agbi, *Japan*s attitudes and policies towards African 
issues since 1945: A historical perspective*, Institute of 
Developing Economies. Tokyo 1982, p. 57.
19. Olatunde J.B. Ojo, 'Nigeria* in T. Shaw and O. Aluko (eds) 
The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy (Aldershot: 
Gower Publishing Company, 1984), p. 198.
20. Chikara Higashi and Peter Lauter, ibid.
21. Marie Lawn (ed), Maior Companies of Nigeria (London: Graham 
and Trotman Limited, 1980), p. 271.
22. ibid, pp. 263-4.
23. Direct Overseas Investment Recorded in FY 1987. Ministry of 
Finance, Foreign Press Centre, Japan. July 1988, p. 2.
24. ibid.
25. African Contemporary Record 1972/73. p. 486.
26. Direct Overseas Investment, ibid.
27. Interpretation by Ozaki and Arnold, o p . cit.
28. 'Japanese Investment in Africa: Trends and prospects for 
the 1970s* UN/ECA Investment Promotion Newsletter, June 
1983. Quoted in, African Contemporary Record 1973/74. p. 
C237.
29. Robert A. Scalapino, 'Perspectives on Modern Japanese 
Foreign Policy' in Robert A. Scalapino (ed), The Foreign 
Policy of Modern Japan (London and Los Angeles: University 
California Press, 1977), p. 309. See also, Jide Owoeye, 
*The linkages between psycho-cultural perceptions and 
Foreign Policy behaviour: A study of Japanese images of 
Africa', Geneve-Afrigue. vol. 24, no. 2, 1986.
206
30. L. Rangarajan, 'The Politics of International Trade', in 
Susan Strange (ed), Paths to International Political 
Economy (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1984), p. 135.
31. Nigeria Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, vol. 10, 10 October 
1980, p. 244.
32. David Morris, 'Digging in —  a diary of development', West 
Africa Magazine, no. 3130, 4 July 1977, p. 1355.
3 3. The Economic and Social Development Plan. 1967-1971 
(Japan), May 1970.
34. New Economic and Social Development Plan. 1970-1975 
(Japan), May 1970.
35. R.P. Sinha, 'Japan and the oil crisis', The World Today. 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, August 1974, p. 
337.
36. West Africa, ibid.
37. The new policy involved greated government participation in 
oil and other energy markets. Among other things, it set 
out to;
a) promote overseas oil development
b) diversify oil supply sources, and,
c) encourage government to government deals.
See, Martha Caldwell, 'The dilemmas of Japan's oil
dependency' in Ronald A. Morse (ed), The Politics of
Japan's Energy Strategy: Resources. Diplomacy. Security
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 67. 
See also, Ronald A. Morse, 'Japan's Energy Policies and 
Options' in Morse ibid. p. 1.
38. Nobutasho Akao, 'Resources and Japan's Security' in
Nobutasho Akao (ed), Japan's Economic Security; Resources 
as a factor in Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Gower Publishing 
Company, 1983), p. 16.
39. Yuan-Li Wu, Japan's Search for oil: A Case Study on
Economic Nationalism and International Security (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1977), p. 63.
40. Valerie York, 'Oil, the Middle-East and Japan's search for 
security', Millenium. Journal of International Studies, 
London School of Economics, Summer 1981, vol. 57, no. 3, p. 
434.
41. The accounts in the article above underscores this bold 
concession of political inactivism for economic necessity. 
See especially pp. 434-448 in York, above. An interesting
comparison can be drawn with James R. Soukup, 'Japanese-
African Relations: Problems and Prospects', Asian Survey.
207
vol. 5, no. 7, July 1965, pp. 333-341. Also with Michael 
Leifer, "Japan and Africa: Political Economy and
Ambivalence” in Olajide Aluko (ed), Africa and the Great 
Powers in the 1980s (Lanham: University of America Press, 
1980). Leifer above, captures the African position most 
aptly in the essential words, "political economy and 
ambivalence". Africa was simply not important enough in 
Japanese calculations.
42. For Japanese investments for the procurement of Nigerian 
crude oil, see, Nishizawa Jun, Afurika no Ki-Shokumishi Ka, 
Tokyo 1971. Also, JETRO, Japanese Multinationals: Facts 
and Figures. Tokyo 1981. For further local details, see 
'The Rennaisance1, 27 March 1974, p. 5. The passage above 
details the visits of two representatives of the Japan 
Petroleum Company to the then North-Western state for 
discussions on exploratory activities.
43. Jide Owoeye, 'Africa and Japan's search for resource 
security', Afrika Spectrum. Hamburg, vol. 19, no. 3,
(1984), p. 285.
44. Japan and Africa, no. .56, November 1970.
45. African Development, vol. 10, no. 12 (1976), p. 605.
46. Figures derived from Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual 
Reports for various years, and Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), Petroleum Statistical Bulletin, pp. 71-
72.
47. Comprehensive Energy Statistics. Japan 1974, pp. 189-99. 
Quoted in Yuan-Li Wu, o p . cit.. p. 25.
48. Sukahiro Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and
Practice (New York: Praegar Publishers, 1980), p. 83.
49. David Morris in West Africa, op. cit.. p. 1359.
50. ibid.
51. J. Harrison Church, 'Japan and West Africa', Part 1, West
Africa, no. 2982, 12 August 1974, p. 983.
52. Africa Development. June 1974, p. J7.
53. Embassy of Japan in Nigeria, News Release. 25 May 1987.
54. West Africa, no. 3130, 4 July 1977, p. 1351.
55. ibid. 27 October 1980, no. 3301, p. 2126.
56. World Development Report. 1988, p.144.
208
57. Jide Owoeye, 'Nigeria and Japan: A Study of Trade
Relations' in G.O. Olusanya and R.A Akindele (eds), 
Nigeria's External Relations: The first twentv-five years 
(University Press Ibadan, 1986), p. 327.
58. The National Concord, edition of 6 April 1988, has an 
account of this project.
59. To Spindler, "the links between Japanese commercial banking
and foreign policy reflect both a natural extension of 
domestic economic and political relationships and an 
adaptive response to Japan's relative position of 
vulnerability in the world". See, Andrew J. Spindler, The 
Politics of International Credit: Private Finance and
Foreign Policy in Germany and Japan (Washington D.C: The 
Brookings Institute, 1984), p. 114.
60. Dr Kenzo Tange of Kenzo Tange and Urtec was the supervisory 
architect and designer of Nigeria's new capital territory 
at Abuja. Codi of Japan carried out feasibility studies 
for the site of a new ocean terminal, a complex designed to 
improve Nigeria's port and shipping facilities. While 
Taisei West Africa undertook the construction of the 246- 
room Suleja International Hotel.
61. Information on the contracts taken from West Africa
Magazine, no. 3301, 27 October 1980. From Martin Roth,
'Japanese firms look to the long-term', African Economic 
Digest. Special Report edition, February 1983; from 
Ministry of Trade Sources and from Embassy of Japan 
publications.
62. Nigeria Trade Journal, vol. 6, no. 2, April/June 1958, p. 
67.
63. ibid. The federal government regarded this as 'the 
greatest filip to the growth of the trade in textiles'. 
See p. 67.
64. Department of Commerce and Industry (Nigeria), Annual 
Reports. 1950-51. p. 30.
65. Hopkins, Economic History, p. 250.
66. West Africa, no. 3301, 27 October 1980, p. 2126.
67. "Japan-Nigeria Association". Speech by JETRO official to 
the Meeting of Japan-Nigeria Association, 1990, p. 4. 
(Kind compliments of JETRO).
68. Martin Roth, 'Japanese investment expands' in African 
Economic Digest, ibid. p. 40.
69. This account is-provided by Neswatch (Nigeria) in 1988.
209
70. Mr H.T. Mathers, former Deputy Chairman took the title as 
the "Are Babale of Abeokuta". Abeokuta is the home town of 
the Chairman, Chief E.A. O. Shonekan.
71. Interview with UACN's Pulbic Relations Adviser, Chief M.O. 
Okereke. December 1990.
72. U. Joy Ogwu, Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Futures 
(Lagos: Institute of International Affairs and Macmillan
Publishers, 1986), p. 129.
73. West Africa, no. 3130, 4 July 1977, p. 1359.
74. The Business Times of 19 June 1979 first drew attention to
this anomaly. It was later officially reported in The 
Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, vol. 9, no. 6, 6 June 
1979.
75. Daily Times (Nigeria), 16 March 1982. See also edition of 
19 March.
76. For an account, see African Development, vol. 10, No. 12, 
1976, p. 606.
77. Yuan-Li Wu, o p . cit.. p. 82.
78. Kiyoshi Kojuna, Japanese Direct Foreign Investment: A model
of multinational Business Operations (Tokyo: Charles E.
Tuttle Company, 1978), p. 147.
79. Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), p. 514.
210
CHAPTER FOUR
EXPORT PRODUCTION. COMMERCIAL POLICY. POLITICAL FACTORS AND 
THEIR EFFECT ON THE TRADE DISPARITY
A constant theme that runs through the literature and the 
historiography on Nigeria-Japanese relations is the one­
sided nature of the trading relationship (see Fig. 4 [i]). 
As Fajana has observed, "of all Nigeria*s trade relations 
with foreign countries, none has generated as much local 
controversy as that with Japan, mainly because of the 
persistent disequilibrium.1,1 The controversial nature of 
this issue has to do with the politics of North-South 
economic relations. As Ohlin has put it, the rapid and 
one-sector-led economic development of some less developed 
countries has often brought disturbances in their trade 
with the industrial countries.2 This is particularly so 
because as we have observed, the dominant perspective in 
the South is one which postulates that trade with the 
industrialized economies only benefits the latter.
From sentimental analysis to macro-economic analysis, the 
issue above has generated much heat and is not lacking in 
subscribers. While Edozien and Oyejide, in search of an 
explanatory model which would allow them to make 
recommendations3, have constructed a Japanese market share 
model, others have approached this subject with the 
characteristic bias and xenophobia adopted by many 
countries faced with Japanese competition.4 Thus, the
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Nigerian Business Digest reported the imbalance in one year 
with the caption, *Japan "milks” three billion dollars from 
Nigeria.|5 Ogunremi and Falola admit that the present 
imbalance (see Fig. 4 [ii]) is the result of reckless
expenditure on non-productive luxury items by the 
government and suggest that the government embark upon 
rapid industrialization as an effective antidote.6 Their 
position locates the obstacles to effective international 
market participation in domestic constraints? but it is not 
the dominant one and contradicts nationalist 
interpretations.
The nationalist school is represented by scholars like 
Bukarambe and Agbi. While the former does not blame Japan 
for the existence of the huge imbalance, he places 
responsibility for its redress on Japan and goes ahead to 
suggest various means.7 The latter places the
responsibility squarely on the Japanese and their 
insistence on quality control.8 The extreme position is 
occupied by the Beiiing Review which takes a characteristic 
Marxist approach. Discountenancing any other factor, it 
suggests that the imbalance exist purely because the 
"Japanese reactionaries" do not want anything from Africa 
except its rich strategic materials.9
For their part, the Japanese believe that the imbalance 
existed because of the supply of raw materials to Japan and 
the latter's heavy chemical products and machinery sales to
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Nigeria. The explanation therefore lies in the content and 
not in the quantity and percentage of both countries total 
trade.10 Commentaries on this issue run the whole gamut of 
interpretation. They are central to Nigeria-Japanese 
relations and we have not in the least exhausted them. 
Although the literature we have examined is in agreement on 
the importance of the trade imbalance to the development of 
the relationship between Nigeria and Japan, none of it 
critically examines the root cause of that trade imbalance. 
It has been argued above that obstacles to effective 
participation in the international market system are 
primarily internal to less developed economies. With that 
in mind, we shall examine some of the relevant economic 
policies of Nigeria which have gravitated against a 
beneficial interchange with the Japanese. Ohlin has 
remarked of the classical trade model that "once emphasis 
was placed on mutual inter-dependence, it was natural to 
ask which internal aspects of each country*s economy 
exercised an influence on international economic 
relations.,|11 The same questions need be asked here and it 
is against this comment that our analysis is set.
It is true, of course, that some of the factors to be 
highlighted below may well account for the general lack of 
progress in Nigeria’s overall economic relations. However, 
this fact does not render our analysis any less relevant 
to, or important, for this particular example. Indeed, 
these factors are much more appropriate in accounting for
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the failure in Japan*s trade because the imbalance with 
Japan in most years, has been more than Nigeria*s other 
trade deficits put together.
Before we proceed with this examination however, it is 
necessary first to look at the political environment.
Following the *new imperialism* of the 1870s, the territory 
now known as Nigeria came under the sovereignty of Great 
Britain. Finding it difficult to transplant the 
Westminster model to a territory lacking an organised 
political structure, Britain was forced to tinker with the 
existing local system to produce a unique pattern of 
administration known as * Indirect Rule *. The territory 
was, however, both geographically and culturally diverse. 
In the North lived the Hansa/Fulari whose system, 
underpinned by Islam, was both feudal and oligarchic. In 
the West lived the Yorubas with a form of constitutional 
monarchy, while the dominant group in the East, the Igbos, 
lived under a highly republican system. Such a mechanism 
of administration, albeit an amalgam representing 
indigenous and hegemonic variants, was not so easily 
universally applicable to so vast a cultural spread and the 
* country* was therefore separately administered. A variant 
of the system was applied to suit the Eastern disposition. 
By 1914, however, the various regions were brought together 
under one administration headed by Lord Fredrick Lugard, 
the chief exponent of the indirect rule system.12
Inherent in colonialism is a proposition for cultural 
transformation, in this context, through Christianity and 
Western education. But within the dynamics of this 
cultural imposition manifested in the Christian ideology 
was a prospect for conflict. This friction was clearly 
embodied in the integrative process of 1914. While the 
Northern system, a largely Islamic inheritance, was not 
easily adaptable to the new order, both the Yorubas and the 
Igbos quickly availed themselves to the new opportunities 
and possibilities. This Krio-led education produced among 
these groups, a highly articulate group which quickly 
constituted itself into a new elite. Having learnt to 
'wear the top hat and drink tea', this elite sought 
political power in order to consolidate their position in 
the new dispensation. After World War II, the struggle for 
collective expression gathered momentum and was 
externalized in the formation of political parties. In 
deference to the regional differences above, this 
mobilization largely took the form of tribal aggregations. 
While the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) represented 
Northern interests, the Action Group (AG) and the National 
Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), formerly a broad based 
coalition, represented the West and the East respectively. 
These tribal groupings inherited the political mantle at 
independence in 1960.
With independence however, the "jagged edges in the 
relations of a mosaic of communities and nationalities,
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overlaid by colonial rule, came thrusting to the 
surface”.13 The crisis which these schisms precipitated; 
countless probes, electoral malpractice, disputed census 
figures and finally pogroms, could not be resolved. 
Indeed, "rather than coalesce around class interests, 
competition in national institutions, education and the 
civil service increasingly reflected ethnic interests”.14 
These internal political contradictions, an account 
tediously provided by Mackintosh,15 acted with explosive 
rapidity. From 1967-1970, the nation was embroiled in an 
internecine civil war.
The end of the war in 1970 however, did not result in any 
redefinition of the nature of the state so as to take into 
account all interests. The victors merely filled the 
political vacuum left by the vanquished and consolidated 
their power. Since the territory held enormous reserves of 
oil, the world energy crisis, in 1973, and the explosion in 
oil earnings, introduced a greater financial incentive into 
this ethnic competition. Since the national treasury now 
held loot beyond the dreams of avarice, the competition was 
intensified and politics became the "process of gaining 
control of public resources for the pursuit of private 
ends".16 As the brigands, the bandits and the 'get-rich- 
quick brigade marched through other carnivals of pseudo- 
parliamentary charade', they excited the cupidity of the 
military. Political instability and a uniquely Nigerian 
corruption became the acceptable modus vivendi. There now
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started what Le Monde has referred to as "Le Grand Gachis 
Nigerian”17 (the big Nigerian waste). This "Nigerian 
Corruption" is truly unique and takes various forms: sale
of import licences, inflation of cost of contracts, illegal 
bunkering, smuggling or simply taking cash from the 
national register. (State governors have been known to 
hide millions of dollars under their beds). Conspicuous 
consumption and other 1 intolerable manifestations of 
affluence' 'unaccounted by any visible and legitimate means 
of income' became de riaeur. Maladministration, 'mockery 
of law and other outrageous trampling on the decencies of 
everyday life' defines the Nigerian system. (In 1992, the 
worlds sixth largest petroleum exporter was forced by 
smuggling to import oil and the president spent millions of 
dollars to buy Peugeot cars to bribe military officers. 
Both cases are well documented18) . Indeed, apart from the 
regional Sicilian government with strong Mafia undertones, 
Nigeria is the only country in the world ruled by organized 
banditry with the military as enforcers. There has been no 
nation building because there was no state to build. 
Nigeria is only an abstract concept; a cruel joke.
In order to understand the account below, it is necessary 
to place it within the context above.
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I
THE FAILURE OF EXTERNAL POLICY AND AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS
The failure of Nigeria's agricultural export economy and 
the skewed nature of external policy are the two area, in 
which an explanation of the deficit in the Japan trade 
should be sought. The former is of significance because 
Nigeria's comparative advantage lies in the agricultural 
sector and agricultural products, in the form of essential 
raw materials, are the main Japanese demand.
The fundamental flaw in Nigerian agricultural export policy 
has its origins in the total concentration of trade with 
the European countries to the almost total exclusion of 
other states and the pre-determination of the pattern of 
external economic relations by the ex-metropolitan power, 
the United Kingdom.19 According to Ogunsanwo, Nigeria 
started off the formation and conduct of its external 
economic relations in 1960, "with a crop of political and 
bureaucratic leadership that was in multi-dimensional ways 
steeped in the British tradition."20 There was a clear 
unwillingness to encourage the growth of political and, 
even more, economic contacts with non-European and American 
countries.21 The Nigerian leaders took the concept of the 
friendly nation to apply only to Europe and America and 
what was more, made the public believe the same.22 The 
legacy of almost a hundred years of colonial administration 
therefore was that Nigeria's economic relations with the
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external world at the time of independence were 
preponderantly with the United Kingdom23, and Europe. It 
remained so for a long time after independence. The above 
point is best illustrated by the direction of Nigeria*s 
external trade to the middle of the 1980*s, as evident in 
Fig. 4 (iii) and Fig. 4 (iv) (see Appendix).
From the table it is quite clear that the United Kingdom, 
the European Economic Community and the United States of 
America dominated Nigeria*s external trade in varying 
degrees during this period. For instance, with a 42.39 per 
cent share in 1960, a figure maintained in varying degrees 
of the same form, until 1973 when its share fell to 27.08 
per cent, the United Kingdom dominated Nigeria's imports.24 
It was closely followed by the EEC and by the United States 
which finally took over this position. In Nigeria's export 
trade, the United Kingdom also enjoyed the same level of 
trade preference. It accounted for 47.6 in 1960, 37.3 in 
1966 and for 18.7 in 1973, as percentage share of total 
value of exports. The percentage share of the EEC 
countries rose from a base level of 30.9 in 1960 to 37.46 
in 1966. From 1966 to 1972, the EEC's share ranged between 
33.05 per cent to 40.15 per cent. From 1973 onwards, the 
USA became the single most important trading partner of 
Nigeria (apart from the UK) but Western Europe still 
accounted for a disproportionate percentage of its trade. 
For instance, between 1971 and 1978, over two-thirds of 
Nigeria's imports came from Western Europe. As we have
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observed, this direction of Nigeria*s trade was promoted 
and encouraged by Nigeria*s leaders and pursued as a very 
active policy. According to the Prime Minister, Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, the Nigerian:
"economy has been closely linked with that of the
United Kingdom and we intend to strengthen that link
to the advantage of both countries.1,25
The result of this factor was that there simply was no 
policy to encourage economic intercourse with other 
countries and no attempt was made to explore new areas of 
trade contacts. Asia, where Japan is located, was largely 
ignored except for Pakistan and India. Even then, contacts 
with these two countries, was severely limited to a 
political one arising from common membership of the 
Commonwealth.26 Economic relations with Japan although 
friendly, were strained by the fact that Japan bought 
almost nothing from Nigeria while accounting for a very 
high percentage of its imports.27 In the 1960*s, Japan was 
not therefore, in the Nigerian understanding of the word, 
among the "friendly" nations. In fact, Japan was so far 
removed from both the knowledge and the external trade 
calculations of the Nigerian government that when Nigeria 
took part in the Tokyo international trade fair in 1967, 
its participation was regarded as "epoch-making".28 Indeed 
the bias in favour of Western European and American trade 
was so great that Nigeria refused a soft developmental loan 
from the USSR.29 The implications of this attitude for the
220
Japanese trade was that since Nigeria made no attempt to 
study the Japanese market with a view to developing 
supplies, potential buyers in Japan were completely 
ignorant of Nigeria's potentialities, except for those who 
had the opportunity to glean the little information 
available from JETRO's pamphlets. In fact, while MITI had 
calculated in 1960 that the Nigerian market was promising 
for Japanese exports (and initiated policies to follow up 
this assessment) knowledge about Nigeria's products in 
Japan could only be attributed to the efforts of JETRO 
which not only displayed Nigerian goods in periodic fairs 
for potential Japanese buyers but also undertook extensive 
research into the prevailing political and economic 
situation. It also surveyed the production activities and 
needs of the Nigerian economy as part of its Africa 
analysis programme.30
The international market system is highly competitive. 
Indeed many countries campaign vigourously in other states 
through the medium of international trade fairs and other 
avenues in order to improve the market potentiality of 
their products. In fact most send trade missions with the 
specific objective of identifying markets where their 
products could benefit from. In the period under study 
Japan sent three such missions to Nigeria (see Chapter One 
and Chapter Two). Other nations sponsor programmes in 
several ways in other countries in order to attract 
attention to their products. For example, in order to sell
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its coffee in Japan, the Brazilian government set up a 
Brazil Coffee Institute in Tokyo to advertise it.31 On 
their part, Singapore set up offices in North America, 
Europe, Japan and other countries and the company, INTRACO 
was formed in 1968 specifically to search for markets.32 
No similar attempt was made by Nigeria. Most importantly, 
the Japanese Embassy had taken it upon itself to advise 
Nigeria on the value of such an undertaking, suggesting it 
arrange an exhibition of its products in Japan.33 Nigeria 
failed to make any such arrangment, even though it was 
taking a very high percentage of Japanese exports. In 
fact, the reluctance to deal with the Japanese was such 
that an embassy was opened there only four years after 
independence, in 1964. On the other hand, Japan had opened 
a consulate in 1956 which it upgraded to an embassy as soon 
as Nigeria became independent in 1960. It may be true that 
the developed countries by the powerful nature of their 
economy are expected to take up the task of encouraging 
exports from developing economies. However, there is no 
understanding or rule of international cooperation that 
places the burden of development of any two countries' 
trade relations purely on the efforts of one.
One of the reasons for the trade imbalance lies in the 
development of Nigeria-Japanese relations. While Nigeria 
was very reluctant to open up trade with Japan, the latter 
was busy expanding its already existing foothold. While 
imports from Nigeria were virtually unknown in Japan
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because of Nigeria*s apparent thoughtlessness, Nigerians 
were being introduced and were gradually getting used to 
Japanese products to a point where they virtually regarded 
them as indispensable. Over the years, Nigeria*s exports 
gradually began to be directed towards Japan but by this 
time Japan*s exports were already more established. If one 
takes into account the vertical structure of trade (raw 
materials against industrial machinery) the imbalance is 
readily explained.
Closely allied to the above point was the almost complete 
lack of a co-ordinated export policy in Nigeria. The long 
term objective of Nigeria*s international trade as laid 
down in the 1962 budget included the diversification of 
exports34, the development of new external markets, the 
strengthening of its position in existing markets and the 
reduction of dependence on imported goods.35 A critical 
examination of the Nigerian economy before the phenomenal 
oil success of the early 1970s, reveals that these stated 
external trade policies were big on rhetoric but short on 
performance. As we shall see in the following analysis, 
especially with regard to agricultural export production, 
no attempt was made to translate objectives into a 
meaningful external trade policy. In fact, beyond the 
grandiose facade lay an almost complete abandonment of the 
nation's external trade interests. For a start, the nation 
was in no shape to compete in the international market 
system. The pre-1966 economy was plagued by persistent
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deficits in the visible balance and external assets. Only 
exceedingly limited short-term efforts were made to tackle 
these problems.36 To say that there was no adequate export 
policy37 or that a purposeful external trade policy was 
lacking38 as some economists have concluded, would be an 
inadequate way of underscoring this point. This is 
because, of the three National Development Plans (1962-80), 
from successive budgets and policy statements of the 
military adventurers, it is quite clear as Ezenwe has 
suggested, that there has been no consistent discernible 
export policy.39
In Japan, by contrast, export promotion was not only the 
cornerstone of its international economic relations but a 
national way of life. From the beginning, trade promotion 
was given high priority in budgets and while the Import- 
Export bank of Japan (EXIM) provided favourable financing 
for overseas sales, tax benefits went to exporters and the 
whole export business. Because international trade serves 
a dual purpose in Japan —  as a way of improving the 
nation*s standard of living and escaping from the poverty 
and stagnation of Asia40 —  exporting came to be seen as 
a patriotic activity. Big business, politicians, and civil 
servants collaborated to prosecute the primary objective of 
promoting export trade. Harohiko Fukui has pointed out the 
immense importance of the tripodal nature of this economic 
decision making process to Japan's international trade.41 
As Spiro has correctly observed,
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"Despite their economic resurgence, the Japanese 
retained the perspective of an economically insecure 
country and despite huge balance-of-payments 
surpluses, they continued to believe that the Japanese 
economy had a structural tendency towards balance-of- 
payment disequilibrium and that foreign trade 
therefore had to be carefully controlled.1,42
The predictable effect of the widely different 
international trade attitude on Nigerian-Japanese trade 
relations was the large trade imbalance. A further 
consequence was trade friction. When confronted by the 
prospects of commodity exchange with an economy whose 
raison d ’etre was the pursuit of an active foreign trade 
policy, the Nigerian policy-makers could resort to nothing 
but a ban on imports.
The inadequate efforts at export promotion are best 
illustrated in relation to the decline in agricultural 
export production. This is very important in accounting 
for the trade disequilibrium as Japan imports nothing else 
from Nigeria apart from raw materials, the bulk of which 
constitute agricultural products. It is also important 
that we proceed to analyse agricultural production since 
our contention about the lack of a sustainable export 
policy could easily be dismissed as not based sufficiently 
on valid or authenticated facts. Further, it is necessary 
because we believe that the net decline in agricultural 
export production was the underlying factor that did not 
provide for reciprocity of trade.
The colonial administration pursued an intensive and 
sustainable agricultural export production policy.43 The 
administration encouraged and supervised the cultivation of 
export crops, by providing local farmers with improved seed 
varieties and technical advice. It refused to grant 
concessions to European firms for plantation agriculture44 
since this would not only lead to a lot of land problems 
but would place the smallholders at a disadvantage negating 
the administration's policy of diffusing export production 
as widely among the population as possible. The colonial 
policy was so successful, despite some of its negative 
effects, that overall the production of export crops 
increased substantially. In the late 1950s, cocoa, 
groundnut and groundnut oil provided 20 per cent, while 
palm products made up 25 per cent of Nigeria's total 
exports.45 According to Hogendorn's accounts, groundnut 
exports in 1957-58 trading year was a total of 715,000 tons 
and this rose after independence to 872,000 tons in 1962- 
63.46 This useful colonial beginning (though arguably for 
a completely different purpose) ensured that a viable 
commodity trade would be developed on strong foundations. 
Ricardo's trade theory encourages nations to specialize in 
those areas where they have a comparative advantage. In 
Nigeria, as in most other developing economies, this 
advantage has been in agricultural export production. It 
did not therefore enter the international market system at 
independence without very well developed agricultural 
export products.
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This advantage was indeed exploited in the early years of 
independence. (We should bear in mind that the crops under 
discussion are the same which generated Japanese demands). 
In 1964, while Nigeria provided 39 per cent of total 
groundnut exports from producing countries47, it was also 
responsible for generating 24 per cent of the total world 
export of palm-oil.48 At this time also, it had became the 
largest producer and exporter of cocoa, second only to 
Ghana.49 This vibrant state of the Nigerian export economy 
was however very fragile as it was built on a colonial 
model with an overwhelming emphasis on bureaucratic control 
and initiative. Since no meaningful efforts were made to 
modify and adapt it to the new conditions existing in the 
international market system, it was not sustained. Largely 
dependent on overseas demand and other extraneous 
conditions to sustain itself, Nigerian agricultural 
exports, not unexpectedly failed to meet competition in the 
international system because as we have noted earlier, 
little or no attempt was made to promote it.
A major factor which made Nigeria1s agricultural exports 
less competitive in the international market system was the 
fact that production was still organised on the colonial 
model without necessary adaption. There were fundamental 
flaws in the colonial mode of production and these flaws 
were thereafter transplanted into the post-independent 
agricultural export economy. The most over-riding flaw was 
the control of exports by the Marketing Boards.
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Agricultural exports were controlled and conducted through 
the marketing boards established under the colonial system 
in the 1940s. Operating largely unrestricted by central 
authority until 1970, the activities of the boards were not 
unexpectedly controlled by powerful but manipulative 
boards, individuals and organisations. This situation 
resulted in a state of affairs, described in an official 
government document, the 2nd National Development Plan, 
"whereby 80 per cent of Nigeria's exports were being
controlled by an organisation which the Federal Government 
responsible for external trade policy did not control.”50 
The document further admitted that not only have
agricultural production been neglected but that the 
activities of these boards were being remote-controlled 
from powerful political and commercial interests in Europe, 
especially in London.51
The Federal Government in the full realization that
agricultural production had fallen disastrously thereafter 
set out to undertake structural reforms of the "Marketing 
Boards". These reforms were envisaged under the Third 
National Development Plan. The reforms not only
centralised the price-fixing process but de-emphasised 
trading surpluses as the objective of price-fixing. It 
also abolished the two-tier system of produce taxation.52 
In 1974, the Export Promotion Council was established and 
this was followed up with an announcement of increases in 
producer prices in the 1974-75 budget. Two years later, 
1976, the state Marketing Boards were formally abolished. 
In their place, seven national commodity boards were
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instituted to encourage production and organise the 
marketing of all the major agricultural commodities. In 
1977, the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme was set up 
to underwrite bank loans granted to farmers in respect of 
certain crops, mainly export crops like cocoa, rubber and 
palm-produce, Japan*s main export demands. (Full account 
of changes given in Chapter Two).
The above reforms and initiated policies, laudable as they 
may seem, were grandiose but superficial? a charade of 
institutional purposiveness. They were debilitated by 
massive corruption and a sheer lack of any real intention 
to follow through - a characteristic of Nigeria*s overall 
policy. For a start, while the Third National Development 
Plan sought to reactivate agricultural export production, 
it still assumed that about 96 per cent of total export 
earnings would come from the petroleum sector.53 Cocoa, 
previously one of the principal crops needed by Japan was 
expected to earn a total of £792.2 million or 1.7 per cent 
of total export earnings in the whole of the plan period.54 
The plans for improved agricultural export production 
failed primarily because the policy makers did not believe 
in them. Nigeria*s Fourth National Development Plan would 
later confirm that "the reform of the Marketing Board 
system on which much hope had been placed to resuscitate 
the nation's sagging agricultural exports seems to have 
failed to achieve the intended objective.1155 With the 
benefit of hindsight, this remark pointed to the real
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consequence of the problem, namely the increasing trade 
imbalance with Japan as the latter could not buy what was 
not on offer. As readily seem from (Fig. 4i and v) the 
imbalance reached its highest level between 1971 to 1985, 
years when agricultural production failed. (See Fig. 4 
[vi]).
The effects of the marketing board system on Nigeria*s 
agricultural exports can be measured purely on fiscal 
policy basis. The idea of marketing boards is not new in 
policy options as a source of government control of the 
export sector. New Zealand adopted this practice in 1936, 
and currently, Australia and Canada operate a limited 
stabilization policy on some strategic exports. This is
essentially to help overcome fluctuations in the
international market, as the wool and wheat controls in 
both countries would clearly illustrate. However, this 
"policy amounts to a tax falling on the producers of export 
commodities."56 As Kindleberger has put it most 
succinctly, "when export taxes are paid by the producers, 
they are a selective income tax levied against a particular 
sector."57 It may be argued that since most developing 
nations depend on the exports of primary products and with 
the prospects of ever depreciating prices in the
international market, some form of government initiative is 
required to protect the producers, who in most developing 
countries are subsistence farmers. Indeed, the practice of 
affording some form of buffer for producer prices is widely
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diffused in West Africa. However, the question which 
remains is; in the context of Nigeriafs overall development 
strategy, how did this help export production?
In the Nigerian situation this was a disastrous policy not 
only because of the serious imperfections in the 
organisation of the system, but also because of Nigeria*s 
peculiar circumstances. This has to do with the discovery 
of petroleum resources, the relative prosperity it brought, 
and the assurance of indefinite production. Given these 
cirumstances, the government policy of maintaining a 
colonial system which paid very little to producers and was 
actually put in place to maximise colonial extraction was 
not a justifiable policy option. In fact, as Sarah Berry*s 
study (see below) has shown, economic activity shifted away 
to other sectors due to the oil boom; a situation that the 
practice of fixing a ceiling price for exports did not 
help. The policy therefore led to a fall in export 
production, and agricultural exports which predominated in 
the 1960s fell to under six per cent of total exports.
Usoro has shown in his study of the oil-palm industry that 
the reduction of producer prices in the period 1955-65, 
although accompanied by the introduction of cultivation 
incentives, caused a decline in export output.58
Professor Ragnar Nurkse recognised this particular policy 
as one which constituted erecting blocks against capital
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formation. In 1952, he warned that such a practice could 
inflict serious damage upon a country's most efficient 
source of foreign exchange.59 It was a warning which 
Nigeria failed to heed with disastrous consequences.
A cross-country analysis will further emphasise our point. 
Again, we turn to Singapore where the role of the 
government was confined to helping exporters search for 
markets for their products. The policy adopted here was to 
grant tax concessions on profits earned from exports.60 
The end result of both policies are only readily apparent.
Specifically, the decline in Nigeria's agricultural 
production which resulted from this policy, affected the 
imbalance because Nigeria turned from a primary product 
exporting nation to a net importer (in Nigeria domestic and 
export production run pari passu). The figure for food 
imports which stood at an average N46 million between 1964 
and 1966 had jumped to Nl,020,7 billion in 1978.61 By 1982 
this figure had trebled. In Anyaegbunam's analysis, 
agricultural exports which accounted for 90 per cent of 
Nigeria's export receipts a decade earlier had so declined 
that in 1970 it could only account for 30.2 per cent. By 
1977, this figure had come down to an abysmal 4.5 per cent 
share.62 The licensing system which had come into effect 
in fact hindered exports.63
By this date crops like groundnuts and groundnut oil had
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faded completely from the nations export list while exports 
of others like timber, logs and plywood, palm kernels and 
groundnut cake were mere shadows of their past
performance64. As they fell, food imports from Japan rose
and further contributed to the trade deficit. In 1978 for 
example, JETRO's figures confirm an increase of over 38 per 
cent in overall sales to Africa due to a large increase in 
canned mackerel sales to Nigeria. In 1985, canned mackerel 
and sardine in tomato sauce were still being imported from 
Japan.65 As Myint has suggested66, increased agricultural 
production could have offered a considerable scope for
"import-substitution” either by cutting down foreign 
exchange expenditure on primary products or absorbing 
purchasing power which sought outlet in other imports. 
This did not happen and food imports were continued from 
Japan with grave consequences for the trade deficit.
Nowhere is this failure to sustain export production more 
suggestive of those factors hindering effective
participation in the international market economy than in 
the pattern of Japanese trade with Nigeria. Our study of 
commodities in Nigeria-Japanese trade (Chapter Two) shows 
that there was a steady decline in Nigeria's agricultural 
raw materials exports to Japan. Between 1960 and 1970, 
agricultural exports recorded mainly as foodstuff and raw 
materials accounted for about 96 per cent of total exports 
to Japan.
From 1971 petroleum exports began to challenge this 
dominance of raw materials and eventually overtook it but
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agricultural exports remained at an acceptable minimum 
level. By 1977, what is recorded as agricultural exports 
in Nigeria-Japanese trade came to mean the export of 
shrimps, prawns and lobsters and these products came to 
dominate Nigeria's exports with the cessation of petroleum 
imports by Japan (see Fig. 4 (vii)) . A cursory look at the 
Japanese firms in Nigeria (Fig.3) and the development in 
Nigeria's fishing industry with the Japanese construction 
of four new trawlers for the Eko-Nippon Fishing Company in 
1973 will reveal an intriguing phenomenon: the Japanese
domination of the Nigerian fishing industry (with the 
USSR). This meant that the composition of Nigerian 
exports, dominated by the sale of shrimps, prawns and 
lobsters from 1977-85, was in fact Japanese generated. The 
Japanese firms in Nigeria not only generated these items 
and sold them to Japanese importers but some of these 
products were then processed, packaged and eventually found 
their way back into Nigeria's import trade in form of 
finished products. The canned mackerel product is an 
adequate illustration. The trade imbalance further widened 
because of this factor.
Closely allied to the foregoing were the lack of expansion 
of Nigerian exports67 to Japan and the lack of 
competitiveness of Nigeria's exports in the international 
market. In reality the Japanese economy has depended (and 
will continue to depend) on imports of huge amounts of 
resources from abroad.68 Yet, because of the neglect in
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Nigerian agricultural export production the nations trade 
did not exploit this fact. As we have shown, what is 
recorded as raw materials exports to Japan have consisted 
in the main of semi-processed goods like timber, cocoa cake 
and smelted tin. As Anyaegbunam has correctly observed 
such products "could represent the minimal transformation 
of primary commodities for export shipment."69 No attempts 
were made to expand these products or indeed develop new 
raw materials for export to Japan. Indeed, as the 
prosperity of the country became highly dependent on 
petroleum earnings (Fig. viii), the dependence on primary 
commodity exports waned70 and interest was altogether lost
on their production. A recent study by Sarah Berry has
demonstrated how this dependence on petroleum led to the 
depreciation of local export production in Western 
Nigeria71 and this example could indeed be extended to the 
rest of the country. There was no innovation and new 
initiatives were lacking. To illustrate the effect of this 
lack of export expansion on the Nigerian-Japanese trade, 
let us take two raw material products needed by Japan and 
show how their development would have affected Nigeria's 
export figures.
Gum-arabic and Beni-seed are raw materials needed in Japan 
because of their industrial value. Nigeria had the ability 
to develop these crops and indeed they were part of
Nigeria's exports in the colonial period as Egbo's72 study 
of gum-arabic and Doward's73 account of Beni-seed have
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shown. In the post-independence period, these products 
disappeared from Nigeria's exports. Trade accounts of 
Nigeria-Japanese trade, 1960-85, make no reference to these 
important products. Their impact on Nigerian export 
earnings cannot be overemphasised. As Douglas Rimmer74 has 
observed, changes in export volume are an adequate 
measurement of export performance where the composition of 
exports and their relative values remain fairly constant. 
It is our view that responsibility for the large deficit in 
the Japanese account lies to a certain degree with this 
lack of trade expansion.
As Nigeria's exports were not expanded or new commodities 
developed, it is difficult to see how Japan could either 
have increased its purchases of Nigeria's products or taken 
in new exports. Both of these factors would have 
significantly lowered the trade disequilibrium. In fact, 
Nigeria did not show concern for this development as it was 
secure in the availability of oil exports until the end of 
the first military era in 1979.75 It is therefore 
erroneous to suppose that the overall decrease in Nigerian 
exports to Japan were the result of distance which led to 
a fall in Japanese demands76 or due to the Japanese 
protection of local interests.77 On the contrary, Nigerian 
exports were very much in demand. For a start, some 
Japanese firms had formed a Japan-Nigeria Trade Company in 
1964 in order to encourage the importation of primary 
products from Nigeria. Japan also took whatever was
offered as Ogunremi's study has shown.78 On the other 
hand, Japanese protection of local interests may well have 
affected its trade with the developed economies like Great 
Britain and especially, the United States of America but 
hardly Nigeria*s exports. This is because there is a 
dearth of essential raw material resources in Japan and 
there would therefore be no local interests to protect. In 
fact, Japan did a lot to encourage Nigerian exports. In 
1966, MITI placed all Japanese exports to Nigeria (from 1 
Decmeber) under a trade control system whereby they would 
require government approval before being forwarded. This 
system was to enable exporters to apply an export-import 
compensation system to all export items to Nigeria so that 
Japan could increase its imports from Nigeria.79 Again, in 
1971, Japan introduced the policy of duty free entrance of 
goods from the developing economies. It is then difficult 
to imagine how factors internal to the Japanese economy 
would have resulted in the decrease of Nigerian exports 
other than those internal to the Nigerian economy as we 
have shown.
The failure to develop and expand export production indeed 
marks a rather grave point. Because no attention was given 
to agricultural exports in Nigeria whatever was produced 
could not compete in the international market —  if we take 
into consideration the intense competition in the 
international market system. For a start, what is recorded 
as Nigeria*s exports to Japan consisting of raw materials
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like oil and oil products —  groundnuts, oil seeds and 
vegetable oils —  could for instance be acquired by Japan 
from Chicago, USA, in form of Soya bean and easily shipped 
home at very minimal costs. Cocoa, a trade commodity which 
consistently appeared in all the years of the trading 
relationship could also be obtained from Brazil. Nigeria*s 
palm products could also very easily be obtained from 
Indonesia? cotton from Mexico and the United States and 
hides and skin from Argentina, as one study has shown.80 
All these nations pursue aggressive market policies for 
their products. It may well be that as Japan found cheaper 
sources it failed to interest itself with Nigeria's exports 
—  although we have shown this not to be the case. In the 
marketing of raw materials resources, there are many South 
economies eager to improve standards and to adapt their 
products to suit international needs. There is therefore 
nothing that ties Japan to Nigeria's sources especially if 
the desperately needed commodities are not forthcoming.
Kindleberger is of the view that the failure of developing 
economies is attributable to their failure to adapt to 
changing conditions rather than to the operation of the 
international market system.81 This fact has amply been 
demonstrated as the main reason for Nigeria's trade 
imbalance with Japan. It is therefore difficult to see in 
Akindele's82 viewpoint how the major pre-occupation of 
Nigeria's external economic diplomacy has been the pursuit 
of a vigorous trade policy. It is precisely the lack of
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such a policy which has been responsible for the huge trade 
deficit in the Japanese account.
II
TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY
Further compounding the lethargic export promotion and 
expansion policy, which is largely responsible for the 
widening of the trade gap, was the open door policy of 
trade and investments adopted by Nigeria at independence. 
Although protectionism is a controversial issue in 
international trade, at different periods in their economic 
growth many states have adopted it. In some of the 
economies, it has met with a high degree of success in 
promoting economic growth and development. The Japanese 
economy is an adequate illustration for this point. In 
many nascent states, especially those with underdeveloped 
economies, the form of policy regularly adopted is that of 
"import-substitution”. The probability of its success 
depends on many aspects of policy and administration83 and 
some have insisted that protectionism leaves infant 
economies in perpetual infancy. Ragnar Nurkse, for 
instance, believes that infant creation should precede 
infant protection.84 Nevertheless, economies wishing to 
profit from the international system with less efficient 
factors of production have usually found it worthwhile to 
afford some form of protection to industries in areas where 
they lack comparative advantage.
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In Nigeria, the kind of industries that would have afforded 
a considerable scope for advantageous trade were those 
engaged in the manufacturing of agriculturally based 
products. In Nigeria's trade with Japan, these would 
include many consumer goods taken in as imports from the 
latter. In this instance, protectionism would have 
substituted for products like textile goods, food stuffs 
and other light industry goods. (In 1985, the imports of 
these products took $31,067 million out of the Nigerian 
account.85) Contrary to the pursuit of affording 
protection to the above products based industries which 
would have considerably reduced the deficit in the Japanese 
account, Nigeria from 1960 opted for the open-door policy 
on international trade and foreign investments.
Foreign firms investing in Nigeria without exceptions or 
consideration for particular sectors of the economy were 
provided with a blank cheque with which to stifle effective 
local development. This was largely because, according to 
the Prime Minister, "so long as there is dearth of Nigerian 
capital, so long must there be an opportunity for foreign
capital in Nigeria".86 This pronouncement was a re­
affirmation of investment laws which sought to attract 
foreign investors by providing incentives, already in
existence. The "Pioneer Industries Act" No. 10, 1952 gave 
company tax relief of between two to five years to
industries designated as pioneer while the "Industrial 
Development (income tax relief) Act" of 1958 gave complete
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exemption from income tax to investors depending on the 
volume of investments.87
On international trade, it retained without any change, the 
colonial government’s policy of liberalized trade. This 
policy permitted the importation of all goods except coal, 
second-hand clothing, gold or articles manufactured wholly 
or mainly of gold.88 The result of this was that at 
independence, a position of almost complete liberalization 
of imports into the Nigerian market was reached and only 
goods from Eastern Europe remained subject to quantitative 
restrictions.89 This also meant that all sorts of goods 
from Japan including consumer goods, some of which the 
nation was well capable of producing, enjoyed virtually 
unrestricted entry into the Nigerian market. With an 
economy of scale that enables it to enjoy a position of 
immense strength in the international market system, goods 
emanating from domestic producers stood no chance of 
competing and the gap of the deficit widened into an abyss. 
The Japanese position was further strengthened by the 
Balewa administration's open-door policy90 of investments, 
as we have noted above. As local manufacturing failed91, 
the Nigerian market thus became a vast candy store for the 
sweet-tooth of the Japanese multinationals, who with 
immense capital at their disposal elbowed aside local 
producers of essential consumer goods with relative ease. 
If one takes into account the deficit arising from the 
invisible account and that accruing from the sales of these
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essential consumer items, the trade imbalance becomes one 
which, even with the immense power of the Japanese economy, 
could have been significantly reduced.
Ill
CORRUPTION AND THE EFFECT ON TRADE
In the qualitative and quantitative analysis of Japanese 
investments in Nigeria, we did suggest a "caveat emptor", 
not as a mitigating factor for any failure for an adequate 
and a sustainable investment policy by Japan but as one 
which is a "sine qua non” for our understanding of the 
dynamics of bilateral trade. That caveat has to do with 
the massive corruption central to the operation of the 
Nigerian economy. It is not our intention to flog this 
dead horse since we have made this point before. However, 
it is our belief that a proper understanding of the 
influence of this factor is central to the whole trade 
issue. In this regard there is the need to highlight an 
example which, saddening as it might be, is not an 
exception. In 1978, Japan exported a total of 46,132 
automobiles to the Nigerian market. This total was made up 
of 15,820 passenger cars, 22,003 trucks and 8,311 buses. 
This number far exceeded the total number of automobiles 
authorized for importation from all sources by the Federal 
Ministry of Trade.92 As we have noted, how this happened 
is now only a matter for conjecture but since this is only 
one of numerous lapses on policy, the effect on the trade 
disequilibrium can only be imagined.
i
!
i ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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It may seem somewhat over-reaching for a study addressing 
the relationship between two states to concern itself with 
domestic policies in one state. This is not an irrelevant 
digression however. The dynamics of this relationship 
cannot be properly understood without such an exercise. It 
is also part of what we have set out in the introduction as 
the main area of inquiry. That is, to outline the factors 
hindering effective participation in the international 
market. In chapter two, trade was considered side-by-side 
with policy. What we attempted here is the critical 
evaluation of these policies. Since our position is that 
obstacles to effective participation in the international 
market lie within the structural distortions in the
domestic economy and not as a result of the exposure to the 
international system, we regard the above attempt as 
imperative.
The next two chapters, (five and six) consider the 
political aspect of this relationship. Our basic theme 
(internal obstacles) remains the same. The goal of the two 
chapters is simply to consider the relationship in the
light of international politics.
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relations...', p. 105.
92. See Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
JAPAN'S AID AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS
In the relationship between nations, trade and other 
contacts often derive from closer political ties. In some 
cases, political ties take root as a by-product of 
commercial interest. However, the absence of political 
ties may limit trade, or even make it practically 
impossible. In the development of Nigeria-Japanese 
relations, the flag was made to follow trade. This 
situation fits into the general pattern of European 
contacts with Africa before the new imperialism of the 19th 
century. In both cases, the demands of a new industrial 
system led to the search for new markets.
At the time Japan began to open up trade with Nigeria, the 
country was under British sovereignty. It could not, 
therefore, maintain direct diplomatic relations since 
Nigeria was a part of a greater empire with which ties 
already existed. The late maturity of the political aspect 
of this relationship was a consequence of this development 
but also of another. Japan was occupied at the end of the 
second world war and deferred to the United States in all 
matters affecting the development of its international 
relations. In the immediate post-war reconstruction 
period, neither Nigeria nor any part of Africa, were on the 
priority list. The continent was relegated to the bottom 
rung of the foreign relations ladder.
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The situation was modified, although not significantly 
changed, by the juxtaposition of two events. First, in 
1960, Nigeria became an independent nation occupying a 
major position in Africa. Secondly, as US/Japanese 
hostility eased, and the United States became entangled in 
the Cold War1, a measure of foreign policy control was 
given back to Japan. These events, occurring independent 
of one another, paved the way for closer political ties. 
Before these events, neither Nigeria nor Japan could deal 
with the other on a bilateral basis until they achieved 
independence of foreign policy.
In the first of two Chapters dealing with the political 
aspect of the relationship, the first sets out to 
accomplish a major task. It examines the place of aid in 
the development of relations. Given the importance of 
foreign aid to economic development2, we intend to examine 
the following issues:
a) The place of foreign aid in Japan's foreign policy, 
particularly towards Africa1;
b) The functions of this aid. Whether it is extended to 
achieve political goals and to redress the huge trade 
imbalance in trade with Nigeria, and,
c) The relationship between Japanese aid and private 
capital.
These issues assume a central place in our analysis not
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only because foreign aid is a means by which developing 
countries may overcome gaps that may appear in their 
capital formation process; foreign aid facilitating the 
development of capital infrastructure and especially the 
creation of social overhead capital. It also bears 
directly on the nature of the relationship between the
North and the South.
Some have argued that aid extended for development 
constitutes economic assistance and must be treated purely 
as such without reference to political issues. Indeed, 
this is the official view of the Japanese government which 
adheres firmly to the principle that development assistance 
is given purely for economic and social infrastructures. 
However, the argument of this chapter is that Japanese aid
to Nigeria cannot be properly understood without
consideration of the political context in which it 
occurred. The next two chapters examine this context.
As we have stated, the place of aid in third world
development is controversial. Japan*s aid giving has been 
seen in various lights by development writers. An 
examination of this literature would serve to put the 
extension of this aid to Nigeria in proper context.
I
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF JAPANESE AID
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A number of studies have examined the nature of Japanese 
aid, and its underlying political and economic rationale. 
Higashi and Lauter3, in a recent study, have shown the 
clearly definable goals of Japan*s Foreign aid policy 
pursued through the years. In the 1960s, Japan's ODA 
primarily took the form of tied aid which had to be spent 
on the purchase of Japanese goods. Following the oil 
crisis of 1973, aid was given to resource-rich developing 
countries and nations situated on important shipping 
routes. From the early eighties, emphasis came to be 
placed on reducing poverty and support for developing 
countries of world wide strategic importance to the Western 
alliance.
Sukehiro Hasegawa's4 analysis while acknowledging the 
economic basis of Japanese aid diplomacy, clearly emphasise 
the primacy of political motivation. The various changes 
in Japanese aid objectives during the post-war period, have 
been a direct consequence of political priorities. Thus, 
Aid in the period, 1953-1973 was extended primarily to 
augment Japan's "kokueki" (the national interest). The 
goals were two-fold? national development and international 
rehabilitation. As the nature of these basic goals 
changed, so did the priorities of immediate aid objectives. 
Having been extended for commercial objectives and domestic 
material prosperity in the first decade, 1953-1963, it was 
structured in the next to improve the societal welfare of 
Japan. It was also designed, according to Hasegawa, to
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help the pursuit of a leadership role and to help secure a 
"proper" place in the international community. It was only 
when industrialisation had doubled in pace and immediate 
economic gains had been firmly secured that humanitarian 
aid began. This later development was not designed to 
mitigate the huge economic advantage by now held over 
recipient countries. This would have been incompatible 
with the vigorous international trade policy being pursued. 
Rather, it was deemed essential for the improvement of 
living conditions in less developed countries, 
indispensable for fostering international peace and 
creating more markets for greater economic security.
An examination of the application of Japanese aid in the 
period would confirm this basic assumption. Hasegawa's 
analysis however runs the risk of overstating the case as 
in the reference to the use of aid to secure "a proper" 
place in the community of nations. This allusion by 
Hasegawa evokes the spectre of the "Greater East Asia Co­
prosperity sphere" and foreign policy in the 1930s. It 
seems hardly in place in a new post-war diplomacy dedicated 
to "sekei bunci" that is; trade without politics. We will 
return to these issues later. First, let us explore 
further the underlying paramountcy of economic motivation.
Two scholars, Terutomo Ozawa5 and Dennis Yasutomo6 offer an 
interpretation which is an extension of both Hobson and 
Lenin's monocausal "new imperialism".7 In this view
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Japanese aid is essentially for entrenching Japanese 
monopoly capitalism and has a definite economic motive. 
They point out that aid is extended for the expansion of 
overseas markets essential for the promotion of exports, 
the development of new sources of raw materials supply and 
for increasing overseas private investment. Leon
Hollerman8 provided support for this interpretation in his 
assessment of Japanese technical assistance. According to 
him, aid is merely a tool for export promotion in under­
developed countries: the purpose is to spread Japanese
technical know-how and induce demand for exports of plants 
and equipment. John White argues, insisting that the 
United Nation's doctrine - namely, there is an obligation 
to aid less developed nations as a humanitarian duty - is 
completely lacking in Japanese foreign aid.9 The general 
opinion thus identifies aid as part of the process of 
extracting resources from developing areas. Some writers 
have even gone as far as to advocate that all aid be 
terminated because of its alleged harmful effects on the 
growth process. To Bauer, for instance, aid in general 
distorts economic growth in under-developed economies.10
It is not our intention to delve into these interpretations 
since to do this would be completely beyond the scope of 
this study. Some of these issues and especially, the 
moralistic concept of foreign aid have been treated 
elsewhere.11 However, some comment on the basic 
assumptions of these interpretations are necessary for this
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thesis.
First, the one sided benefit of the flow of capital 
transfers denies the fact that this kind of assistance has 
become indispensable to the capital formation process of 
the developing economies. Indeed, as the experience of 
many states and especially Australia12 confirms, government 
expenditure financed by foreign loans "can be a suitable 
method of laying the foundation of a country1s economic 
development in the form of public services and social 
overhead capital”. Such transfers can also fulfil
an equilibrating function as far as the balance of payments 
is concerned, in Ragnar Nurkse1s viewpoint.13 This is 
however merely a hypothetical approach resting on the 
supposition that international income disparities open up 
gaps in the balance of payments and international income 
transfers will fill them. But so is the analysis that 
assumes automatic benefits to the lending economy. 
Keynesian income and employment effects of the return flow 
cannot be stretched without qualification. Indeed, it was 
once the primary concern of economists in the developed 
countries that these and other forms of capital transfers 
may not serve to stimulate but depress their economies.14 
Professor Nurkse's warning that such theories of capital 
movements concerned with capital as a factor of production 
must direct attention to such fundamental issues as the 
proportion in which capital co-operates with labour and 
land in different parts of the world; to the relation
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between capital movements, population growth and 
migration15, among others, must be taken into account, for 
a proper contextual understanding.
Having made the observations above, let us step away from 
dogma and examine the official Japanese government aid 
policy, and the performance of this aid, with respect to 
the developing economies and Africa in particular.
II
OFFICIAL JAPANESE AID POLICY
In 1959, the principle behind the extension of succour to 
developing nations was first articulated in Japan*s aid 
programme. The policy document noted that, "the economic 
development of the less advanced countries is of extremely 
great significance for the achievement of permanent world 
peace”.16 This was, however, only an affirmation of intent 
since no aid policy was outlined. This initiative is not 
difficult to imagine. Japan*s interest in these years was 
concentrated on achieving the economic ideals set out in 
the 1951 Peace constitution. Until 1973, aid policy, as 
part of foreign policy was therefore left to the 
arbitration of the United States. Aid given in these years 
merely comprised reparations, Yen loans and technical 
assistance. It was not only small in absolute terms but 
was extended as discerned necessary, not guided by 
predefined policy. In 1967 and 1968, for instance, total
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aid to developing nations amounted to £285 million and £350 
million. Calculated by ratio against its national income, 
these figures represent in percentage value, 0.89 and 0.94 
respectively. Also in terms of GNP per capita, it ranked 
a distant fifth among the member nations of the Development 
Aid Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD).
In 1977, the government announced its decision to double 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). According to the 
Prime Minister17, Japan would endeavour to raise the level 
of its Official Development Assistance close to that of 
other major advanced industrialised nations and would be 
active in seeking solutions to the problem of primary 
commodities and other issues. It would also, positively 
expand, in particular, bilateral grant aid. Aid was also 
further untied. This change of attitude was largely due to 
the pressures of the OECD and especially the United States 
which insisted that Japan should take its share of 
responsibilities as a member of the Western alliance.
From this period and for these purposes, Japanese aid 
rapidly expanded. At the Bonn Summit in July 1978, it 
pledged to double its ODA in three years and committed 
itself to expanding its aid positively in succeeding years. 
In an attempt to honour this pledge, a meeting of its 
government ministers voted to increase the grant element of 
aid by 86 per cent. It also decided to ease the conditions
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of its loans.18 From 1981-1985, aid was again doubled.
An examination of Japan's aid during this period confirms 
that these promises were partly met. But the increments 
sounded more impressive than they were, because the base 
level was so low. Its lending rates average 3.5 per cent 
in interest rates, spread over 23.5 years. These figures 
are high compared with the same rates of the United States 
which works out at 2.6 per cent, and 38 years.19 The grant 
component of its ODA has also been the lowest among the 
eighteen OECD countries. A recent OECD report confirms.20
Japanese aid policy is still very much provincial and 
focused on strengthening economic ties and on countries 
where it has a major economic interest. It is also tied to 
the foreign policy of the United States. Thus, the term 
"Comprehensive Security first used officially in expressing 
the conceptual framework of Japan's aid policy in 1980" 
emphasised assistance to countries bordering on conflict 
areas of strategic significance to the Western alliance. 
As Inada's study has shown21, these "conflict areas" refer 
to anti-communist areas and are not identifiable with other 
forms of struggles. Pundits would argue that this 
convergence of interests is not difficult to follow; while 
American arms went to prop up these regimes as showpieces 
of capitalism and western ideals, Japanese capital supplied 
their industry. However, such an assessment, true as they 
may be, only captures part of the general picture.
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Japanese aid varies in application, comprising political, 
economic and strategic elements. It would also do little 
justice to a nation, which, in 1981, returned to the 1959 
theme with a decision to strengthen aid to areas important 
to the maintenance of peace and stability of the world.
Whether taken, like Sushi, with a pinch of salt or vinegar, 
it is difficult to deny that an attempt has been made to 
strengthen aid and to extend it beyond the narrow confines 
of South-East Asia. It is also undeniable that the volume 
of Japanese aid is out of proportion to its enormous 
economic success. (In 1985, in terms of GNP per capita, 
Japan ranked eleventh among donor countries.) Let us 
consider this policy as it was applied to Africa.
Ill
AFRICA IN JAPAN1S AID DIPLOMACY
With reference to Africa, South of the Sahara, the policy 
pursued has deviated very little, if at all, from the 
general principles and practice of Japanese aid set out 
above. Both the paucity of funds provided, the high 
interest rate charged, as well as the late arrival all fit 
perfectly into the general pattern. The policy towards 
Africa was clearly defined in an official government 
document published in 1981. It declared inter alia, that;
"Japan is of the view that it will ultimately 
contribute to Japanfs own security for her to extend
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as much and as wide economic cooperation as possible 
to black African countries with a view to helping 
their nation building efforts.”22
This statement of policy was the culmination of a process 
embarked upon since 1971. The aim was not only to aid 
African countries in their nation building, but to promote 
relations in trade, economic co-operation and other 
fields.23
Here again, the real intention behind this policy has come 
under intense scrutiny. Don Shanon sees this as designed 
purely to secure commercial gains,24 while Kweku Ampiah 
insists that this aid is designed neither to achieve 
political objectives, nor to support developmental 
objectives resulting from decolonization - it is simply 
designed to develop Japan's domestic industry.25 The model 
of Japanese aid provided by Hasegawa above, is extended to 
determine the interest on Africa, in the most comprehensive 
analysis of Japan's African aid by Owoeye and Vivekanda.26 
Echoed in no uncertain terms, this aid is not only a form 
of Japanese imperialism, but serves as an important vehicle 
in the commercial exploitation of Africa. This is used to 
further promote its upward mobility within the elite club 
of industrially advanced Western capitalist nations. 
Without any doubt, this is an assertion of the Marxist view 
that Aid promotes foreign investment and trade at the 
expense of true development and extracts wealth from 
developing countries through debt servicing.27
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It is true, as Frey and Schneider have correctly asserted, 
that "economic aid given by governments of industrialised 
to less developed countries is scarcely given for 
philanthropic and humanitarian reasons".28 However, to 
insist without qualification, that this aid is only 
selfishly motivated, would be to stretch human reasoning 
beyond the confines of what is normally acceptable. 
Japanese aid to Nigeria, as we shall show, has undoubtedly 
helped the capital accumulation process of the country as 
Japanese bilateral aid has in many African states.
To state the above is not to deny that aid in Africa and 
Nigeria definitely encompass some of the characteristics 
that occupy the definition of the above viewpoints. Aid 
here has not only been small but has also been influenced 
by the infinite search for raw materials supply. This 
purpose is evident from the conclusions of the Japanese 
mission to the African continent in February 197029; from 
the recommendations of the meeting of Japanese envoys to 
fourteen African states in June 197430; from Japanese 
newspaper editorials31, and generally from the fact that 
the spread of aid only take into account those African 
countries with which it has a sustainable economic 
interest. A breakdown of Japanese aid figures, on the 
basis of our conclusion, shows that Tanzania, Zaire, 
Madagascar, Kenya, Mauritania and Sierra Leone account for 
four-fifth of total aid to Africa between 1960 and 1982.32
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These countries constitute essentially the sum of Japanese 
African interest. From 1960 to 1980, Africa's share of 
Japan's ODA was only 6 per cent, or the cash equivalent of 
$223 million.33 Investments have also remained at a bare 
minimum. From April 1960 to March 1982, Africa received 
only 4.4 per cent of total Japanese overseas investments.34 
This compares to 29 per cent for Asia; 16.2 per cent for 
Latin America; 27.1 per cent for North America; 11.6 per 
cent for Europe. The process of relegating Africa to the 
background in aid and investments terms is a continuous 
one. Not only have public and private capital transfers 
gone mostly to South-east Asian countries, of all ODA 
granted in the period 1984-1985, 71 per cent went to the 
Asian-Pacific region, in particular ASEAN countries and 
Indonesia.35 Although this "position reflects the totality 
of their political and economic relations with Japan and 
has historical roots"36, the practice of concentrating 
investments on one area means paying only lip service to 
the developmental efforts of other areas. In real terms, 
as we have shown, the total African grant might have been 
insufficient for Nigeria's capital needs considering the 
enormous gains that have accrued to Japanese private 
capital and industry there.
IV
JAPAN'S AID TO NIGERIA
260
A lengthy discussion of Japanfs aid policy in general, and 
Africa's position in particular, is necessitated by the 
fact that the policy in Nigeria is part of the overall aid 
giving process and can only be understood within that 
context. It is an important consideration, in part, 
because of the existence of the huge imbalance in the trade 
of both nations. Such income transfers play a central role 
as they facilitate development if we consider capital 
purely as a factor of production. However, the benefit of 
this process as a potent political tool is not lost on this 
analysis and part of our own task is to determine its other 
significance in terms of international politics.
The table below (Fig. 5[i]) divides these transfers, 
generally referred to as Overseas Development Assistance, 
into appropriate categories. This is very crucial to our 
judgement, vis-a-vis trade and other activities considered 
in Chapter Three. It will also lead to a proper 
understanding of the analysis of the relationship between 
Japanese aid and foreign capital investments which shortly 
follows.
Fig. 5[i] JAPAN'S ODA DISBURSEMENTS TO NIGERIA BY
CLASSIFICATION. 1960-1985*7
1. Grants in Aid
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a) Grant Aid for Fisheries
1981 —  Marine Fisheries Training and Research
Vessel for Nigerian Institute of 
Oceanography and Marine Research.
E/N: 2 March 1981 ... $21. million.
1982 —  Fishery Training Equipment. NIOMR.
... $0.12 million
1984 —  A Skip Jack Pole and Line Fishery Research
and Training Vessel. NIOMR.
E/N: 3 April 1984 ... $2.0 million.
1984 —  Spare Parts for Vessel. NIOMR. $27,000.
b) Grant Aid for Agriculture
1981 —  Agricultural Research Equipment, IITA, . ..
$0.1 million.
1984 —  Laboratory Equipment Agronomy Department,
University of Ibadan ... $14,000.
c) Grant Aid for Education and Research
1983 —  861 sets of Microscopes for Secondary
Schools ... $100,000.
1983 —  Book Donation, NIOMR ... $1,200.
1984 —  Book Donation, University of Jos ... $4,240.
ii) Project Type Technical Cooperation to Universities
This involves Training in Japan, Dispatching of 
Experts and Supply of Equipment. Field —  Medical 
Cooperation.
University of Nigeria. 1972-1979
Number of Experts Dispatched —  10
Number of Experts Trained in Japan —  4
Equipment Donated —  $0.5 million
Obafemi Awolowo University. Ife. 1972-1979
Number of Experts —  26
Number Trained in Japan —  10
Equipment Donated —  $0.6 million
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TOTAL GRANTS IN AID, 1960-85 —  $6,666,440 million
ASSISTANCE TO NIOMR —  $4,248,200 million
ABBREVIATIONS
E/N —  Exchange of Notes
IITA —  International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture
NIOMR —  Nigerian Institute of Oceanography and 
Marine Research
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[ii]
DATE OF 
AGREEMENT
23 November 1966 
(1st Yen Loan)
LOAN ASSISTANCE (YEN LOANS)
PROJECT AMOUNT FINANCIAL INTEREST MATURITY
INSTITUTION RATES (PA) (GRACE PERIOD)
i) Arewa Textile ¥10.8 billion EXIM 5.75 18 (5)
Expansion Project ($46.96 million)
... ¥1.26 billion
ii) United Nigerian 
Textiles Expansion 
Project ... ¥1.512 
billion
iii) Dieselization of 
Nigerian Railway 
Corporation (12 
Diesel Locomotives)
... ¥1.241 billion
iv) Lagos-Kaduna Coaxial 
Cable Project ...
¥6.5 billion
14 September 1972 Kainji Dam and Nepa 
(2nd Yen Loan) Power Distribution
Projects
¥6.2 billion EXIM
($26.38 million)
4.75 20 (7)
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DATE OF PROJECT AMOUNT FINANCIAL INTEREST MATURITY
AGREEMENT INSTITUTION RATES (PA) (GRACE PERIOD)
30 March 1974 Nigerian Railway ¥6.2 billion EXIM 4.50 25 (7)
(3rd Yen Loan) Expansion Project ($26.38 million)
(140 Passenger Cars)
24 July 1981 Lower Anambra River ¥16.9 billion EXIM 3.50 30 (10)
(4th Yen Loan) Irrigation Project ($99.41 million)
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As evident from the table, it is quite clear that a high 
percentage of these income transfers were in the form of 
direct government loans. The first of these loans, 
extended in 1966, was to correct a balance of payments 
disequilibrium in a period when Nigeria imposed 
discriminatory tariffs and quantitative restrictions on 
Japanese imports. This credit attracted a high interest 
rate of 5.75 per cent and was to be paid over 18 years. 
Other loans were extended in 1972, 1974 and 1981, for
various purposes. These transfers had one thing in common; 
the excessiveness of their lending rates. At an average 
rate of 4.62, these rates compared poorly to America's 2.6 
per cent. Nigeria's rates are also high compared to 
Japan's average lending rates of 3.5 per cent. Without 
exception, all the loans were also heavily tied to the 
purchase of Japanese equipment and the execution of the 
project by Japanese firms. (This latter relationship is 
fully examined in the final part of this chapter). Such a 
policy of tied transfers was applied to the 1981 loan, even 
though the decision had been taken in 1977 to untie Aid. 
An example of such tied transfer is appropriate.
In 1974, an agreement was signed in Lagos for Japan to 
extend a Yen-based loan to the Nigerian government to 
finance the Nigerian Railway Corporation's purchase of 140 
passenger cars and freight rail coaches (see Fig. 5[i]). 
The rolling stock to be purchased for the replacement of 
worn-out stock would be supplied by Kawasaki Heavy
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Industries, Hitachi, Kinki Sharyo, Tokyu Car Manufacturing, 
Nippon Sharyo, Seizo Kaisha and Fuji Heavy Industries. 
Export arrangements were to be made by Nisho-Iwai, Marubeni 
Corporation and C. Itoh; all Japanese Companies.38 
Needless to say, an important percentage of the cash value 
has been taken by these firms before the resources were 
realised. Other loans and similar agreements have since 
been reached and other disbursements made (see Fig. 5[ii]). 
At the end of 1982, Nigeria's total indebtedness to Japan 
stood at $2.5 billion representing 17.65 per cent of 
Africa's total.39 This prompted Major-General M. Buhari, 
then Nigeria's Head of State, in April 1984, to make a 
direct appeal for Japanese understanding of Nigeria's debt 
burden.40
Another major characteristic of these income transfers is 
the insignificant value of the grant element. The grant 
element of the 1966 loan, for instance, was only $8,421.41 
The allocations were also small in comparative terms. 
While it extended just over $26 million for the railway 
project in 1972, a similar grant to Zambia for the 
electrification of its railway system in 1973 was $30 
million and $120 million to Zaire for railway construction. 
Although it is unfair to compare aid directly in this way 
since costs and purposes differ, it is significant to note 
that Zaire's single grant almost amount to about two- 
third's of Nigeria's four yen loans. Also, Nigeria does 
not benefit from the "Gratuitous Cooperation" programme of
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Japanese aid. This is designed to help recipient nations 
procure equipment from Japan on a charity basis. JETROfs 
sources show that by 1980, 28 African nations had
benefitted from this programme.42 Admittedly, this is 
designed mainly to help the poorest of developing 
countries. Again, Nigeria was not a beneficiary of Japan's 
Cooperation Overseas Volunteer Scheme (its version of 
America's Peace Corps) in the whole of the period, 1965- 
1985.43
It has however gained indirectly from Japan's participation 
in multilateral institutions and organisations aimed at 
promoting growth and development in the third world. Japan 
is for instance, the third largest contributing member of 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.44 
It was also, one of the first thirteen non-African states 
to join the African Development Bank, with an initial 
investment of $290 million when the bank was set up in 
November 1972.45 (This figure was only surpassed by the 
Contribution of the United States). It has further 
contributed a total of $195.8 million to the African 
Development fund, the soft loan affiliate of the African 
Development Bank, and is the institution's biggest 
supporter.46 By 1985, it had contributed a total of $149 
million to the World Bank's special facility for sub- 
Saharan Africa (SFA). By actively supporting these 
organisations, each of which Nigeria could draw funds from,
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it has opened other avenues for Nigeria*s development 
finance.
It is however, in the field of technical assistance and 
education finance that the paucity of the funds provided, 
as well as its stringent terms are partly excused. In the 
field of education, grant aid and various donations have 
been made. (See Fig. 5[i]). This aid is most visible in 
Nigeria*s education finance. According to Segun Adesina47, 
a breakdown of the basis of calculation of monetary value 
of this type of external aid shows that Japan spent N12,000 
per annum, per expert from 1960 to 1967.
The Japanese government further complemented its private 
sector's adherence to the policy of technical training and 
development of Nigeria*s manpower resources. This 
technical cooperation programme consists of two types of 
training? Individual and Group Training courses. The first 
is undertaken at the request of developing countries, and 
the second, organised according to their greatest common 
needs. These programmes are further complemented by the 
"Expert Programme" involving the dispatch of experts to 
applying countries. This is an on-going process involving 
numerous bodies, and not least, the Japan Foundation. It 
is important to consider the performance of this type of 
assistance in the early years of Nigeria's independence to 
assess the impact at a time such efforts were needed most.
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This assistance started in 1961 when seven Nigerians were 
received to take part in a technical group training course. 
By 1968, a total of seventy-nine Nigerians had been 
accepted and trained under this scheme in various fields 
such as rice cultivation, fisheries, civil engineering, 
telecommunication, vocational training and small scale 
industrial management.48 By this date also, the number of 
experts sent to various institutions in Nigeria had reached 
a total of fourteen. By this time, twenty-eight technical 
award schemes were open to Nigerians. It would appear that 
premium was placed on the development of Nigeriafs manpower 
resources. In 1968, for instance, 70 per cent of all 
African trainees in Japan were Nigerians.49 By March 1975, 
up to 176 Nigerians had been trained in various fields in 
Japan thus making it the highest recipient in Africa's 
total of 877 (out of a world total of 21,98750). At the 
end of 1979, this number had increased to 400. Taken 
separately, or seen from today's values, these efforts may 
not amount to very much. However, coming at the crucial 
moment as it did, it was invaluable to Nigeria's 
development efforts as it provided a new nation with 
practical skills with which to secure its independence.
It is difficult to account for Japan's reluctance to extend 
as much aid as possible to Nigeria, considering the huge 
economic gains it had secured both through trade and other 
ventures. Africa's lack of political leverage in Japan, as 
well as the other factors enumerated in our account of the
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inadequacy of Japan*s investment (see page 172) may indeed 
offer us a clue but they only provide part of the answer 
and perhaps one need to consider other underlying factors. 
In this instance, it may well be perfectly in order to 
contend that not enough pressure was brought to bear on 
Japan, through the threat of economic boycott or through 
other diplomatic channels. This would no doubt have had an 
effect on Japan*s policy considering the relative 
importance of the Nigerian market which is its second 
largest in Africa. (Truck exports to Nigeria, until the 
end of our period, provided Japanese manufacturers with a 
third of the entire African market51) . But this complaint 
featured prominently in all discussions with visiting 
Japanese officials. It may then be that the frequent 
change of leadership and the sheer lack of articulation of 
national interests undermine this pressure. It may also be 
that Nigeria's need for such foreign capital places this 
aid in perspective. This may indeed, explain part, if not 
all of the problem.
From 1977 when Japan's overall aid policy gathered momentum 
to the end of our period 1985, Nigeria amassed tremendous 
wealth from the sale of petroleum products. During this 
period the need for foreign capital was very minimal. In 
the Third National Development Plan for instance, no 
provision was made for the use of foreign capital.52 Since 
this was the case, it may have been that the need for 
Japanese aid did not arise. Then the issue of paucity of
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aid loses its relevance to our debate. What is difficult 
to ignore is that this provides us with a classical case of 
high economic activity without a corresponding political 
consideration. (This theme will be pursued in the 
following Chapter.) One may look at this from several 
angles. We do not pretend to have all the answers.
V
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPANESE AID AND JAPANESE PRIVATE
INTERESTS IN NIGERIA
The various interpretations earlier considered broadly 
identified Japan*s aid objectives. A study of this aid in
Nigeria confirms the double-sided nature of this
/
subvention? to provide succour for Nigeria*s developmental 
efforts and to help to further secure Japan*s commercial 
objectives. Our attempt here is to add another element? 
the merger between Japan*s public and private interests. 
The general purpose of this is not to construct an 
intricate web of conspiracy. Rather, it is simply to 
provide an example of the inextricable link that 
peculiarises Japan’s public and private interests abroad. 
To chart the various channels where aid has been utilised 
will further demonstrate clearly the overall significance 
of these income transfers.
Our first consideration is the involvement of Japanese
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firms in the execution (or its other interests) of the 
projects for which the various Yen loans were extended. 
Our second is to show the clearly definable objective of 
aid by showing the purpose behind the extension of grants- 
in-aid, and how the private interests benefitted from such.
From the table (Fig. 5(i)), we identified the projects for 
which the various loans were offered. Half of the first 
Yen loan, 1966, was used to the benefit of Japanese firms. 
The first project, the Arewa Textiles expansion project, 
was of direct benefit to Japanese firms as this was a 
Japanese company. Admittedly, this was so because this 
loan was in aid of Nigeria's balance-of-payments 
difficulties: since the bulk of Japanese exports
constituted textiles during this period, increasing the 
capacity of local plants was a direct way of curbing 
imports. Part of the loan was therefore used to expand the 
largest local mill, Arewa (the venture that combined the 
interests of Toyobo company and eight other spinning mills 
from Osaka), and the United Nigeria Textiles. An increase 
in Arewa's productivity will reduce imports. It will also 
increase profitability for the owners. Government loan 
therefore went into a project that helped its trade but had 
no long-term effect on the balance of payment position as 
the foreigners long term claims cancelled out any offset in 
short term transfers. The other project, the Lagos-Kaduna 
co-axial project, directly involved Japanese firms. As we 
have seen in Chapter Three, the contract was undertaken by
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Nisho-Iwai.
The second Yen loan of 1972, was also of immense benefit 
to Japanese private interests in Nigeria. This loan was 
utilised for the development of electricity supplies. (The 
Kainji Dam and NEPA's Power Distribution project). As we 
have shown in Chapter Three, this field was almost 
developed for Nigeria exclusively by Japanese firms. 
Marubeni Corporation for instance, is the principal 
supplier of transformers for NEPA's various power 
distribution programmes. The Japanese government had used 
a tool open to it to secure the interests of its private 
companies. While this had an indirect effect, the third 
Yen loan, 1974 directly benefitted the "Sogoshoshas". As 
we have demonstrated on page 265/6, the contract for the 
Railway Expansion Project, down to transport arrangements, 
was exclusively organised by these firms.
Nowhere in this cooperation is it more evident than in the 
EXIM-funded lower Anambra Irrigation Project (fourth Yen 
loan). Again, from its finance to the realisation of the 
project, this was an exclusively Japanese private capital 
undertaking. It involved three firms; C. Itoh, Taisei 
Corporation (both locally registered) and Nippon Koei.
Japan's grants in aid have also gone to prop up Japanese 
local interests. Out of the total amount of just over $6 
million, a disproportionate amount (over $4 million) went
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to aid NIOMR, the national authority for fisheries and 
marine research. We have previously shown that Nigeria's 
fishing industry is almost, an exclusive preserve of 
Japanese interests since the main concern here is raw 
material sourcing. It cannot be denied therefore that the 
overwhelming concentration of the grant element of its ODA 
in this sector is clearly to the benefit of its private 
interests. In fact, these donations have always been 
accompanied by Japanese experts. In 1984, a marine 
engineer was sent and in 1985, a master fisherman and a 
specialist on modern fishing methods: both were long-term 
experts.
By extending these grants to NIOMR (Japan is its largest 
supporter) the purpose were two-fold. First, the Nigerian 
government would be amenable to accede concessions for 
fishing rights. It will also look favourably on the 
Japanese fishing fleets like the Eko-Nippon fishing 
company. Even if this was not the expressed intent, the 
government would be trusted not to take any drastic action 
that may radically affect the sourcing of this essential 
raw material. Also by assisting NIOMR which is purely a 
research organisation, the principal gains of its research 
would accrue to Japanese fishing ventures.
We do concede that any point to be made about this 
collaboration of public and private interests belong to the 
general issue of tied ODAS; a normal practice for most 
donor countries. We would also agree that it is a 
perfectly legitimate aspiration of foreign policy to seek
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to protect national interest. It may even be argued that 
Japan*s relative position of strength in the world economy 
and its relatively inexpensive goods account for the tied 
nature of this aid: it was to the benefit of Nigeria to buy 
these services from the donor country. Loan agreements 
also usually require to be accompanied by experts since 
most developing nations lack this facilitating factor. The 
validity of these arguments does not escape our notice. 
Nevertheless, they do not render any less valid, our basic 
point as it cannot be denied that a large percentage of 
these income transfers have gone to prop up the interests 
of Japanese private capital.
As an attempt to look at Japan *s relations with Nigeria 
from the context of international politics (a theme further 
taken up and developed in the next chapter), this chapter 
raises a number of questions. Very central to the 
development of the thesis is the issue whether Japan*s aid 
has been at all important to Nigeria*s growth and 
developmental process. From 1977 when Nigeria officially 
requested Japanese technical assistance for the successful 
completion of its development plan, Japan*s aid, especially 
technical assistance, has been indispensable to the growth 
and development process in Nigeria. Even in instances 
where aid was tied to particular projects, Japanese 
practices have been exemplary. As we have shown in the 
agricultural sector, their assistance went a long way in 
promoting a programme of self-sufficiency in food
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production. In other areas, their assistance has been 
crucial to the effective utilisation and the cross-linkage 
of national resources. This assistance also helped to 
develop basic infrastructures. The second question raised 
by the discussion relates to the paucity of aid provided. 
It is difficult to make any kind of judgement here, or to 
jump to any conclusion because this depends on the 
interplay of several factors. It may be true that the aid 
given is small in comparative terms. It would be easy to 
base any argument on this fact and to reach conclusions. 
However, this position would merely reflect not only a 
rather narrow perspective but the opinion of developing 
countries who by that very position, must adopt an Oliver 
Twist attitude. In reality this abstracts from economic 
interrelations.
For a start, the amount of aid provided would be relative 
to Nigeria*s needs. As we have demonstrated (see page 270) 
the need for this kind of assistance was neither compelling 
for Nigeria, nor desirable in the second half of the period 
under study. The absorptive capacity of the economy is 
also an important consideration. It is further difficult 
to say that more aid should have been given since this 
depends on the resources available to the donor country and 
its foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, Japan mainly 
extends development assistance on request and according to 
greatest need. The possibility that what Nigeria got was 
the sum of what it requested - and by extension, its needs
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- does not seem far-fetched but very reasonable.
We would therefore conclude that while increased aid would 
have been desirable to accelerate the development efforts 
of Nigeria, any judgement based on this can only be 
effective if seen from the context of Japanese overall aid 
policy, Nigeria's needs and its position in the league of 
needy developing countries. In the twenty-five years under 
study, it cannot be denied that Japan's aid has made an 
enormous contribution to Nigeria's development.
278
NOTES
1. The involvement of the United States in the Korean war is 
regarded as the turning point in the post-war re-attainment 
of a measure of economic and political independence by 
Japan.
2. G.O. Olunsanya, "Nigeria and the World Economy", Nigerian 
Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 10, No. 2, 1984, p. 
58.
3. Chikara Higashi and G. Peter Lauter, The 
Internationalisation of the Japanese Economy (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), p. 214.
4. Sukehiro Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and
Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975).
5. Terutomo Ozawa, Multinationalism. Japanese Style 
(Princetown, New Jersey: Princetown University Press), pp. 
34-5.
6. Dennis T. Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and 
Japanese Foreign Policy (Lexington: Lexington Book, 1986), 
p. 6ff. The organisation of Japanese aid is examined by 
Alan Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid: Policy making and politics 
(London: Croom Helm, 1980).
7. See, J. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study. London 1902, and V. 
Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. 2nd 
ed., 1934.
8. Leon Hollerman, Japan’s Dependence on the World Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 119.
9. John White, Japanese Aid (London: Overseas Development
Institute, 1964) , pp. 10-11. For the treatment of UN 
concept of aid as a humanitarian obligation, see, Goran 
Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered (Paris: OECD
Centre, 1966), p. 14. See also, Marta F. Loufti (ed), The 
Net Cost of Japanese Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1973). Ohlin's work above is quoted on p. 48.
10. P.T. Bauer, Dissent on Development: Studies and Debate in
Development Economics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1971) , p. 95ff. This was an extension of the argument that 
Bauer had developed earlier. See P.T. Bauer, "Foreign Aid: 
an instrument for progress?" in B. Ward & P.T. Bauer, Two 
Views on Aid to Developing Countries (Institute of Economic 
Affairs, London, 1966), p 37. Bauer's major points are 
that such unearned grants obstructs the development of the 
qualities, attitudes or efforts which are necessary for 
material progress. It thus serves to divert attention from 
the prime movers of development.
279
11. See, Roger Riddel, Foreign Aid Reconsidered (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1988).
12. In 1930 the external public debt of Australia amounted to 
about three-quarters of the total foreign capital employed 
there. See, C.P. Haddon-Cave, "Some Aspects of Private 
International Investments with Special Reference to 
Australia". (Australia and New Zealand Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Perth Conference, 1947, 
Mimeographed), p. 9. Quoted in Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of 
Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1953), p. 91.
13. Ragnar Nurkse, ibid. p. 93.
14. See for instance, Norman S. Buchanan, International 
Investment and Domestic Welfare (New York, 1945) in Nurkse 
ibid. p. 132.
15. Nurkse, ibid. p. 131.
16. Gaiko Seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1959), p. 27. In Juichi 
Inada, "Japan's Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or 
Strategic?, Millennium. Winter 1989, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 
399-414.
17. Mr Fukuda's remarks to parliament at the opening of the 
80th Session of the Diet, in West Africa. No. 3130, July 4, 
1977, p.'1353.
18. "Special Report on Japan and Africa", West Africa. No. 
3249, 22 October 1979, p. 1935.
19. Nihon Keizai. 22 July 1975, in Agbi, "Japan's Attitudes and 
Policies ...", p. 80.
20. OECD, Economic Assistance Report. 1989. Quoted in William 
Nester, "The third world in Japanese Foreign policy", 
Millennium. Winter 1989, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 378.
21. Inada, ibid.
22. Diplomatic Bluebook 1981: Review of Recent Developments in 
Japan's Foreign Relations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Tokyo, p. 55. See also, West Africa. No. 3301, 27 October 
1980, p. 2129.
23. Foreign Relations, a Year in Review: Excerpts from the 
Diplomatic Bluebook April 1970-March 1971. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Tokyo.
24. Don Shanon, "Japan in Africa: Commercial Pay off Business 
without frills keep raw materials flowing to power 
industrial exports". Africa Report. Vol. 15, May 1970, pp. 
24-27.
280
25. Kweku Ampiah, MA one-sided Partnership”, West Africa. 
November 28-December 4, No. 3720, p. 2221. This opinion is 
a direct quote from a 1961 MITI report. See Joanna Moss 
and John Ravenhill, Emerging Japanese Economic Influence in 
Africa: Implications for the United States (Berkeley: 
University of California, Institute of International 
Studies, 1985), p. 66.
26. Owoeye Jide and Franklin Vivekanda, "Japan's Aid Diplomacy 
in Africa", Scandinavian Journal of Development 
Alternatives. Vol. 5, No. 4, 1986, p. 145.
The importance of this raw materials interest is backed up 
by two other studies. See, David Morris in New Africa. May 
1983, p. 39. Also, Ozaki and Arnold, o p . cit. . p. 166. 
These studies contain extensive information on various 
Japanese aid agencies, both private and government owned.
27. For this analysis, see, Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of 
International Economic Relations, p. 172.
28. B.S. Frey and F. Schneider, "International Political 
Economy: A Rising Field", in Economica Internazionale. Vol. 
XXXVII, Nos. 3-4, Agosto-Novembre 1984, p. 325.
29. At the end of the visit, the mission described Africa as "a 
treasure house of natural resources", and proposed an, 
"active promotion of technical cooperation and development 
of Africa*s vast natural resources for the mutual benefit 
of both Japan and the African nations". It went further to 
observe that "with our dependence on raw materials being 
what it is, imports of such natural resources are vital to 
our economic well-being". (Nigeria was among the countries 
visited). See, Nigeria-Japan Economic Newsletter, 
December/January 1971, pp. 2-4.
30. At the end of this three-day meeting in Tokyo, the envoys 
urged their government to step up its relations with the 
various countries where they were stationed, by increasing 
investment, trade and economic cooperation. The envoys 
were the representatives to Nigeria, Ghana, Gabon, Senegal, 
Ivory Coast, Zaire, Liberia, Central African Republic, 
Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, the United Nations and 
the Counsel-General to Pretoria. Further details are 
contained in, West Africa. No. 2974, 17 June 1974, p. 735.
31. The "Daily Yomuri" in an editorial stated that the first 
objective of Japan*s relations with Africa is the "Securing 
of natural resources such as Cobalt, manganese, uranium and 
iron ore for which Japan depends on Africa for more than 50 
per cent of its imports'*. Quoted in Africa Diarv. 19 
October 1979, p. 9716, in Owoeye, "Africa and Japan's 
Search p. 281.
32. Ozaki and Arnold, o p . cit.. p. 159.
281
33. Fumihiko Togo, "Africa in the context of Japanese foreign 
policy”, International Affairs Bulletin. Vol. 6, No. 3, 
1982, p. 50.
34. David Morris, "Japanese Investment in Africa”, New African, 
May 1983, p. 39. See also, Africa Economic Digest. 10 
December 1982, p. 13.
35. Higashi and Lauter, o p . cit.. p. 216.
36. Inada, op. cit.. p. 407.
37. Information taken from JETRO, Economic Cooperation of 
Japan. Tokyo 1979; Embassy of Japan (Nigeria) Economic and 
Technical Cooperation bv the Government of Japan. 1990.
38. Africa Development. June 1974, p. J7.
39. Mainichi Shimbum, "Still a long way to go", West Africa. 28 
November 1983, No. 3439, p. 2743. Together with Kenya,
Tanzania and Zambia, these countries are the four of the
top five African recipients of Yen loans up to June 1982. 
See Masaki Tamagami, "Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan 
countries: Credits targeted creation of infrastructure".
Look Japan. 10 September 1982, pp. 16-17.
40. "Daily Times" (Nigeria), 27 April 1984, p. 24.
41. Tsusansho, Keizai Kyoryoku no Genjo to Mondai-ten: 1973.
(Tokyo 1973), p. 168. Quoted in Hasegawa, o p . cit.. p.
154.
42. JETRO, Economic Cooperation of Japan. 1980.
43. Outlook of Japan's Economic Cooperation. Economic
Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 
October 1988.
44. "Special Report on Japan and Africa", West Africa. No.
3249, 22 October 1979, p. 1935.
45. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic. Financial and
Technical1. 15 June-14 July 1972, p. 2403. See also,
Miguel S. Wionczak (ed), Economic Cooperation in Latin 
America. Africa and Asia: A Handbook of Documents
(Cambridge, Massachussets: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 408-412.
46. Information Bulletin (Japan), Vol. XXVII, No. 7, 15 July 
1980, p. 9.
47. Segun Adesina, "The Place of Foreign Aid in Nigeriafs 
Educational Finance, 1960-1968", Quarterly Journal of 
Administration. Ibadan. Vol. 7, No. 4, 1973, p. 474.
48. ibid.
282
49. ibid.
50. Information Bulletin. 1976. Public Information Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, pp. 103-107.
51. Africa Now. No. 34, February 1984, p. 57.
52. Compared with 50 per cent in the 1962-68 plan period, and
20 per cent in the 1970-74 period.
283
CHAPTER SIX
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN THE CONDUCT OF NIGERIA-JAPAN
RELATIONS
In the light of previous discussion and with specific 
reference to the rhetoric of Japanese foreign policy, it is 
necessary to assess the true dynamic factors in the 
relationship with Nigeria. Accordingly, this chapter 
examines fully the difference between the form of 
declaratory policy and the substance of operational policy 
in the context of international politics.
Our first task will be to examine the place of each country 
in the others1 foreign policy. After considering the 
principle guiding their respective policies, we shall then 
identify the international issues arising out of this 
relationship and the different ways in which each country 
has dealt with them. As Japan*s foreign policy is 
predicated on **sekei-bunci**, (the pursuit of trade without 
politics) and since we are looking at these policy options 
from the point of view of North-South relations, the 
international issues considered are mainly those which 
concern Nigeria. In this regard, those which claim centre 
stage are; the international politics of oil and raw 
materials sourcing and Japan*s support for Nigeria*s 
nationalist aspirations. In dealing with these sensitive 
questions, our main areas of concentration are: the nature
of Japan*s response to nationalist struggles in Africa; 
Japan and the international politics of the Nigerian civil
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war? as well as Japan and the Apartheid regime of South 
Africa. An important measure of Japan's sensitivity in the 
first consideration (oil and raw material politics) is to 
see how it sought to deal with Arab issues and then compare 
this to its response to Nigerian issues. Its voting record 
at the United Nations concerning these issues will 
constitute a critical determining factor.
These issues which are closely linked to the question of 
aid considered in Chapter Five, and investments considered 
in Chapter Three, constitute the basis of our judgement on 
the state of Nigeria-Japan relations. In fact, the 
exoerimentum crusis here is whether Nigeria is of any 
significant political interest for Japan or is it just 
another market. The importance of this as an index of 
Japan's Africa relations is a crucial and intentional part 
of this analysis: Nigeria which is one of Africa's most 
powerful states and its largest economy is also, most 
importantly, Japan's second largest market in Africa. If 
the emphasis of our analysis seems to fall too heavily on 
multilateral rather than on bilateral issues, this is 
simply because with limited bilateral contact between them, 
their respective positions on multilateral issues provide 
the best available evidence on the evolution and the 
present state of Japanese/Nigeria relations.
I
THE PLACE OF JAPAN IN NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
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Independence for Nigeria in I960, carried over a whole 
baggage of colonial legacies and prejudices, and with it 
impulses that led to the relegation of Japan to a low 
priority in the formulation of foreign policy. Not only 
did these impulses help to foster an age-long economic bias 
for Western Europe and the United States, it ensured that 
Japan remained distant in political terms as in 
geographical terms.
Many factors were responsible for this state of affairs. 
For a start, the state began the formation and conduct of 
its external relations with a bureaucratic leadership 
steeped in the British tradition.1 There was a reluctance 
to encourage the growth of political and economic ties with 
non-"Western” nations.2 This is partly explained by the 
fact that the government relied on British diplomatic 
missions abroad to conduct its external relations where it 
had no missions.3 Indeed, it could be argued that at this 
period independence was only nominal. It was a period when 
the Prime Minister could hardly take any major foreign 
policy decision without first consulting the British 
government.4 The Parliament functioned a rubber-stamp of 
foreign policy decisions.5 Indeed foreign policy was 
totally subordinated to the will of the Prime Minister.6 
This state of political attachment not only undermined the 
very basis of independent nationhood but led also to a 
failure to mobilise Nigeriafs potential in international 
affairs.7 It had far-reaching repercussions for its
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relations with Japan.
Throughout Britain's colonial period in Nigeria, the 
administration pursued a policy of protectionism and other 
generally complementary anti-Japanese policies (see Chapter 
One) . These measures were the counterpart of political 
propaganda, a practice carried to such an extent that not 
only trading commodities but everything Japanese was held 
to be inferior. This was a campaign sustained to fever- 
pitch. By allowing Britain to direct its foreign policies 
after independence, the latter's priorities predominated. 
It therefore not only inherited but effectively retained an 
anti-Japanese foreign policy. The situation was further 
aggravated by the lopsided nature of trading relations and 
even though Nigeria opened an embassy in Japan and sent 
Alhaji Baba Gana as its first ambassador in August 1964, 
the distance persisted. A result was the 1965 trade ban 
against Japanese goods.
The civil war, 1967-70, economic realities and the 
increasing importance of oil in the international economic 
system combined to change Nigeria's external policies. If 
the increasing importance of oil did not do much to change 
the "invisible" nature of its foreign policy, as James 
Mayall believes8, the civil war re-ordered its priorities. 
At last, the Federal government realised that it had only 
been tacking behind the prevailing winds without enough 
power beneath to carry it to a destination of its own
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choice. Against the secessionist Biafra, Nigeria's support 
had come mainly from the Eastern bloc. These states 
actively supported its determination to avoid the break-up 
of the national polity. In contrast, the West with which 
it had aligned itself vacillated. Some, like France came 
close to siding openly with Biafra. Aluko9 considers the 
civil war as the most profound influence on Nigerian 
foreign policy because of the new realities of 
international relations that it generated.
The economic dimensions of these new realities had to do 
with credit for the various development projects envisaged 
in the First National Development Plan, covering the 
period, 1962-1968? for post-war reconstruction and for 
similar types of succeeding plans. All these plans 
required foreign capital, and the need for foreign capital, 
as one observer has shown, was now at a level where 
discrimination against certain sources became untenable.10 
From then on the policy was one of, ex ouocuncrue caoite; 
the source of foreign capital did not matter? the important 
thing was to get it. Consequently, Japan was increasingly 
brought to the centre-stage of foreign policy. The post- 
civil war period was without any doubt a turning point in 
Nigeria-Japan relations.
Admittedly, the ground had been prepared, to some extent, 
before the war. Thus, even though prejudices inherited 
from the colonial period affected the conception of
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Nigerian policies and attitudes towards Japan in the pre- 
1970 period, the government was still aware of the value of 
maintaining friendly relations. Its embassy in Japan, 
which was opened four years after independence, in 1964, 
was its first in the Far-East. However, after the civil 
war, it began actively to look to Japan in efforts to 
modernize the economy.11 From this period, the need for 
Japanese capital and the latter*s need for energy and raw 
material resources dictated closer cooperation. This 
relationship thereafter entered a new phase underscored by 
exchanges of visits and closer bilateral economic 
cooperation.
Although no visits have been made as yet at the state 
level, they have been made by high ranking government 
officials. On the Nigerian side, the visit in June 1977 of 
General James Oluleye, the Federal Commissioner for 
Finance, to Tokyo for talks with government leaders attests 
to increased cooperation. This particular visit was very 
important to the development of Nigeria-Japan relations 
because for the first time, Nigeria formally requested 
Japan for assistance in completing its Third National 
Development Plan (1975-1980) . It also asked for help in 
developing its mineral resources other than oil and in 
setting up a car plant.12 Other visits sponsored by the 
government and the private sector followed. The need was 
necessarily propelled by the realities of an economy 
already in increasing difficulties. it was against this
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background that a 30-member delegation of the Nigerian 
Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and 
Agriculture paid a visit to Japan in 1981 to attract 
capital and technical expertise for joint ventures with 
Nigerian industrialists and entrepreneurs. For this 
purpose also, and as a complement to the 1977 visit of 
General Oluleye, Professor Ishaya Audu, the Minister of 
External Affairs visited Japan in 1983. The main purpose 
on this occasion was to request general economic and
financial assistance for agricultural development projects 
and the construction of liquefied petroleum gas facilities 
and oil cracking plants.
The relationship gradually evolved, and as we have shown in 
previous chapters, it was marked by a high level of
economic activity. By 1980, Nigeria's Vice-President, Dr 
Alex Ekwueme, could speak of the "great scope for 
partnership between Nigeria and Japan." In this year too, 
as a mark of closer cooperation, two delegations from the 
National Assembly went to Japan to study its democratic 
institutions. The friendship had become so strong by 1984 
that when major earth tremors swept through three Nigerian 
states, Japan was the first country to offer assistance.13
It should be noted that the relationship developed in line
with the rapid growth of the Nigerian economy and its
willingness to involve Japanese interests while spending 
its petro-dollars. The decline in oil earnings since 1983
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has meant that once more, the relationship has become low- 
keyed and marked by a certain lethargy reminiscent of the 
pre-1970 relations.
II
JAPAN’S AFRICA FOREIGN POLICY 
For a proper understanding of Japanese-Africa policies it 
is necessary first to consider the development of post-war 
Japanese foreign policy. This will provide the context 
within which to identify Africa's position.
Prior to 1945, Japan had pursued a vigorous foreign policy 
which was outward looking and expansionist. All apparatus 
of state deferred to the military schema and the "zaibatsu" 
(financial cliques) were used to secure economic gains once 
military conquest was completed. Initially, much of the 
energy of state was spent in building a greater empire in 
South-East Asia, grandiloquently referred to as the 
"Greater East Asia Co. prosperity sphere". This aggressive 
tendency involved Japan in a disastrous Pacific War and 
ultimately led to the complete collapse of foreign policy 
and to the dissolution of empire. The mandate for the 
occupation of Japan was given to the United States by the 
victorious allied powers. As this occupation progressed, 
it became quite clear that in the new dispensation, there 
was no space for any independent foreign policy. The 
Japanese themselves were also too pre-occupied with
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rebuilding their economy to undertake any external policy.
As post-war US/Japanese relations thawed and the Americans 
became embroiled in the Korean conflict, the need for a 
powerful friendly Asian economy became part of the strategy 
of the Western alliance. By extension, this need meant 
obliging the Japanese to take much more independent control 
of their affairs. Accordingly, the San Francisco peace 
treaty of 1951 and the Peace Constitution that followed 
ushered in a new period of post-war independence albeit 
regulated by the United States.
This development however, did not lead to the sudden 
explosion of Japanese world interest with a corresponding 
policy to match. Having adopted a Peace Constitution, the 
Japanese were determined to secure their economic well­
being by pursuing a different kind of policy devoid of 
political considerations. In fact, its main pre-occupation 
was not to change the international situation or to play a 
more influential role but to adjust to it.14 The raison 
d'etre of the state became the pursuit of a vigorous 
international trade policy with little active consideration 
for world politics. In the 1960s, as the attainment of a 
higher standard of living seemed more than ever a 
realisable possibility, (its GNP which stood at a base of 
109 in 1950 had risen to 430 in 1960) , Japan started to 
rebuild its shattered image abroad but continued not only 
to rely on, but also to defer to the United States in all
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matters of foreign policy. This attitude which one writer 
has referred to as an "adaptive reflex"15 continued until 
1973: a date which marked the beginning of Japan fs
independent African policy.
It has been necessary to touch on the state of Japanese 
foreign policy before 1973 for a good reason. Because of 
the subordination of Japan's national interest to that of 
the United States, the policy considerations of the latter 
automatically predominated. Since relations with Nigeria, 
or indeed Africa were by no means a priority for the United 
States in these years of Cold War, Japanese-African 
relations did not develop and indeed withered even in 
Nigeria where some seeds had already been sown prior to 
1951. Africa was not considered important and was treated 
with the levity deserving of an unknown continent. There 
was no separate African department in the foreign office 
where issues concerning Nigeria could be handled. In fact, 
African issues were handled by a minor desk in its Middle 
Eastern Bureau. It was not until 1961 that a separate 
African position was established and even then continued as 
a minor department. This state of affairs had enormous 
repercussions for the development of Nigeria-Japanese 
relations. It continued until 1973 when the international 
politics of energy resources drew Nigeria and the rest of 
Africa sharply into the focus of foreign policy.
The events leading up to the 1973 energy crisis lie outside
293
the scope of this study. What is important to note, 
however, is that the immediate period was one of profound 
traumatic dislocation in the Japanese economy. The four­
fold increase in oil prices between October 1973 and 
January 1974, the cutback in oil production by Arab 
countries and the Arab embargo on the United States and the 
Netherlands created intolerable hardship in Japan as in 
most of the non-oil producing states.16 Not having much 
energy resources of its own, Japan was much more affected 
than any other consumer nation to the extent that its panic 
buying at the Rotterdam spot market helped to increase oil 
prices even more. This development was in the face of 
already existing United States restrictions on soyabean 
exports and the subsequent explosion of food and raw 
materials prices. Since Nigeria, and indeed Africa 
possessed enormous reserves of these resources, it was 
drawn sharply into the focus of Japan*s economic 
calculations.
It was then that an African foreign policy based on this 
need to secure vital resources, was formulated. According 
to the Prime-Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, in an address to 
the conference of Japan's ambassadors to Africa in 1974, 
Japan had to acknowledge that its existence and prosperity 
could no longer be viewed as something unrelated to the 
vast area that is Africa. The problem of where to position 
Japan's relations with Africa in Japan's diplomacy, he 
continued, was a task to be tackled from then on.17 In the
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realization of this new objective, the Foreign Minister, 
Toshio Kimura became the first Cabinet Minister to visit 
Nigeria and four other African states in 1974. Since then, 
similar visits have been made and further assurances given 
about Japan*s genuine interest to assist in Africa*s 
development. At a breakfast meeting held between the 
Japanese Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe and 24 ambassadors 
of the member states of the OAU at the Foreign Ministry 
Guest House Tokyo, in 1983, the Japanese government 
reiterated its commitment to continue to provide economic 
assistance to complement these African nations*s own 
efforts to achieve economic development.
These assurances however were mere diplomatic manoeuvres 
since Japan*s Africa relations were essentially dependent 
on the exigencies of the moment. No distinct and 
sustainable Africa policy existed in Japan between 1960 and 
1985 except for like-periodic statements and reviews of 
activities published in the Diplomatic Bluebook and similar 
documents. The state has tried through the provision of 
aid where necessary (see Chapter Five) to secure its 
private interests. Africa very rarely features in both 
private and public discussions in Japan, except with regard 
to the sourcing of raw materials. In fact, it could be 
summarized without any fear of contradiction that the whole 
Africa policy operates in fits and starts.
As Robert Ozaki and Walter Arnold18, have correctly
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identified, the phases of Japanfs Africa policy fall into 
an easily identifiable pattern?
1. The pre-1973 period when Japan's Africa relations were
minimal or non-existent;
2. The post-1973 period when the energy and raw materials
crisis drove Africa increasingly into the reckoning 
and?
3. The period from 1975 when Japan having weathered the
oil crisis, lowered its high inflationary trend,
adjusted its balance of payment position and recovered 
from recession let its Africa relations revert to its 
pre-1973 position.
Thus, it is quite clear that economic factors have 
determined the nature of importance attached to relations 
with Nigeria. This feature of Nigeria-Japanese relations, 
a phenomenon one writer has correctly referred to as "high 
economics and low politics"19, hinges on the latter's need 
for raw material supplies and an overseas market with 
effective demand for its industrial products. There is no 
doubt on the face of it, that Japan views Nigeria as 
politically important20? its ministers and officials 
sometimes wax lyrical on the subject. Still, among its 
diplomatic corps, service in Nigeria is regarded as almost 
analogous to the old Soviet exile to Siberia? something 
they would rather not wish to experience.21 This extremely 
low level of political interest tied to the paucity of aid,
presents one conclusively with evidence that Nigeria is in 
Japan’s view, a theatre where its predilection for business 
without frills can be played out. A situation where it 
could extract values without the added weighty baggage of 
attendant political concern that are associated with such 
economic rewards. The various diplomatic efforts made by 
Japan with respect to Nigeria bears this out.
In 1953, Japan established a consulate in Lagos which it 
upgraded to a full embassy in 1961, shortly after Nigeria’s 
independence. In 1956, JETRO sponsored a six-man trade and 
economic mission which held extensive deliberations with 
the Nigerian minister for Trade and Industries (see Chapter 
One). This 1956 effort was followed up in March 1960 when 
the government sponsored another mission on economic and 
technical cooperation to seek ways in which its 
entrepreneurs could cooperate and assist in developing the 
business and industry of Nigeria. (Also noted in Chapter 
One) .
In 1970 (followed later in 1978) a high powered delegation 
of the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organisations) had 
visited Nigeria as part of its African tour programme. Its 
purpose was purely economic. In 1971 a 19-man economic 
delegation led by Mr Shinobu Ichikawa also came to Nigeria 
to seek out the possibility of future joint ventures. It 
was during this visit that Japan’s interest in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry was first officially put to the
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government. The visit of Foreign Minister, Kimura in 1974 
was again necessitated by the need to diversify resources 
supply. The last visit, July 1979 was also due to the 
dictates of economic needs in the period of the second 
world energy crisis.
Relations between both nations have therefore simply 
mirrored Japanese economic aspirations and have proceeded 
without considerations for African national interests or 
any other political considerations as we shall show 
shortly. Nigeria possesses oil and other natural resources 
which is of enormous importance to Japan. It relations 
with Japan can therefore only be understood viewed from the 
context of Japan's needs for resource supply in Africa. 
This is a view with which Hideo Oda and Kazuyoshi Aoki22, 
Nobutoshi Akao23, as well as Joanna Moss and John 
Ravenhill24 would agree. It is a phenomenon that manifests 
itself in many ways: In a public opinion survey on
diplomacy carried out by the Prime Minister's Secretariat, 
on June 13, 1982, 27 per cent of the opinion sample had no 
idea whether relations with African countries were 
important, 34 per cent said it was not important and only 
39 per cent thought them worthwhile.25 On this problem, 
Professor Nish, the distinguished scholar of Japan at the 
LSE could only commiserate with the author. Japanese 
intellectuals explain this state of affairs on the basis of 
Japan's lack of political experience in Africa, and high 
ranking Japanese officials find other excuses. The former
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Foreign Minister, Toshio Kimura in a speech at the 16th 
anniversary of the inauguration of the OAU put it down to 
geographical considerations.26 As if both the alleged lack 
of political experience and distance was something that 
fifty years of very profitable relations with Nigeria could 
do nothing whatsoever to ameliorate. It is further 
claimed, by way of reassurance in official circles, that 
Africa* s position can only improve from the new 
assertiveness creeping into Japanese foreign policy. Since 
anyone who lives on a diet of hope would die fasting, we 
can but agree with Owoeye when he asserts that Japan is 
only seeking in both Nigeria and the rest of Africa, a 
reliable and guaranteed long term supply of natural 
resources which it requires for both domestic and 
industrial purposes.27 The only rider is that it had 
sought to ameliorate this position by the high level of 
interdependence that marks its economic cooperation with 
Nigeria. It is this position that , mainly interests our 
analysis? that is, since Japan*s interest was purely 
economic, how did Nigeria try to gain from this? However, 
any analysis of this political side of relations that did 
not consider the Japanese conception of Africa as a 
"treasure house of natural resources" would be totally 
inadmissible.
Ill
JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. 1967-1970
A pointer to Nigeria's relative lack of importance in 
Japan's political calculations is the nature of the 
latter's response to the Nigerian civil war, 1967-1970. We 
need not enter into a background study of the war since 
much has been written about it.28 It is important to note 
however that the issue involved was national identity: the 
feeling by the Igbos that since the federal state had 
failed to secure their general interests and was seemingly 
indifferent to the genocide by the Muslim North, they were 
better off being politically on their own. The primary 
point here is that the situation was not different from 
that in many new states where society and polity are not 
necessarily congruent. In Nigeria, it was not so much a 
case that unresolved tensions of the colonial period, 
(those sources of myriad resentment settled by 
"pacification" as Davidson29 would put it) were now re­
launched within the nation state that was still the 
colonial state. The natural tensions between different 
communities were re-inforced by intra-elite conflicts. It 
was simply the case that the inheritance elite who marched 
through the carnivals of pseudo-parliamentary charade 
chanting hymns to the "dear Fatherland" (as the anthem 
proclaimed) plus ten per cent had failed to reconcile their 
interests and brought in the masses to fight in their own 
war. When Africa's disease of military dysplasia 
threatened to sideline these interests they retreated to
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their regions and using religion and ethnic interests 
unleashed a trail of bloodshed, like denied vampires. In 
1967, a full scale civil war erupted.
From war documents and from major works on this issue, it 
is clear that Japan*s response was simply nonchalant. When 
Mr Hasiji Hattori arrived in Nigeria as Japan's new 
ambassador in 1967, his main concern was not the looming 
crisis which threatened to dismember the country but the 
Yen credit agreement.30 (See Chapter Five) In fact, the 
military leader, General Yakubu Gowon had to give him an 
assurance that the crisis would not stand in the way of 
trade and other types of cooperation.31 The following 
year, 1968, Nigeria solicited the help of Japan for the 
development of its telecommunications programme. The 
latter was most reluctant to help since its officials 
openly voiced doubts whether Nigeria would remain intact 
after the war.32 In 1969, the government of Japan assured 
Mr G. Dove-Edwin, Nigeria's ambassador of its absolute 
support for the stand of the Nigerian federal government.33 
By this time, the Biafran forces were not only in retreat 
but were rapidly collapsing and it was clear whose 
interests had prevailed. At the end of the war, in 1970, 
Japan's new ambassador, Mr Akira Shigemitsu offered his 
government's praise for the efforts of the federal forces 
in winning the war and bringing about unity and stability. 
He drew attention to the fact that they had done it "by 
themselves", an unintended irony that was not lost on his
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host and audience, Colonel Mobolaji Johnson, the military 
governor of Lagos.34
The above attitude of disinterest shown in Nigeria's 
greatest hour of need is marked out in many other ways and 
supported by other sources. John Stremlau's definitive 
book on the International Politics of the Nigeria civil war 
makes no mention of any Japanese efforts.35 Japan's only 
contribution was to reconstruction efforts. The government 
gave a $1 million grant to Nigeria to help alleviate the 
refugee problem, and the Japan Ship Building Association 
(principal member of the Motorist Federation of Japan) 
donated eight ambulances for relief and reconstruction 
purposes.36 Even then, the purpose was clear enough: the 
interest of its private capital would best be served by an 
accelerated return of economic conditions to the status quo 
ante. This case was a clear illustration of the essence of 
Japan's policy towards Africa summed up by Michael Leifer 
who observed that "it appears to convey the impression of 
getting off the political fence without in practice being 
obliged to take such an uncharacteristic step".37 In this 
particular instance, if we may be allowed to take Leifer's 
metaphor one step further, it was the case that Japan 
"hovered above the fence" without any intention of 
attempting to sit on it. As mentioned earlier, this 
response was typical of Japan's general response to 
political issues affecting Nigeria other aspects of which 
are considered below.
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IV
JAPAN1S RESPONSE TO AFRICAN ISSUES AFFECTING NIGERIA 
i) JAPAN AND APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
An aspect of international politics that further underlines 
Nigeria*s lack of importance in Japan*s political 
calculations, has been the latter*s South Africa policy. 
Because of the predominance of economic motives in Japan*s 
Africa policy the rope of political interest has been kept 
slack with a total lack of consideration for Nigeria *s 
political sensitivities. Our first task is to show the 
central place occupied in Nigeria*s policy by the struggle 
for black liberation in South Africa. We would then gauge 
Japan*s response and show the reality of economic needs.
Since Nigeria's independence, Africa has always been the 
centre-piece of its foreign policy. The liquidation of 
racial oppression in the whole of the continent is a very 
important aspect of this policy to which large resources 
were devoted. The anti-apartheid position was clearly 
defined in a policy statement by the former head of state, 
General Yakubu Gowon in 1969. Among other things, it 
declared that "Nigeria considers the existence of white 
supremacist regimes anywhere in Africa as a positive menace 
and a threat to her independence and territorial 
integrity". The policy committed the nation, "wholly to 
the struggle against racial oppression".38
This position was made clear to Japan in no uncertain terms 
on different occasions. In 1974, during Foreign Minister 
Toshio Kimura1 s visit to Nigeria (as part of his five- 
nation African tour), the Nigerian head of state requested 
that Japan switch its imports of agricultural produce from 
South Africa to other African nations. He stated that; 
"all that Nigeria and indeed, Africa would like to achieve 
with regards to South Africa is to see the Republic change 
her apartheid policy".39 Prior to this, in May 1973, the 
meeting of Japanese ambassadors to fourteen African states 
had alerted their government to the strong feelings in 
Africa regarding apartheid in South Africa. They warned 
that Japan would not hope to develop close links with black 
Africa without showing support for the anti-apartheid 
movement.40 At a further meeting between Nigeria's head of 
state, General Olusegun Obasanjo and the visiting Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Mr Sunao Sonada, these sentiments were 
again clearly expressed. Japan was called upon to increase 
its pressure against South Africa. In fact, Japan's link 
with apartheid South Africa again dominated top-level 
discussions held between Nigeria and Japan in July 1979.41
In its response to these well articulated national 
feelings, Japan elected for a highly hypocritical approach. 
On the surface, through very well polished public 
pronouncements, it stood firmly with world opinion on the 
issue. But an examination of its real response to this 
central issue reveals international jiggery-pokery? a
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pathetic case of a nation sacrificing its moral values on 
the altar of materialism.
This visceral perfidy dressed up in the garb of support for 
anti-apartheid fervour took effect from 1966 when Japan 
officially declared its stand against apartheid. This 
stand came in the form of a declaration at the United 
Nations which stated that, "the policies of racial 
discrimination whenever and wherever they have been 
practised and by whatever racial groups against another 
have inevitably and invariably retarded the progress of 
humanity for a world of peace and justice".42 Before this 
date however, Japan's UN representatives had abstained on 
the motion to expel South Africa and Portugal from the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and voted against 
proposals to impose extensive sanctions on South Africa in 
1962.43 After the 1966 declaration, it embarked on a 
wishy-washy policy and contrived somewhat, at least on the 
official level, to maintain a semblance of an anti­
apartheid stance.
This cosmetic practice was carried out in a series of 
operations in different years whenever prevailing economic 
conditions permitted. It was a highly professional public 
relations venture which started in 1967 when Japan 
participated in an international seminar on Apartheid held 
in Kitwe, Zambia. After this meeting, it made a donation 
of $20,000 to the United Nations' education and training
scheme for black South Africans. In 1971, it banned the 
sale of arms (which it has never sold abroad) to the racist 
enclave and in 1973, the meeting of its ambassadors to 
fourteen African states further emphasised the need for 
more positive action if it was to improve its economic 
links with black African nations. In the following year, 
1974, it downgraded its embassy in Pretoria to a consulate 
and refused to grant visas to South Africans. On 5 June, 
it announced a suspension of cultural, sports and 
educational ties. At the United Nations in September, a 
highly acclaimed speech confirmed this commitment to 
Africa. In 1977, Japanese firms were prohibited from 
undertaking joint ventures in South Africa and Japan 
imposed further restrictions on a number of other 
exchanges. In 1981, Japan's foreign minister, Sunao Sonada 
gave a speech at the 40 th session of the UN General 
Assembly in which he denounced apartheid in no uncertain 
terms. He stated clearly Japan's position which is that it 
is "determined to take whatever steps it considers 
necessary until the government of South Africa embarks upon 
drastic and specific reforms for the abolition of 
Apartheid".44 In 1984, after South Africa had imposed 
martial law, Japan refused to buy Krugerrands or to sell 
computer equipment there. On October 9, 1985, the Japanese 
government announced a decision to impose further sanctions 
on South Africa on account of the latter's continued 
adherence to Apartheid policies. Among other things, these 
sanctions include a ban on the import of iron and steel,
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the sale of computers to the South African police and the 
import of Krugerrand gold coins.
These policy objectives were very laudable in so far as 
they sought to bring pressure to bear on apartheid South 
Africa. In fact, our examination of Japan's voting records 
at the United Nations, confirms that it has voted in 
support of African nations condemning raids by the South 
Africa military into Mozambique and Angola and policies 
towards Namibia. On the face of it, this demonstrates a 
high level of commitment to African issues affecting 
Nigeria. However, if one overlooks the political theatre 
and hastens to step away from the much expended klieg 
lights a different reality emerges. Indeed, the whole 
Japanese anti-apartheid policy calls to mind the elaborate 
De Gaullian manoeuvre45 as evidence at our disposal 
suggests that Japan's anti-apartheid policies were mere 
theatrical displays which only served to divert attention 
from the big tents to the side shows.
Kitazawa, Richard, Morikawa, Prestowitz, Spring, and 
others46, have all carried out extensive research on the 
question of Japan's relations with South Africa and we 
shall not attempt to reproduce this vast literature. Our 
basic task here is to demonstrate how economic needs 
subverted all other aspects of Japan's sensitivities to 
this international issue at the centre of Nigeria's Africa 
policy.
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Japan*s trade with South Africa dates back to the early 
years of the century, and from the 1960s, the Republic 
began to account for a significant portion of its overseas 
trade. Since apartheid had become the official policy at 
this time, Japan sought for, was conferred with, and 
accepted an "honourary white" status in 1961. It did very 
little to restrict the activities of its private companies 
and carried on a policy of "blind" trade.
From the studies above and from other related sources, as 
well as from documents dealing with international commerce, 
it is quite clear that a great divide exist between 
political rhetoric and the realities of economic existence. 
Both the needs of the Japanese economy for strategic raw 
materials and minerals supply as well as the need for 
overseas market with sustainable supply interests have 
conspired to ensure that government anti-apartheid policies 
remain in the main, "a death of an oyster diminishes me" 
after-seafood dinner speech. Since 1961 when the Japanese 
were accorded an "honourary white" status to enable 
commercial and other activities to be carried out in South 
Africa, extensive banking and investment activities, as 
part of the process of the internationalization of the 
economy, have been maintained. Its needs for supplies of 
certain strategic minerals from South Africa leap-frogged 
from a part supply source to a position of 
indispensability. Since South Africa had assumed a 
position of great importance in this supply economics,
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Japan*s position on anti-apartheid was severely compromised 
and a posture of ambivalence became inevitable.
Japan not only depended on South Africa for its Vanadium 
ore, calico-chrome, platinum chrome ore, manganese ore and 
felo-chrome, but also for the supply of uranium ore mined 
by South Africa in Namibia.47 By 1979, its dependence on 
South Africa for the supply of these minerals had assumed 
a disproportionate position accounting for the following 
percentages in its entire world demand.
Fig. 6(i) A8
MINERAL ORE TOTAL JAPANESE DEMAND
(IN PERCENTAGE)
Vanadium 100
Calico Chrome 92
Felo Chrome 71
Chrome Ore 41
Radium Lumps 75
Manganese Ore 48
Platinum 34
By this date also, it had become South Africa*s biggest 
customer for chromium and platinum49, as well as the 
largest export market for South African sugar.
The necessities of a world based economy may have made 
South Africa indispensable to Japan for strategic minerals 
but it was a partnership which was not one-sided but highly 
symbiotic. South Africa needed Japan as much as Japan 
needed it. With the Republic's decision to embark on rapid 
industrialization in the 1960s, it came to rely
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increasingly on Japan in the face of an international trade 
boycott, for its supplies of plant, equipment and 
machinery50, as well as for technical assistance in 
constructing dams, railways and generally for the creation 
of social and public overhead capital. Japanese private 
capital also found a lucrative outlet in the manufacturing 
sector, especially motor manufacturing and related assembly 
plants.
This interdependence not only increased but did so in 
geometrical progression. In 1974, at the end of the game 
of musical chairs being played by the major industrial 
powers51 over links with South Africa, Japan was the 
republic's fourth largest trading partner. However, this 
was a position that could only improve since the other 
major trading partners of South Africa had by now started 
their policy of de-linking. By 1981, Japan had become the 
republic's second largest trading partner? the republic 
accounting for 37.4 per cent of its total African trade.52 
Since then, long-term supply contracts have been signed53 
and investments have doubled.54 The method of these 
investments have varied from time to time depending on the 
build up of international pressure. In the face of 
increasing international condemnation, the Japanese trading 
companies adopted the practice of setting up dummy 
corporations (Yurei Kaisha) financed by South African 
capital. Even discountenancing this practice, its Foreign 
Direct Investment, both portfolio and greenfield, is very
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substantial. Toyota*s South Africa plant, for instance, is 
the company*s largest plant outside Japan.
There is nothing inherent inviting special condemnation in 
this Japanese posture considering the general cosmetic 
approach adopted by the industrialized countries on trade 
sanctions against South Africa. However, as Kitazawa has 
pointed out, the rapid growth of Japan*s South Africa trade 
represented an alarming trend not found among other major 
trade partners of South Africa such as the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America.55 One may add to this 
also, the attempts made by some Western economic powers 
such as West Germany and the USA to embark on disinvestment 
programmes. Despite the ambivalence of Margaret Thatcher*s 
government which was apartheid*s biggest supporter and 
where economic sanctions were positively discouraged, 
private organisations took up the mantle and championed the 
case against apartheid. In Japan, not only did government 
policy fall short of the standards expected of it but also 
public sentiment against apartheid has been essentially 
non-existent. 56In fact, as Prestowitz and Baker have 
shown57, key members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
belong to the Japan-South Africa Parliamentary Friendship 
League which advocates closer ties with South Africa based 
on the reality of Japan*s economic needs. Recent 
scholarship supports the view that financial commitments 
strengthening apartheid did increase.58
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The increased financial commitment was indicative of an 
effective lack of willingness by Japan to treat with any 
consideration, the central issue in Nigeriafs foreign 
policy. Moreover, this apathy permeates the fabric of 
Japanese society and is very much evident in policy 
options. A few illustrations highlight this assessment.
The first indication may be most readily glimpsed from the 
reply of the Japanfs Foreign Minister, Toshio Kimura, to 
General Gowonfs demand that Japan switch its imports of 
agricultural produce from South Africa to other African 
states. While insisting that Japan was doing its best in 
the fight against apartheid, Mr Kimura stated that Japan 
could not scale down dealings with South Africa immediately 
but was prepared to substitute essential raw materials from 
other parts of the continent, if available. Implicit in 
this statement is the admission that so long as these 
commodities were unavailable elsewhere, Japan would 
continue to obtain them from South Africa despite the 
inhuman policies of the racist enclave. In fact, this lack 
of political commitment was an issue touched on by an 
editorial of the "Japan Times"59 on Toshio Kimura*s visit. 
This newspaper expressed the view that Japan must be 
prepared to take difficult political decisions in the years 
ahead if it hoped to sustain the new found meeting of minds 
with proud black African states. In retrospect, it was a 
sacrifice that Japan was not willing to make as the various 
examples (above) and further evidence below clearly
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illustrate.
This last pointer has to do with the selective nature of 
the limited sanctions imposed by Japan. As Prestowitz and 
Baker60 have put it, "areas of trade that matter" were not 
affected by the sanctions. Coal, which is one of the 
commodities excluded on grounds of national security, 
abounds in the United States but Japan choose to import it 
from South Africa where the use of exploited cheap black 
labour guaranteed lower prices. As this article further 
shows, this practice was even against the background of 
sustained efforts by US trade negotiators to persuade Japan 
to switch its imports to the United States.
The over-riding economic motivation above ensured that even 
the little political remonstrance that Japan was prepared 
to muster in support of anti-apartheid efforts was highly 
qualified. In the early years of the anti-apartheid 
struggle, it not only stood firm against any economic 
sanction but failed to support the suggestion by African 
states that South Africa be expelled from the United 
Nations. Its reasoning, like that of the industrialized 
Western nations, was that this would negate the diversity 
and universality that characterises the United Nations and 
reduce the effectiveness of the international body's action 
against South Africa. Also, if one looks at Japan's record 
at the United Nations, it is always very careful, in its 
condemnation of apartheid, to emphasise its opposition to
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apartheid and not the South African government.61 This 
exceedingly limited political action has been dependent on 
the ebb and flow of the world market. At the close of our 
period, 1985, Japan had become more positive in its anti­
apartheid posture. At this point, however, the supply of 
South African raw materials was no longer a dominant 
concern in Japan*s economic security calculations. As in 
other areas where the absence of, or laxity of certain 
actions leads to increasing embarrassment for any 
government, the apologia officially adopted resurrects the 
anti-slavery debate.
The official line is that Japan is one of many and cannot 
be singled out for condemnation especially given its 
peculiar circumstances. Japan perceives itself as a trading 
nation and is economically so vulnerable that it cannot 
afford to practice economic blackmail for political ends.62 
Such a rationalisation lacks intellectual integrity. 63
What the Japanese have demonstrated in their unwillingness 
to enforce a measure of economic discipline in their 
dealings with South Africa is the lack of any useful desire 
to enforce sanctions. The ever expanding trading links 
indicate that Nigeria*s opinions and legitimate aspirations 
have meant very little in Japan*s foreign policy 
calculations. This is despite anti-apartheid policy being 
Nigeria*s major foreign policy objective in Africa and the 
nation expending a great deal of scarce resources in
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pursuit of this objective. When added up with the other 
factors previously enumerated such as the paucity of aid 
provided and investments undertaken, the absence of any 
desire to assist Nigeria in its greatest hour of need 
during the civil war, the picture that emerges clearly 
shows that for Japan, Nigeria is just another market. We 
need only examine the final aspect of this kind of response 
to further underscore the point. This last point concerns 
Japan’s attitude to African nationalist aspirations. To be 
able to effectively underline this point — * as Nigeria is 
also an oil producing country —  there is the need to show 
the sensitivity to Arab interests and compare this to 
Nigeria1 s.
(II)
JAPAN AND AFRICAN NATIONALISM
A study of Japan’s United Nations record and policies on 
African nationalism corresponds closely to its position on 
Apartheid and other issues already considered. It is quite 
clear that on this issue, the Japanese were content to hide 
under the ’’sekei bunci" policy while carrying on a 
hypocritical practice. This practice was clearly stated at 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1957. On 9 
September, Mr Aiichiro Fujiyama, the Japanese Foreign 
Minister adopted what amounted to a patronising outlook
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when he clarified Japan's position. According to him, 
Japan sympathised with African nationalist aspirations but 
would like the people engaged in the realization of these 
goals to desist from arbitrary actions, narrow mindedness 
and work for their economic, political and social progress 
in a spirit of tolerance and trust.64
Japan espoused and developed this patronising attitude 
further at the General Assembly plenary meeting in 1962. 
At this session, Japan openly counselled Africans who 
wished for independence to be more patient and less 
distrustful of colonial powers.65 Prior to this date, in 
1960, it had voted against the Soviet proposal for a United 
Nations timetable for independence for all colonies by 
1961.66 Its position was that colonialism and imperialism 
should be ended promptly and unconditionally since the 
right to self-determination was guaranteed to all 
peoples.67 This position, on the face of it, clearly 
demonstrated support for colonial peoples. In practice, it 
was not so. Rather, it was the opinion of a nation which 
was reluctant and, not at all, willing to help to secure a 
definite commitment on independence from the colonial 
powers. We need not go far for this explanation: the 1962 
speech (above) is clearly illustrative. Not only was this 
reluctance the case, but it also shows, as Agbi has 
correctly observed, the unwillingness of Japan to 
understand the aspirations of peoples in countries where 
the colonial powers were reluctant to grant independence.68
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A diabolical hypocrisy is exposed in Japan*s refusal to 
apply the resolutions of the United Nations on colonialism. 
Japan's attitude is diabolical because it voted in support 
of some of these resolutions which it afterwards 
practically ignored. A major economic power, it gave 
encouragement to those determined to disregard world moral 
opinion and continue with their inhuman policies.
Two cases most readily epitomise this point: Namibia and 
Zimbabwe. The issue of Namibia is closely tied to the 
struggle against South Africa. The territory known as 
South West Africa was colonized by Germany, and after the 
first world war became a League of Nations mandate, passing 
under a United Nations trusteeship in 1945. During this 
period, South Africa unilaterally assumed control of the 
area despite protestations from the people of the 
territory. Following an International Court of Justice 
advisory opinion in 1971 which questioned South Africa's 
tenure, international pressure mounted against South Africa 
to relinquish control. Nigeria, with many other African 
states, championed this struggle, and channelled support to 
the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) which 
had emerged as the leading nationalist group. Intense 
lobbying at the United Nations produced minor results, such 
as the UN's rejection of South Africa's plan for the 
division of Namibia into tribal homelands and eventual 
independence, in 1974. Later, following the
crystallisation of world opinion against South Africa,
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significant steps were taken by the UN to guarantee 
eventual independence for the territory. In 1975, the UN 
Council for the administration of Namibia passed a 
declaration which was meant to limit further economic 
plunder by South Africa. This decision concerned mining 
activities. It stated that "no natural resources should be 
exported from the territory" without its consent.
In total disregard for this declaration, South Africa 
continued to undertake mining activities for strategic 
mineral resources especially, uranium. Japan was the 
nation which virtually guaranteed the demand for these 
minerals. Among other things, it was the major customer 
for the controversial Rossing uranium mine in Namibia. 
This connection with South Africa regarding Namibia, has 
been studied in detail by Kitazawa Yoko69 who documents in 
detail a nation's complete disregard for world moral order 
and virtual abandonment of Africa's nationalist 
aspirations. The dynamics of this relationship, constitute 
a study in microcosm of moral atrophy which has been 
characteristic of Japan's response to such African issues. 
At the UN, Japan continued with long winded speeches 
censuring South Africa.70
The same attitude was adopted in response to the 
independence struggle in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). The 
Zimbabwean struggle is a test case of Japan's overall 
attitude to Nigerian and African nationalist aspirations as
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it epitomised nationalist struggles everywhere in Africa 
because of the settler factor. It was also a case where 
Lagos took centre-stage and began training militia and 
other personnel for the nationalist groups in Zimbabwe. It 
also took a strong position with the British government on 
the issue. On the whole Zimbabwe question, Japan was 
against the use of force by the groups fighting for 
independence, a position which was completely in opposition 
to the stand of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) . 
Its policy was to defer to Britain's leadership in the 
crisis precipitated by Ian Smith's UDI between 1962-1965.
It only closed its consulate in Salisbury in May 1968 when 
it had become clear that the struggle had taken a different 
direction. Following this development, its Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, MITI, announced that it 
would no longer underwrite insurance for goods destined for 
the territory. As in South Africa, where rhetoric was not 
matched by decisive action, it continued to defy the UN and 
trade with Zimbabwe. This prompted an OAU report in 1974, 
to describe Japan as "the most notorious sanctions 
buster".71
We isolated these two African issues? Namibia and Zimbabwe, 
because more than any other nationalist struggle (apart 
from Angola and Mozambique) Nigeria championed these causes 
which became a matter for national pride. These facts are 
often countered by the suggestion that Japan was not 
apathetic to African nationalist aspirations because it was
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the first Western nation to recognise the independence of 
Guinea Bissau in August 1974. Contrary evidence is more 
convincing, however. First, before this date, Japan had 
abstained on a vote for a resolution censuring Portugal and 
advocating independence for Guinea Bissau, at the 28th 
General Assembly of the United Nations in November, 1973. 
Secondly, it could afford to do this because Portugal was 
a minor European power whose trade with Japan amounted to 
very little. There was no fear of political reprisal from 
any quarter. The real reason therefore was political 
expediency: this was the period of the world energy and raw 
materials crisis and the start of Japan's new African 
diplomacy. The recognition of Guinea Bissau's
independence, a tiny African state occupied by a puny 
European power involved very little political or economic 
exertion and presented an excellent platform for the take­
off of this policy.
As stated earlier, our main purpose is to show how far 
Japan was willing to back issues in the mainstream of 
Nigerian foreign policy. Relevant here is the fact that 
Nigeria is a leading African state and also a major 
producer of oil. Let us therefore place side-by-side 
Japan's response to Arab nationalist feelings in the case 
of the Palestinian struggle in order to see how the edifice 
of "sekei bunci" stands in the face of minimum pressure.
Again, from its record at the United Nations, it is clear
that Japan eschewed a non-political stand and took positive 
action in support of the Palestinians. It supported this 
struggle from the beginning. In 1970, it voted for 
resolution 2628 (XXV) of the General Assembly which called 
for respect for the rights of the Palestinian peoples. It 
further voted for another General Assembly resolution 
(2792D.XXVI) recognising the Palestinian right to self 
determination. J.C. Hurewitz's study72 provides an 
adequate illustration of the political wimp suddenly became 
assertive when its energy requirements were placed in 
jeopardy thus threatening the basis of its whole industrial 
structure. This logic is not difficult to follow. Japan 
depends heavily on Arab states for its energy supplies: a 
situation clearly recognised by policy. For example, a 
JETRO publication explains? "close economic ties with the 
area are vital for Japan's national economic security".73 
It therefore seems to have succumbed to the pressure of 
economic needs and the UN automatic majority and took a 
positive stand to back an issue so sensitive to Israel 
considering that the official policy of most of the Arab 
states was then to drive Israel into the sea. It was 
purely a question of economic importance: Africa was not 
important enough for Japan to get off Michael Leifer's 
"political fence". In the Arab case, it discarded its 
political wimp image and entered for an Olympic gold medal 
in political arm-twisting.
What is striking is that Japan was able to disregard
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African political sensitivities without suffering any 
opportunity cost. During the period that Japan an economic 
giant was willing and anxious to play the role of a 
political dwarf74, its trade with the continent increased 
by 500 per cent.75
Japan *s excessively minimalist and cautious attitude 
adopted towards Nigeria*s national interests can be 
explained, because its interests were not only identical 
with the ex-colonial powers and South Africa but protected 
by them. Unlike China, it did not use its membership of 
the United Nations to support Africa*s nationalist 
aspirations because it felt secure in the Western camp.76 
The willingness of Japan*s foreign policy to shadow that of 
France and Britain with regard to these central issues in 
Nigerian Africa policy may be further understood in another 
way. As a defeated power, it was anxious to win back the 
favour of the allied powers since its economic recovery 
depended on precisely that effort. However, this 
explanation is untenable. The issue of nationalist 
aspirations in international relations cannot be subjected 
to the need for economic self preservation of any one 
state.
What we have demonstrated in this chapter is Japan *s 
consistently hypocritical policy in the way whereby it paid 
lip service to the promoters of African nationalism and 
Nigeria in particular.
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Two important issues arise from this conclusion. The first 
is the question: 'What other states which had material
rather than propaganda status in any country (not just 
Nigeria) are prepared to sacrifice them for nationalist 
sensitivities?' Judging from the conduct of international 
political economy since I960, the answer is none. If this 
is the case, is the above then a totally justifiable 
parameter to apply in assessing Japan's political conduct 
with respect to Nigerian issues? Again, our response would 
be in the negative. It may also seem contradictory to our 
position - which is that the obstacles hindering a 
beneficial interchange between the North and the South lie 
within the South - that we have outlined the lack of 
political sensitivity of the Northern state.
The answers to the above questions are not far-fetched. 
Our attempt in the first instance was merely to show the 
interplay of international factors affecting this 
relationship and how the two states reacted to them. As we 
said earlier, to seek to secure material interests is a 
legitimate aspiration of foreign policy. In the second, 
the conclusion reached concerning Japan's lack of political 
sensitivities does not weaken but is rather useful to our 
position. This is because part of the argument of those 
who believe that the Southern states are caught in an 
inherent web of disability in their relations with the 
developing economies, is the exercise of undue political 
influence. The argument is tied closely to imperialism and
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neo-colonialism which is at the centre of this dependency 
position. To summarise this position, the political 
control exercised by the developed countries often results 
to skewed development and reinforces underdevelopment 
because this leads to the emergence of a comprador elite. 
This elite are often the managers of a periphery existing
to serve the development objectives of the hegemon. The
v
client state therefore will never benefit from any economic 
relationship with the centre as a result of the distortions 
inherent in this system. Indeed, all other aspects of the 
dependency analysis may be said to be predicated on this 
"client-state" phenomenon.
Japan, which has no colonial relationship with Africa, also 
operates a "trade for trade alone" policy, as we have 
conclusively proved in the chapter. Since this is the 
case, the developing economy had been presented with a new 
set of relationships and an almost classic ideal for a most 
beneficial interchange? and if we are to extend this 
position, for conditions necessary to make a fresh start. 
Yet, in the twenty-five years considered, the benefits of 
this relationship failed to accrue largely to the 
developing economy. Why did the Southern economy, in this 
case Nigeria, fail to exploit the new relationship that was 
free of the paradigm constructed by dependency analysis? 
It may be posited that this inability resulted from the 
mode of production enforced by the first relationship (the 
colonial heritage). But, how could this be the case here?
As we have shown, the pattern of Nigeria's production would 
have benefitted her since Japan was ever desirous of its 
products. This was not the case however, as none of these 
products were forthcoming. It seems to us therefore, that 
the answer lies in the operation of the domestic economy 
and not in the international system.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
I
THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THESIS
A central object of this thesis has been to illustrate the 
interplay of domestic factors hindering the effective 
participation of a Southern economy in the international system. 
This approach is in opposition to the thesis articulated by 
dependency analysts in which the international system acts as the 
prime stumbling block. Both positions, that is, the failure to 
mobilise potential and properly articulate development objectives 
resulting from structural distortions in the domestic economy, 
and dependency analysis are part of the conventional wisdom on 
development in the third world. This debate has historical roots 
and may only be properly understood within that context.
Sustained growth, as the product of domestic and international 
activity, has been at the foundation of economic thought from 
Adam Smith to Keynes.1 Different factors have been identified 
as the prime movers for development. To many theorists, this 
change was propelled by capital, the accumulation of which was 
seen as an end in itself. Some, however, sought alternative 
explanations. To Joseph Schumpeter,2 entrepreneurial sprit was 
the prime-mover. The economic basis for human progress 
(sustained growth) seemed limited by inherent and easily 
identifiable barriers. David Ricardo3 argued that agriculture,
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then wrongly attributed with diminishing returns as opposed to 
increasing returns in industry, would act as a barrier to 
development. It was on this basis that the Rev. Thomas Malthus4 
propounded a theory of population as a threat to development. 
According to Malthus, populations which grew at geometrical 
progression as opposed to arithmetical progression in food 
production would finally outstrip agricultural productivity. 
Characteristically, reservations about the prospects of sustained 
growth were most articulately put by John Maynard Keynes. 
Expressed in terms of the falling marginal efficiency schedule 
of capital, Keynes believed that "as capital accumulation 
proceeded, new investment opportunities were gradually used up? 
and as the rate of interest could not, for various reasons, 
continue to fall in step with the falling marginal efficiency of 
capital investment, capital accumulation and progress would come 
to a stop".5 In general all these scholars agreed on the 
importance of international trade and factor movements in the 
realisation of developmental goals. Major differences remained 
on how important international cooperation and in particular, 
foreign trade were to national growth. Among the scholars who 
emphasised the beneficial economies created by foreign trade were 
J. S. Mill, Alfred Marshall, Jacob Viner and G. Haberler.6
These scholars, however, did not primarily concern themselves 
with the problem of development in the third world or with the 
nature of the market relationship between the latter and the 
developed states. This task was left to neo-classical 
scholarship, a body of thought which emerged chiefly in the
United States. Kindleberger, Singer, Rostow, Nurkse and Meier, 
among others, were scholars who typified the attempt made to 
examine the problems facing the late comers in economic 
development. These scholars identified the major problem as that 
of capital accumulation. One of the most important theses about 
third world development was provided by Ragnar Nurkse who 
carefully analysed these problems in Some Problems of Capital 
Formation in Underdeveloped Countries. Nurkse recognised that 
the attraction of the higher living standards of the developed 
economies would act as a stumbling block to capital formation as 
rampant consumerism would arise in the developing economies. 
This would act as a threat to savings and realisable investment. 
All recognised the fact, most succinctly put by Simon Kuznets,7 
that domestic factors were as important as external factors in 
third world development analysis. Some, like Kindleberger and 
Peter Bauer, found that domestic obstacles more than external 
factors accounted for the lack of development in the third world. 
Since there was an agreement that a right combination of domestic 
policies would help overcome these problems, a characteristic of 
these writings were explicit policy recommendations. As a result 
of these efforts, third world development was established as a 
legitimate line of academic inquiry.
Southern economists, like Arthur Lewis,8 who joined this debate 
were optimistic about the possibilities of rapid development in 
the developing countries. Some, like Gunnar Myrdal9 maintained 
an unqualified pessimism and were increasingly apprehensive not 
only about the contribution of trade to development in the South
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but also about the frameworks for sustaining development in the 
South. By this time (end of the 1950s and early 60s) certain 
rapid developments were taking place in the third world. For a 
start, independence had become a reality for most of the nations 
and with this came increasing demands for the redistribution of 
the world*s resources. The economics of development became the 
economics of discontent10 and the interests of the developed 
economies were seen as widely divergent from those of the 
developing countries. All over the third world, the demand was 
for an increased share of the world's resources. It was from 
this mood that Dependency theory emerged.
As a theory, dependency forged a link between the causes of 
underdevelopment and the relationship between the North and the 
South. This pattern was explained by reference to historical 
antecedents which were characterised by asymmetrical 
interdependence. A dependency framework was established based 
on this explanation and it was argued that not only was this the 
cause of underdevelopment but that Southern states could not hope 
for a beneficial interchange with the North because of the 
inherent bias of the system. The alternative way to development 
was state ownership of the means of production and planned 
distribution of total output between investment and consumption 
as the most effective way of ensuring an increasing use of 
resources directed at improving living standards. This was the 
most effective system, it was argued, since it was free of the 
alleged class interests plaguing the established diffusionist 
model. Since the demand in the third world at this time was for
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increasing share of available resources, this theory seemed to 
legitimise these aspirations. Accordingly, it was given a wide 
reception in academic institutions in the third world. In some, 
it transcended this level and had a most profound influence in 
terms of psychology, encouraging a rabid nationalism.
In Africa, the belief was that dependency was the most potent 
explanation for its underdevelopment (for details see 
Introduction). The influence of this theory was more pervasive 
than might have been previously imagined. For one, most students 
of African universities could not hope to pass their examinations 
in politics without being very well versed on the dynamics of 
this relationship. Indeed, the theory legitimised political 
aspirations. It gave impetus to certain groups who sought to 
overthrow their inherited systems. It also informed Africa*s 
approach to the multinational agenda. But most important of all 
would have been its psychological effect. As Africans came to 
believe that their conditions were not of their own making but 
attributable to external forces this resulted in a sense of 
diminished responsibility. Regimes could now care less about 
their domestic systems and coup plotters could justify their 
actions since they fought against western imperialism and their 
* lackeys* (dependency's comprador bourgeoisie). Everywhere in 
Africa, corruption and dictatorships thrived and scant 
consideration was paid to the practical problems of development. 
Dependency theory was the ideal hostage to fortune.
There can be hardly any doubt that dependency which has since
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"become one of the foremost interpretations of development",11 
was a relevant hypothesis. Indeed, by reference to historical 
factors, it articulated a system that had characterised North- 
South relations and which could hardly be ignored. As a force, 
it helped to bring the issues of the third world to the centre 
stage and led to the defeat of Eurocentrism and the centre bias 
prevalent at the time. It may even be argued that the various 
international initiatives on the solution to third world 
problems, such as UNCTAD and the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) resolution of 1974, were the result of pressures mounted 
by this challenge to conventional development thinking. The 
Group of 77 symbolises the pervasive influence of this thinking 
and the attempt to affect a reformist redistribution through 
multilateralism, though not necessarily through state ownership.
Dependency analysis in its attempts to explain Africa's 
underdevelopment and its relations with the developed economies 
was, however, fraught with fundamental flaws. It was a plausible 
theory but one which was largely untested. As a mode of 
explanation for present relationships, it left a lot of questions 
unanswered. As we have underlined in the introduction, some of 
these questions needed to be reconsidered. One, the line between 
the two systems (developed/underdeveloped) is not as sharp as it 
was when the theory was articulated. Some underdeveloped 
countries have made giant strides and are now classified as Newly 
Industrialised Countries, (NICS) . Some of these NIC's had a very 
similar political and economic heritage to others still 
underdeveloped (e.g. Malaysia, Nigeria). Indeed, some
underdeveloped states have had opportunities presented to them 
for massive capital accumulation of a kind unlike that 
experienced by some developed economies. Yet, they remained 
underdeveloped. What plausible explanation was there for these 
divergencies? Even discountenancing these nagging problems, 
third world countries, as we have pointed out, are not 
homogenous. In fact, the difference between oil producing and 
non-oil producing third world states are as wide as the one 
between the former and the developed countries. It may even be 
said that these states (oil producing) may have done more damage 
to the economies of the non-oil producing states than the 
perceived effect of the developing nations. Even some minor 
details needed explanation. Such as the fact that Nigeria, the 
worldfs largest producer of palm-oil in the 1960s is now a net 
importer, some of it from Malaysia where Unilever had taken some 
samples in an earlier period. Where lies the responsibility for 
this inertia? external or internal factors? Again, since the 
1960s the international system has increasingly provided 
opportunities to the third world for capital growth through 
multilateral development agencies. While some states like 
Singapore (which secured its independence in 1965) have made 
effective use of these resources, others like Nigeria (which 
became independent in 1960) and which is more richly endowed had 
completely wasted these resources in projects such as the 
Ajaokuta Steel Mill. (A project which has presently cost the 
nation about $5 billion without yet producing a single tonne of 
steel12) . Were these facts also as a result of a mythical 
conspiracy or simply one of the imperfections of the domestic
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system?
Beyond the problem of inadequacy of interpretation, there are 
also some conceptual difficulties in application. Two of these 
difficulties are;
(a) The extent to which the underlying assumptions do in fact
correspond to the actual situation13 in each case and;
(b) Whether any resulting shortfall for the South in the
relationship with the North must be automatically put down 
to dependency relationships.
These were the issues we raised and the questions we posed at the 
outset of the thesis. They were important because in the light 
of an ever changing international system, any relevant model must 
be able to provide adequate explanations to them. In dependency 
analysis, they are subsumed under a covering hypothesis. For us, 
therefore, this was an incomplete model.
What has been offered in our analysis, with regard to the
explanation of the nature of the relationship between the North 
and the South, is an alternative explanation. By studying the 
relationship between a Northern and a Southern country, we have 
argued that underdevelopment is not the result of an inexorable 
decree of fate arising from structural alignments. Rather, that 
the explanation must be sought with reference to domestic 
factors. We posited that a myriad of political and economic 
factors combined to place obstacles in the way of sustained 
growth as a corollary of participation in the international
I
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economic system.
We justified this position by putting clearly the main arguments 
along the following lines.
By considering trade side-by-side with policy, we showed that 
while there was reciprocal demand, this was not matched by supply 
on the Nigerian side because of the ineffectiveness of policy. 
This ineffectiveness resulted mainly from massive corruption and 
the neglect of agricultural production with the discovery of oil. 
The massive corruption central to the operation of the Nigerian 
system created administrative bottlenecks and with it, the 
collapse of the machinery for policy execution. In our 
discussion of Japanese investments, we argued that increased 
investments may not have been possible because of this factor. 
As a Japanese official had put it, "Japanfs main business concern 
is business risk.” (See page 161). This was merely one result 
of this factor. Further structural distortions in the domestic 
economy resulted from the retention of the colonial Marketing 
Board system without necessary adaptation. Since this was a tax 
falling on domestic producers, with the discovery of oil and a 
resulting boom, activity shifted away to other sectors. This led 
to a drastic fall in Nigeria's exports. The neglect of the 
agricultural export sector also meant a lack of competitiveness 
in the international market.
The lack of discipline which permeated the whole apparatus of 
economic policy making and implementation - a general
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characteristic of Nigeria*s overall policy during the period, was 
as we have shown - of supreme importance in the shaping of 
Nigeria*s relations with Japan. It led to a lack of restraint 
for managing an economy for massive importation of Japanese 
consumer goods without promoting a correspondingly higher value 
of exports. The end result was an asymmetry in trade. The 
inverted trade and resulting huge deficit was not therefore the 
result of the industrialised economy's competitiveness or the 
result of "structural variations in the conditions of supply and 
demand between the developed and the developing systems"; that 
is, of declining terms of trade, as Prebisch had argued.14 In 
this particular case, it was simply the result of the lack of 
articulation of overall national interests.
This failure of external trade policy was also the result of the 
conduct of external relations. Since the policy emphasised 
Western European and American ties it led to the neglect of other 
areas, most significantly Japan, a country that had already 
become a major supplier of the Nigerian market. The skewed 
nature of external policy meant there was a lack of any knowledge 
of the operations of other systems and their markets. In the 
relationship with Japan, the result was a failure to meet 
competition and exploit the latent demand for Nigerian goods in 
the former's domestic market.
We also argued that the domestic political structure of Nigeria 
did not allow for a beneficial interchange with Japan. This 
system was marred by competing factions, mainly ethnic interests.
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This led to the lack of articulation of overall national 
interests. We showed how these interests distorted development 
objectives. The most noticeable effect of this was the ruinous 
civil war and other effects such as the siting of development 
projects. Done purely on the basis of political considerations 
and devoid of economic rationalisation, the practice whittled 
away resources that would have been spent pursuing development 
objectives which would have led to a most beneficial interchange. 
This political consideration also led to showpiece projects that 
had no relevance to overall economic development.
It was also our belief that the absence of democratic 
institutions and the succession of military coup d*etats did not 
provide a stable economic environment. Since tariff and 
investment policies were ever changeable, the political 
instability which resulted hindered capital movements in the form 
of Japanese foreign investment. Coupled with the lack of 
articulation of overall national interests, this affected the 
movement of Japanese capital in the form of development aid. 
This is because in Japan, such assistance is provided only for 
overhead capital.
We had sought to further consolidate our argument, by showing 
that Japan*s insensitivity to Nigeria*s political sentiments and 
its general lack of political interest in the pursuit of 
international relations presented a novel proposition. It meant 
that the damaging political influence which as dependency 
explained, characterised North-South relations was simply not a
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factor. The developing economy was thus presented with a 
relationship that was completely different. Yet, the developing 
economy did not exploit the situation. As we have argued, this 
was because of the structural distortions in the domestic system. 
We therefore concluded that any explanation of the asymmetrical 
interdependence which developed must be sought in the domestic 
economy and not in the operations of the international system.
It is not our intention to extrapolate from the above and 
conclude that all North-South relations are characterised by the 
pattern we have described. This would amount to, in Karl 
Popper's15 words, a historicist inclination. Besides, the 
privilege of pontification still remains that of the Vatican. 
It is our opinion, however, that although historical links are 
important, in the light of an ever changing international system 
and relationships, dependency theory is a form of scholarship 
which is of little relevance as a mode of explanation of North- 
South relations. Developing countries are in the main, the 
architects of their own destinies and all scholarly 
interpretations should come to terms with this fact of life.
II
PPOBT.KMS OF JAPAN-NIGERIA RELATIONS
A study of Nigeria-Japan relations, 1960-1985 is a study of 'high 
economics and low politics'. As a prelude to these modern 
relations, Japan's interest in Nigeria in the 1930s was primarily
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economic. At this time, Japan was rapidly modernising its 
industrial structure and expanding its capital base. Since 
industrial output consisted mainly of primarily goods, mostly 
textiles, the international politics of textiles and the decline 
of the China trade meant that alternative markets had to be 
found. Nigeria was seen as a lucrative market with enough 
potential to allow for increased cooperation. Accordingly> 
trading links were established and other necessary policies 
adopted to suit this disposition. Any political attention that 
would have followed this economic interest was not forthcoming 
in this early period because Nigeria was under the sovereignty 
of Great Britain and this ruled out bilateral contacts. 
Secondly, the Japanese drive towards economic maturity was led 
by the military which used the "Zaibatsu" (financial cliques) to 
subvert all other apparatus of state. This meant that Japan*s 
national political interests were not very well articulated.
This state of affairs provided the foundation upon which the post 
1960s relations were built. When Nigeria became independent in 
1960, it needed to undertake its own modernisation process by 
providing necessary infrastructural requirements. These needs 
readily became part of the national development plans increasing 
the prospects of trade in both consumer goods and industrial 
machinery between both states.
As Nigeria is an oil producer, the 1973 energy crisis helped to 
draw it even closer to Japan. By the late 1970s, this 
relationship had come to be marked by a high degree of
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cooperation not only in commodity supplies but in other areas, 
mainly the service sector. The need for the imports of these 
goods and services for Nigeria meant increasingly expending 
foreign exchange and the prospects of balance-of-payments 
difficulties. A situation that was not improved by the fact that 
its comparative advantage lay in the agricultural and not in the 
manufacturing sector. The nation therefore rapidly embarked on 
an alternative: import substitution. This obliged the Japanese
to set up local industries but this was not without initial 
difficulties as we have seen in Chapter Two. Increased trading 
and investments thereafter became the marked characteristic of 
the post-independence relationship.
The use of this increased bilateral economic cooperation for 
political advantage did not result, however. This was for two 
main reasons. First, the skewed nature of Nigeria's external 
policy which initially emphasised Western European and American 
contacts almost exclusively, had led to the relegation of Japan 
to a secondary position in foreign policy considerations. 
Secondly, the Japanese in exorcising the ghost of adventurism 
that had led them to a disastrous Pacific War conceived a foreign 
policy which separated trade from politics. This was known as 
"sekei-bunci”. Preoccupied with economic reconstruction and 
adjusting into new alignments, Nigeria was only marginally 
important.
The lessons of the twenty-five years of bilateral relationship 
are therefore very limited. It is the respective attitudes of
the two states which is more of interest. Japan*s relations with 
Nigeria, 1960-1985, is a study of two widely differing responses. 
On a broad canvas, they would be separated by two sharply 
contrasting shades? adaptive adjustments and minimalism bordering 
on laxity. While the first stroke would capture the sum of 
Japan's attitude, the second would clearly illustrate Nigeria's 
overall posture. This variation did not result from differences 
in economic base. Rather, it denotes the degree of articulation 
of overall national interests. That the gains of this 
relationship accrued largely to Japan was the result of the 
consistency of its approach to the Nigerian market. From the 
1930s when problems in its China trade brought Nigeria to its 
attention, until the 1970s when the energy crisis made Nigeria 
a very attractive market, its attitude remained the same. This 
could be seen in the nature of its economic adjustments: the
rapid responses to changes called for by the market as 
illustrated in the thesis. It further undertook some necessary 
initiatives to improve the relationship. Japan's exceedingly low 
level political response to bilateral and multilateral political 
issues affecting Nigeria may be explained as a result of its 
trade for trade alone policy. Its dedication to helping 
Nigeria's growth process was exemplary. As we have pointed out, 
the Japanese factor was crucial to Nigeria's development.
For Nigeria, the twenty-five years under study was one of missed 
opportunities. Its inability to articulate its interests vis-a- 
vis Japan was the result of several factors as we have shown. 
Japan was of economic importance yet the failure of relevant
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policies militated against a highly beneficial interchange. This 
inability to participate effectively in the international system 
is symptomatic of the domestic constraints existing in the 
economics of many third world states. This study is illustrative 
of this belief. Nigeria, however, possesses an economic 
advantage in the form of its huge reserves of essential raw 
materials. It is this fact which holds the prospects for a 
changing pattern.
The prospects for a changing pattern involving greater 
reciprocity must be viewed, however, from the context of the 
political economy of energy and raw materials resources in the 
international system. Japan has not only become an economic 
superpower but also an emerging political power. Its energy and 
raw material needs still remain and increased by greater 
production. The paramountcy of economic needs which had governed 
the bilateral relationship therefore remains intact. As U. Joy 
Ogwu16 has observed, the large deposits of raw materials in 
Nigeria and the large market which it provides for finished goods 
from Japan will act as an incentive to maintain and improve 
friendly relations. However, it is doubtful whether these 
incentives would go any respectable distance in improving 
relations in the light of other international developments.
The rapidly unfolding changes in the international system are 
producing a different set of equations for Japan's economic 
calculations. The break-up of the old Soviet Union and the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe are realities which
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threaten to unhinge Nigeria*s balance in this equation. The 
territories of the former Soviet Union produce most of the 
mineral resources obtained by Japan from Nigeria and indeed, from 
the rest of Africa. It has also a larger market in terms of 
notional effective demand and a relatively better articulated 
development objective than Nigeria. Added to this is the 
proximity to Japan. Japanese entrepreneurs could well undertake 
massive investments to develop much needed resources here as in 
Eastern Europe. Any Soviet venture may however depend on 
improved Japan-Soviet relations, especially on any agreement 
reached over the Kurile Islands. Given the monumental changes 
in the former Soviet Union, and the fact that it was able to 
reach a solution with West Germany enabling the latter to absorb 
the former East Germany, a complete pull-out is not a far-fetched 
possibility. The prospect of massive infusion of much needed 
capital by Japan into a rapidly collapsing economy makes this 
highly probable. Given that Japan’s resources are not unlimited 
and the opportunity cost consideration for overseas investments, 
it seems that Nigeria is likely to lose out to the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe.
This position seems even more likely by the absence of any power 
relationship between Japan and Nigeria or indeed any African 
nation. This kind of power relationship, illustrated by Zuhayr 
Mikdashi with reference to the US/Saudi relationship,17 is 
usually characterised by a sense of interdependence. In the 
US/Saudi case, this is heightened by the oil-import requirements 
of the US and substantial Saudi assets held in the US currency.
In fact, no African nation, except possibly South Africa, 
possesses any kind of leverage over Japan. Any prospect for 
improved relations will depend on much needed political and 
economic changes in Nigeria. These would provide a more stable 
economic environment necessary for the attraction of investments. 
However, the possibility of these changes taking place is not 
very bright. Nigeria is still beset with an elite dedicated to 
securing personal and ethnic interests rather than a national 
goal. The proposed return to democracy in 1992 holds very little 
hope since some fundamental issues have not been addressed. 
Again, the history of Nigeria's past democracy and the lack of 
discipline in the armed forces does not leave room for any 
serious optimism. It remains to be seen whether the elected 
representatives would be determined to undertake a revolution of 
values, or whether the only bills they would be passing are those 
which line their pockets as their reputation most infamously 
indicate. With a rapidly growing population and increasing 
discontent, they may have no choice but to introduce much needed 
economic changes. This is the only basis for any optimism. 
There is no doubt that Nigeria is important in Japan's economic 
calculations (out of a total of 3,964 Japanese living in Africa 
in 1981, 906 were resident in Nigeria18) and that Japan would be 
most willing to increase its economic cooperation once conditions 
improve.
The lesson of Japan-Nigeria relations is a lesson for Africa - 
a continent that has not only replaced Turkey's position in the 
19th century as the sick man of Europe, but is proving an
increasing burden on the rest of the world.
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With Japan and the other industrially advanced countries most 
likely to be switching investments and development aid, to 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Africa has no choice 
but to reform its political and economic systems. As the Rev. 
R.S.B. Attoh-Ahuma19 irreverently put it in 1911, it must emerge 
from the savage backwoods into the open where nations are made. 
The economics of development must begin to replace the economics 
of discontent.
Ill
MANAGING THE JAPAN-NIGERIA RELATIONSHIP
The issue of trade has always been controversial in North-South 
relations, especially when it is perceived to leave the southern 
economy at a disadvantage. Japan*s relations with Nigeria in the 
period, 1960-85, epitomize this difficulty in North-South
interchange. The question of a more profitable trade for the 
South is indeed central to the development of relations between 
the developed and developing economies. Since the inception of
GATT, especially from the early 1960s when the last of the
developing economies threw off the shackles of colonialism, the 
organisation has tried to address the problems facing trade in 
the southern economies. The United Nations for its part, through 
such agencies as UNCTAD, has also tried to address this perennial 
problem. The southern economies have also made some useful
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efforts through inter-regional and intra-regional associations 
that have enabled them to present a bloc of opinion to the wider 
world trade associations. These efforts have sometimes met with 
a degree of success but have more often been obstructed by the 
lack of internal consensus and convergence of interests. Such 
attempts have also been severely limited by the lack of economic 
discipline, bureaucratic ineptitude, infrastructural problems20 
and a general lack of political will. The massive corruption 
institutionalized in most of these economies has also, not 
unexpectedly placed enormous barriers on sustained growth as a 
corollary of international trade.
All these factors account for the general lack of progress in 
Nigeria's trade with the rest of the world. The Japanese problem 
stands out from the general pattern only because of the massive 
disproportion in the trading accounts. Indeed, it has been 
specifically shown by Bukarambe that the pattern with Japan is 
not different with Nigeria's other international trading 
partners. According to him, "without the regular purchase of 
Nigerian oil, the outcome of the trade with Western Europe and 
the United States of America would be identical to the pattern 
with Japan given the effective lack of variation in the Nigerian 
economy."21 Because of the above points, any useful approach 
adopted towards the realisation of a reciprocal relationship 
between Nigeria and Japan is severely constricted. This is 
because from the foregoing analysis it has become apparent that 
the obstacles to effective international market participation 
rest very squarely within the structural distortions in the
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Nigerian economy. But to suggest that trade cannot be improved 
until these problems are eliminated would not be practical. Our 
study of Nigeria-Japanese relations leads us to believe that the 
following changes in policy set out below are indispensable to 
the development of any meaningful relationship between the two 
countries.
First, it has been suggested that the enormous deficit in 
Nigeria-Japanese trade could be bridged if Japan shows a 
willingness to develop Nigeria's non-oil mineral resources and 
take them in as imports. However, such reasoning has very little 
approximation to reality. This is so because, as one study22 
has shown, Nigeria's list of minerals does not include any of the 
eleven strategic rare minerals being stockpiled in Japan since 
1983. It does not possess also, any of the twenty minerals 
imported wholly (100 per cent) by Japan. Although its supply of 
tin, coal and iron ore are among the minerals whose supplies are 
actively sought by Japan, these minerals at the present rate of 
production, are mainly consumed locally, or exported to Western 
Europe. As for its limestone, Japan is self-sufficient. It must 
be pointed out however, that discoveries have been made in 
Nigeria which could be of interest to Japan. Resources like 
uranium ore have been found to exist in Nigeria and this is an 
area where Japan could take an active interest in the effort to 
improve relations. Indeed, Japan has already indicated an 
interest in this area. We hasten to add that the realization of 
this laudable objective further depends on a number of factors 
including Nigeria's security considerations and the profitability
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of such a venture in Japan*s economic calculations. This is a 
very important area of cooperation worth exploring by both 
countries in order to develop a more productive relationship.
Secondly, the problems of organising increased production and 
exports of essential raw materials like cocoa, groundnuts, 
sheanuts and cotton, for which there is demand in Japan, must be 
addressed immediately if the trade relationship is to be brought 
back into balance. The solution to the problem does not lie with 
curtailing exports or outrightly banning them as in 1965. This 
would not only lead to complications in trade and other aspects 
of the relationship but may cause problems for the domestic 
economy which may result in even more distortions in balance of 
payments. Britain and France's experience and adoption of 
necessary changes in the transitional process of changing their 
economic base from agriculture to industry is illustrative of the 
multiplier effect of such trade policy. In the late 19th 
century, when faced with declining productivity in agriculture 
the two nations adopted different solutions. One adapted despite 
severe difficulties and the other extended protectionist cover. 
Over the years, the agricultural industry in Britain became more 
efficient so that the industry could compete in the international 
market without succour from government. On the other side, 
agriculture has steadily failed to keep up with other industries 
and has become a gigantic millstone around the neck of the 
national economy. (The lamb "war" between French and British 
farmers in 1990 is one example). Kindleberger1s advice based on 
the example above may therefore be extended to Nigeria with very
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slight modifications. According to him;
”to evade specialization in exports or to cut off imports 
may be a reasonable step to protect social values during a 
period of adjustment... but the adaptation should take 
place. Resisting the changes called for by the market is 
likely to produce worse results in the long run than any 
possible short term harm which the transitional process may 
inflict. "23
Indeed, any effective hope for the redress of the trade imbalance 
lies with adaptation. Having removed the obstacles facing 
agricultural productivity, Nigeria should also adopt an 
aggressive market campaign in Japan through participation in 
periodic fairs and follow the Brazilian example, namely, the 
establishment of commodity institutes. The use of trade 
catalogues would also improve trade as it has always been a 
matter for recurring regret that Japanese business interests who 
had sent such requests to Nigeria often receive inadequate 
replies.24 The government has already instituted specialised 
bodies and this will help trade significantly. The commodities 
must also be processed to give them a higher value in Japan. 
Increased manufacturing is not a solution to the Japanese problem 
since Japan has already attained an economy of scale which will 
make such efforts counter productive. The only hope for Nigeria 
is the expansion of exports in volume. This process would afford 
a considerable scope for increased earnings and should be 
followed by the development of new raw materials in need in 
Japan. The argument that the effects of export expansion are 
severely limited by the declining world commodity prices is an 
excuse not a reason. The World Development Report. 1988, has
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shown how many economies of south-east Asia were able to overcome 
the strictures imposed by severe contractions in non-oil 
commodity prices after peak in the late 1970s, by a sustained 
programme of stepping up the volume of primary commodity 
exports.25
Thirdly, since the Japanese trade accounts for such a significant 
proportion of its imports and since Professor Ragnar Nurske's 
"demonstration effect"26 has led to a situation of almost 
complete adaptation of Japanese products, Nigeria must set up a 
specialist institute to deal with the problems arising from the 
Japanese trade. This would enable the country to be familiar 
with the prevailing market conditions in Japan and to adopt 
effective policies. The current situation whereby Nigeria is 
flooded with Japanese goods but little knowledge exists in the 
country about the Japanese and their needs is not encouraging. 
To suggest that it must also observe a high degree of discipline 
concerning its own policies to avoid a repetition of the case of 
smuggling on page 226 is completely outside the scope of this 
study. However, relevant policies and their successful 
application is an inseparable ingredient in economic development. 
Particularly, such internal factors are very important. In 
Kuznet's analysis, the domestic structure is as important as 
other factors determining trade and other capital movements 
across national boundaries.27 Political will must follow the 
provision of economic policies otherwise any attempt made to 
address the Japanese problem will turn out as the rest —  
insufficient and ineffective.
Fourthly, necessary changes in attitude must be adopted by the 
Japanese in their approach to the Nigerian market. It is not the 
intention of this study to apportion blame for the grossly 
inverted trade on Japan and its ability to take advantage of the 
multiple imperfections in the Nigerian economy. The temptation 
may be great but this would only serve to mask the real nature 
of the problems faced with North-South trade. Such an attempt 
(unfortunately dominant in the interpretation of North-South 
relations) would not only digress from the main reason why 
nations participate in the international market system, that is, 
to increase their GNP and improve the standard of living of their 
nationals. In its basic supposition, it treats the developing 
economies as if they were in a dormant state and incapable of 
taking up initiative and putting into effect effective policies 
concerning international trade.28 In our opinion, this is the 
real danger. However, having made the above point it is not our 
intention to suggest that there are no ways in which the Japanese 
would help the Nigerian governments achieve their developmental 
objectives and in particular, mitigate the effect of the 
imbalance. There are indeed various ways.
One way to achieve this end is through Aid. It is easy to 
suggest increased aid but aid is not and indeed can never be a 
panacea to all such problems in North-South relations. It is a 
means and not an end in itself and with this in mind we would 
suggest that the Japanese develop a new type of developmental 
assistance to be known as "Applied Aid”. This is because all too 
often, aid given to Nigeria ends up in other non capital
projects? usually projects that massage the ego of a particular 
adventurer in power or in private accounts. We would therefore 
suggest that future aid involve as little credit as possible and 
be tied to specific projects. An illustration of the benefit of 
this kind aid is appropriate. The lower Anambra project funded 
by the EXIM bank of Japan can safely be said to be its most 
valuable assistance to Nigeria in the twenty-five years of the 
trading relationship. The lower Anambra project for instance, 
with the benefit of Japanese rice cultivation skills, has so 
immensely benefitted agriculture in this area that the people are 
not only self sufficient in food supply (thus preserving much 
needed foreign exchange) but are in fact exporting these products 
to neighbouring states and earning foreign exchange. (This 
writer can attest to the immense benefit the people have derived 
from this project since he hails from this area) . Such 
qualitative but "applied” aid has not only been beneficial to 
Nigeria but indeed holds future prospects for increased Japanese 
trade as capital accumulation seeks outlet in consumer goods. 
The Israeli example must be followed in extension of aid to 
Nigeria. It used to be the Israeli policy before the unfortunate 
and totally unnecessary break in diplomatic ties that qualitative 
manpower tied to specific projects was the best aid on offer to 
developing economies. (It must be said here that no single 
nationfs aid, not even the United States has as much been 
' beneficial to the ordinary people of West Africa than that of 
Israel). Quality manpower tied to specific projects must 
therefore be a necessary corollary of Japanese foreign aid in 
Nigeria.
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There are practical reasons for this kind of practice. The 
infrastructure in Nigeria is inadequate to handle large scale 
projects without assistance. The Japanese should not take it for 
granted that policies have been fashioned out and that capital 
is the only facilitator. We are aware of the various arguments 
against this kind of assistance. These include security 
considerations and the political argument that insistence on such 
"applied" aid would be an unnecessary interference in domestic 
affairs.
The possible disruptive effects on economic development have also 
been emphasised. Part of the argument, as Gerald Meier puts it, 
is that this kind of aid distorts the recipient's investment 
priorities and twists its import pattern in favour of the import 
components of the tied projects.29 We wish to emphasise the 
point that by "applied aid", we mean the direct execution by the 
donor of a project which is part of a development plan. This is 
different from project-tying which involves the former picking 
out project at random, especially those likely to benefit its 
interests. In our case, a general understanding is needed 
between the donor and the recipient, as regards those projects 
most likely to benefit the latter's overall development strategy. 
In Nigeria's case, applied aid removes such bottlenecks as the 
inflation of the cost of projects - a practice at the heart of 
Nigerian business environment. This helps to conserve the 
resources of the country.
The suggestion above is important because most governments in
Nigeria do not represent the people as usually power comes 
through the barrel of a gun. Even when they do (and this is an 
unlikely proposition) there is a propensity not to separate 
public and private accounts. These factors are practical 
considerations and must be practically addressed. Besides, since 
the Japanese through the application of strict standards and the 
exercise of immense discipline have come to assume a position 
where they are now able to dispense aid, they should do so 
according to need and this need would be a consideration for the 
impoverished masses suffering from government maladministration. 
The problem has assumed a desperate dimension that calls for the 
developed economies to dispense with such niceties of 
international relations. The only hope for Japan to help with 
Nigeria*s developmental efforts in an effort to address the trade 
issue is to apply the golden rule of economic superpower 
politics. That is, "he who has the gold makes the rule.". Until 
this approach is taken by Japan the imbalance will not only loom 
larger than ever but whatever credit it extends to Nigeria would 
be money down the drain and will only serve to increase Nigeria*s 
external debt.
Japan should also help to address the trade problem through 
increased investments. As Agbi puts it, "investment is an area 
where the Japanese could, both in theory and practice, 
demonstrate to the African countries that their foreign policy 
in Africa is not characterised by trade for trade only".30 It 
is true that some of the Japanese investments, especially those 
in the consumer goods manufacturing sector, have afforded
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considerable advantages to Nigeria and that Japan*s policy of 
technology transfer is exemplary in North-South relations. 
However, a lot still needs to be done. The number of investments 
at the present rate is insufficient especially if one were to 
consider the benefits accruing to Japan from the Nigerian market. 
The advantage of such increased investment is one that would 
enable increased production and consequent upon this, Nigeria 
would be able to export these products to neighbouring states and 
elsewhere. If this is done, the imbalance with Japan would not 
be a serious issue since it transforms the goods it buys into a 
productive means of accumulating capital. The benefits would 
then be shared by the two nations? Nigeria by earning foreign 
exchange from other customers and Japan through increased sales 
and other additions in the invisible account.
New investments must also be undertaken in the heavy industries 
sector. It would be difficult to see the viability of such 
investments since the intensive capital content makes them less 
feasible. However, some of these industries are engaged in the 
manufacturing of component parts for the Japanese world wide 
commercial empire and in Nigeria, there is a lot of raw materials 
for their use. The automobile industry is a likely area. Japan 
could set up industries manufacturing parts for Japanese assembly 
plants spread all over the globe. These export-based industries 
would then earn foreign exchange for Nigeria and generate related 
investments from other places. As Myint has noted, the mistake 
often made in developing countries is to enlist the support of 
foreign firms for domestic production instead of for primary
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export production with less favourable effects on the balance of 
payment position.31 These investments must however be part of 
a sustained investment in domestic production. At any rate, the 
Nigerian domestic market is very well supplied by both local 
Japanese firms and others, at the moment. The need for export- 
based industries is therefore critical to the capital 
accumulation process. The Japanese have already done this is 
other areas, especially in South-East Asia and Brazil as part of 
the policy of "security of supply". There is no reason why 
industries that could supply Japanese ventures in the whole of 
Africa cannot be concentrated in Nigeria given the existence of 
enormous raw materials reserves. This is an area that should be 
developed. Nigeria is the largest market in Africa both in terms 
of purchasing power and population. The trend of ever increasing 
world energy prices denotes sustainability of purchasing power. 
Japanese investment such as suggested would go a long way to 
benefitting both nations and fulfilling the prospects of mutually 
advantageous trade.
Central to all these increased efforts on the Japanese side is 
the change of attitude. Japan must adopt a positive attitude to 
the Nigerian market and the development of the country. It must 
cease to regard it as just another lucrative market for Japanese 
industrial goods. The policy it adopted in 1959 that the 
"economic development of less advanced countries is of extremely 
great significance for the achievement of permanent world 
peace"32 must be truly pursued. Japan's experience is 
instructive to Nigeria and it must make a conscious effort to
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"export” these experiences. The veneer of civilization is very 
thin. The prospects of a truly harmonious world lies in the 
conscious efforts of the developed to help the developing 
otherwise such excesses of greed as Iraq's covetousness towards 
Kuwait in August 1990 will turn out to be the dominant character 
of world politics.
Having made the above points, it is our considered opinion to 
state that the initiative for increased cooperation must be taken 
by Nigeria not Japan. First, Japan must form a central part of 
Nigeria's external trade policy and all the benefits and 
privileges currently enjoyed by the other Western nations must 
be extended to Japan. This is very important for without 
political consideration there can be little hope for improved 
economic relationship. Nigeria's heads of state must arrange for 
state visits to Japan (from 1960-1985, no Nigerian leader ever 
set foot in Japan but all have visited the USA and Britain) where 
their problems must be brought into focus. Juichi Inada33 has 
shown that the Japanese rarely refuse requests from visiting 
heads of state or their representatives and this is of great 
significance. Nigeria must take the initiative for this is the 
only way Japan has of recognising its needs since it is not the 
only developing country that Japan has to consider in its aid 
diplomacy. This policy should be part of a wider attempt to de- 
emphasise Western European and American contacts as the 
overwhelming concentration of economic relations. Nigeria has 
a lot to gain by improving relations with Japan and focusing 
economic relations on India and South-East Asia for their
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interests converge. The privilege of improving relations with 
Japan is totally Nigeria*s. It must begin to equate necessary 
changes in domestic policy with attractiveness to capital 
movements from Japan. As the World Development Report. 1988 has 
phrased it,
"growth and trade policies in industrialized countries have 
a direct bearing on export opportunities for developing 
countries ... but the developing countries own policies 
help to determine how vulnerable they will be to such 
external factors.34
In other words, obstacles to effective international market 
participation and the prospects of growth lie with necessary and 
appropriate changes in policy which must be pursued with all 
amount of discipline. Nigeria must make these changes otherwise 
its protestations about the trade disparity will remain like 
those of other third world nations who are in the same position, 
a mere brass band of discontent forever crowding the developed 
countries, causing minor irritations and resulting in an 
occasional penny. W.W. Rostow has the last word on this issue. 
According to him, the only solid potential basis for North-South 
partnership are northern policies that reconcile sustained growth 
with control over inflation and southern policies that begin to 
correct the accumulated structural distortions.35
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15. Karl Popper in The Poverty of Historicism (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1960, observes the tendency of 
Marxist thought not to accept plurality of interpretation 
but to present views as theories or doctrine. See page 
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APPENDIX
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
1 Civ) NIGER I A-JAPANESE TRADE. 1934-1960 3 67
YEAR JAPANESE IMPORTS (€000) NIGERIA'S EXPORTS (€000)
1934 397,718 750
1935 213,856 3,307
1936 483,710 24,001
1937 917,473 2,746
1938 379,068 1,346
1939 212,435 772
1946 125
1950 5,835,903 8,000
1951 7,523,587 5,000
1952 11,344,577 12,000
1953 5,576,426 2,736
1954 9,351,551 6,000
1955 16,652,323 -- (negligible)
1956 20,222,957 8,000
1957 17,602 26,000
1958 19,433 1,029
1959 18,826 2,311
1960 27,814 2,455
Sources: Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, Trade Reports (various years)
and Nigeria Trade Journal (various years)
(V) JAPANESE SHARE OF NIGERIA'S TOTAL TRADE. 1929-1932 AS PERCENTAGE VALUE
YEAR PERCENTAGE VALUE
1929 .01
1932 .72
1933 .02
1934 2.53
1935 1.07
1936 2.82
1937 2.46
1938 2.07
1939 1.25
(Vi) PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL IMPORTS. 1934-1939 (JAPANESE)
YEAR PERCENTAGE 5
1934 7.21
1935 2.58
1936 3.82
1937 4.94
1938 4.39
1939 3.19
(Vii) AVERAGE PERCENTAGE SHARE OF IMPORTS. 1950-1959 (JAPANESE)
YEAR AVERAGE SHARES
1950-54 8
1955-59 11.9
TABLE 1 Cvili) PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL IMPORTS. 1946-1960 (UNITED KINGDOM) 3 6 8
YEAR PERCENTAGE
1946 64.6
1950 59.8
1954 45.3
1960 42.9
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics. 1963
3 6 5
FIS 2 {I }
NIGERIA--3APANESE TRADE, 1960-1984 
(Unit: $1,000)
Unit
of
guan
i960 1961 1962
Export goods quan
tity Value
guan
tity Value
Quan
tity Value
Total - 75,214 - 72,800 - 63,982
(Exchange
received) _ m 1[66,355)
Foods and 
beverages 157 . 321 . 270
Fish - 86 - 173 - 227
Textiles - 60,456 - 58,951 - 47,667
Cotton fabrics 1,000SH 72,883 24,846 86,442 28,544 74,800 22,648
Rayon fabrics a 3,719 1,292 318 115 490 160
Spun rayon 
fabrics a 66,674 14,083 54,047 10,947 24,260 4,873
Synthetic fibre 
fabrics a 3,033 1,774 2,263 1,201 1,352 724
Hoolen fabrics a 1,034 1,476 848 1,112 1,295 1,511
Clothing - 9,110 - 9,630 - 9,100
Fishing nets - 439 - 726 - 1,356
Hetal and aetal 
products _ 6,064 5,292 6,443
Iron and Steel HT 25,724 5,113 22,863 4,357 29,002 4,978
Salvanished 
iron plates a 25,692 5,105 22,092 4,218 26,388 4,601
Hetal products - 943 - 803 - *830
Hachinery and 
instruaents 3,431 3,527 . 4,312
(Hachinery) - 3,067 - 3,072 - 4,419
General
Hachinery 487 . 498 _ t 747
Textile 
Hachinery 
Setting aachines
- 1
413
-
407
- 21i
39i
Electric
lachinery 1,204 1,002 *1,589
Radios Huaber 33,303 861
Transportation 
eguipaent 
Autoaobiles 
and parts
Bicycles and parts 
Precision 
instruaents
Caaeras Nuaber 1,334 60
Nonaetallic
23,984 620 55,440 1,056
1,339
262
1,085
1,588
517
1,017
2,687 455
*2,077
1,039
1,023
* 397
mineral
products _ 673 658 504
Pottery - 349 352 194
Chemical and 
pharmaceutical _ 135 199 211
products
Others _
Toys - 153 - 215 180
Footwear - 1,807 - 1,186 - 1,217
Umbrellas and 
parasols _ 452 - 214 237
Rubber tires and 
tubes 269 274 474
Iaports from Nigeria 
(Unit: $1,000)
Import goods Unit
of
quantity
1960 1961 1962
Quantity Value Quan
tity
Value Quan Value 
tity
Total - 8,156 - 9,480 - 5,211
(Exchange paid) - - - (4,441)
Foods and beverages - - - 1,310 949
Cocoa beans NT 1,962 1,279 2,452 1,251 2,065 947
Raw textile
materials - 1,894 - 2,038 - 237
Raw cotton NT 2,939 1,894 3,054 2,033 362 237
Others
Soyabeans NT 3,550 418 6,510 722 0 0
Cotton seed » 22,210 1,966 36,194 3,185 0 0
Exports to Nigeria
(Unit: $1,000)
Export goods Unit of 1963 1964 1965
Quant­
ity
Quant­
ity
Value Quant­
ity
Value Quant­
ity
- Value
Total - 74,109 - 79,514 - 58,984
(Exchange received) - (76,266) - (83,513) - 1[63,369)
Foodstuffs - 768 - 1,917 - 1,491
Fish 743 - 1,900 - 1,475
Raw Materials and
fuels - 3 - 4 - 7
Light industry
products - 59,378 56,668 - 43,176
Textile products - 55,001 - 52,110 - 40,295
Fabrics - 33,965 - 27,711 - 22,764
1,000
Cotton fabrics SM 73,798 24,815 47,128 16,310 50,200 12,220
Woolen fabrics " 1,414 1,584 1,347 1,469 1,611 1,652
Synthetic fiber
fabrics “ 4,411 3,251 7,802 6,033 6,742 5,032
Rayon fabrics * 7,683 2,332 8,414 2,667 2,223 1,497
Spun rayon fabrics * 
Textile Secondary
13,012 3,114 7,472 2,362 4,059 1,416
products - 20,619 - 23,706 - 16,563
Clothing - 16,511 - 18,337 - 13,779
Nonmetallic
mineral products - 575 - 589 - 412
Others - 3,802 - 3,972 - 2,469
Heavy and chemical
industry products - 13,960 - 20,926 - 14,309
Chemical and 
pharmaceutical
products - 536 - 796 - 917
Metals and metal
products - 6,930 - 10,089 - 6,739
Iron and steel MT 34,120 5,758 49,007 8,609 34,990 5,749
Sheets * 3,331 393 22,241 3,602 25,608 3,972
Machinery and
instruments - 6,494 - 10,041 - 6,653
(Machinery) - 5,973 - 9,291 - 6,184
General
machinery - 870 - 2,945 - 1,296
Electric
machinery - 1,870 - 3,323 - 2,522
Radios - 954 - 1,756 - 1,628
Transportation
equipment - 3,280 - 3,116 - 2,463
Exports to Nigeria
(Unit: $1,000)
Export goods Unit of 1963 1964 1965
Quant­
ity
Quant­
ity
Value Quant­
ity
Value Quant­
ity
- Value
Total - 74,109 - 79,514 - 58,984
(Exchange received) - (76,266) - (83,513) - I[63,369)
Foodstuffs - 768 - 1,917 - 1,491
F ish 743 - 1,900 - 1,475
Raw Materials and
fuels - 3 - 4 - 7
Light industry
products - 59,378 56,668 - 43,176
Textile products - 55,001 - 52,110 - 40,295
Fabrics
1,,000
• 33,965 * 27,711 - 22,764
Cotton fabrics SM 73,798 24,815 47,128 16,310 50,200 12,220
Woolen fabrics H 1,414 1,584 1,347 1,469 1,611 1,652
Synthetic fiber
fabrics M 4,411 3,251 7,802 6,033 6,742 5,032
Rayon fabrics N 7,683 2,332 8,414 2,667 2,223 1,497
Spun rayon fabrics ft 13,012 3,114 7,472 2,362 4,059 1,416
Textile Secondary
products - 20,619 - 23,706 - 16,563
Clothing - 16,511 - 18,337 - 13,779
Nonmetallic
mineral products - 575 - 589 - 412
Others - 3,802 - 3,972 - 2,469
Heavy and chemical
industry products - 13,960 - 20,926 - 14,309
Chenical and 
pharmaceutical
products - 536 - 796 - 917
Metals and metal
products - 6,930 - 10,089 - 6,739
Iron and steel MT 34,120 5,758 49,007 8,609 34,990 5,749
Sheets n 3,331 393 22,241 3,602 25,608 3,972
Machinery and
instruaents - 6,494 - 10,041 - 6,653
(Machinery) - 5,973 - 9,291 - 6,184
General
machinery - 870 - 2,945 - 1,296
Electric
machinery - 1,870 - 3,323 - 2,522
Radios - 954 - 1,756 - 1,628
Transportation
equipment - 3,280 - 3,116 - 2,463
Precision
instruaents 474 657 _ 373
Reexports and 
exports of special 
commodities 0 0 t
Imports from Nigeria
Import goods Unit of 
quantity
1963 1964 1965
Quan
tity
Value Quan Value 
tity
Quan Value 
tity
Total - 6,760 - 7,351 - 9,285
(Exchange paid) - (6,241) - (7,490) - (9,357)
Fooodstuffs - 2,895 - 2,239 - 1,339
Cocoa beans AT 5,293 2,895 4,332 2,222 3,500 1,337
Ran materials - 3,844 - 5,106 - 7,921
Raw cotton AT 44 28 1,685 1,126 3,024 2,030
Raw materials
for vegetable oils - 3,274 - 3,520 - 5,409
Cottonseed AT 28,961 2,160 14,606 1,084 29,015 2,418
Others - 21 6 25
373
Export tea# Unit of 
Quantity
1966 1967 1968
Quan
tity
Value Quan
tity
Value Quan
tity
Value
Total
Light industry
- 39,572 - 38.335 - 13,094
products - 26,097 - 24.587 - 4,227
Textile products - 
Non aetallie
23,940 22.852 3,471
iineral products - - 195 - 180 - 31
Others 
Heavy and 
cheaical industry
1,962 1,555 726
products 
Cheaical and 
pharceutical
13,114 13,4381 8,613
products - 1,030 - 732 - 371
Iron and Steel HT 32,509 5,054 30,212 4,176 32,862 4,776
Sheets
Hachinery and
21,987 3,147 28,070 4,176 29,280 5,000
instruaents - 6,232 - 7,530 - 3,242
(Hachinery)
General
5,321 7,148 • 3,164
Hachinery
Electric
• 1,971 3,087 1,637
aachinery
Transportation
• 1,732 2,162 1,415
equipaent - 2,175 - 1,989 118
Bicycles
Precision
* 451 226 * 33
instruaent 
Re-exports and 
ex-exports of 
special 
coaacdities
354
0
342 71
Imports fro* Nigeria
Iaport Itea Unit of 
Quantity
1966 1967 1968
Quan
tity
Value Quan Value 
tity
Quan Value 
tity
Total
Foodstuffs
- 13,671
1,362
16,163
- 5,132
14,502
- 4,649
Cacao beans HT 2,897 1,34? 8,223 4,874 5,592 3,657
Raw materials - - 12,081 - 9,712 - 9,820
Raw naterials for 
vegetable fats and
oils - - 10,270 - 7,794 - 8,027
Cotton seeds HT 65,134 5,847 49,577 4,686 46,625 3,861
Others - 291 1,319 - 33
Crude Oil 1,000 - 50 718 0 0
KL
Petroleu*
products - 269 - 569 - 0
Exports to Nigeria
(In thousands of dollars)
Year Unit of 1969
Export 1 tea Quantity Quantity Value
Total - - 28,625
Foodstuffs 29
Light industry products - - 5,483
Textile products - - 4,198
Yarn - - 2,292
Nonmeta! Mineral products 44
Others - - 1,240
Heavy and chemical industry
products - - 23,029
Chemical & pharmaceutical
products - - 712
Metals and metal products - - 9,794
Iron and steel MT 62,502 9,466
metal product - - 315
Machinery and Instruments - - 12,523
General machinery - - 6,874
Electric machinery - - 3,297
Transport equipment - - 2,217
Automobiles NO 821 1,443
( e xd. parts)
Precision instruments - - 135
Re-export and experts of
special commodities 79
Imports from Nigeria
(In thousands of dollars)
Year Unit of 1969
Quantity Quantity Value
Total - - 12,949
Foodstuffs - - 6,034
Cacao beans MT 4.904 4,793
Raw materials - - 6.267
materials for vegetable oils - - 4,246
Nonferrous ore MT 1,055 1,785
Crude oil KL - 643
Re-exoorts and exports of
soecial commodities 5
Export to Nigeria
(Unit: $1,000}
Year
Ite»
1970 1971 Increase over 
the previous 
year (X)
Total 62,892 95,989 152.6
Foodstuffs 121 414 342.1
Light industrial products 10,754 29,817 277.3
Textile products 8,154 26,485 324.8
Synthetic fibre fabrics 974 9,159 940.3
N'on-aetalllic lineral
products 475 390 82.1
Other light industrial
products 2,125 2,942 1,384
Heavy industrial products 51,932 65,526 126.2
Cheaical products 1,632 2,246 137.6
Hetals and oetal products 26,631 28,228 106.0
Iron and Steel 24,153 26,198 103.4
Hetal products 2,402 1,893 78.8
Hachinery and instruaents 23,669 35,051 148.1
General aachinery 11,920 11,656 100.3
Electric aachinery 5,693 6,470 113.6
Transport equipaents 5,845 15,525 265.6
ftutoaobiles (exd.parts) 3,605 7,250 201.1
Precision instruaents 510 1,401 274.7
Iaports froa Nigeria
(Unit: $1,000)
Year 1970 1971 Increase over
the previous
I tea year (X)
Total 12,841 27,131 211.3
Foodstuffs 1,993 1,543 77.2
Cacoa beans 1,349 973 72.1
Raw aateriais 10,317 12,124 112.1
Raw cotton 741 529 71.4
Naterials for vegetable oils 7,910 9,345 124.5
Non-ferrous aetal ore 1,768 1,365 77.2
Hineral fuels 0 13,372 -
Petroleua products 0 616 -
Exports to Nigeria
(Units: $1,000)
Coroffiodity
Unit of 1972
Quantity- - - - - - - - - - -
Quan Value 
tity
1973
Quan Value 
tity
Compared
with
Previous 
Year (7.)
Total 125,998 141,147 112.0
Fccdstuffs - - 1,664 - 1,395 83.8
Light Industrial 
Products 38,093 26,811 70.4
Textile Products - - 33,352 - 22.925 68.7
Synthetic Fibre 
Yarns HT 3,413 8,498 3,390 11,082 130.4
Staple Fiber Fabrics N 1,456 1,044 1,536 1,093 104.7
Synthetics Fibre 
Fabrics 1000SH! 19,599 13,454 4,708 3,937 29.3
Clothings - - 3,019 - 1,962 65.0
Scarves, Shawls - - 2,018 - 1,444 71.6
Other Light 
Industrial Products 3,938 3,240 82.3
Heavy and Chemical 
Industrial Products _ 86,059 112,797 131.1
Chemical Products - - 3,029 - 3,219 106.3
Hetal and Hetal 
Products _ 31,780 43,594 137.2
Iron and Steel HT 155,354 30,365 163,437 41,378 136.3
Plates and Sheets fl 83,086 15,660 105,247 25,278 161.4
Steel Pipes It 36,416 7,612 44,586 12,349 162.2
Hetal Products y> - 1,394 - 2,180 156.4
Hachinery and 
Equipment _ 51,249 65,983 128.7
General Hachinery - - 9,623 - 11,789 122.5
Textile Hachinery - - 4,960 - 5,135 103.5
Electrical Hachinery - - 8,751 - 15,757 180.1
Radio Hroadscast 
Receivers 1000 NO 173 3,065 189 4,892 159.6
Transportation
Equipment _ 32,002 4,892 115.3
Automobiles 
(exd. Parts) NO 9.072 17.917 11.903 21,418 119.5
Passenger Hotor 
Cars (Assembled) » 7,548 11,539 9,742 16,820 145.8
Buses, Trucks (incl. 
Chassis) H 1,469 6,180 2,151 4,564 73.9
Precision Instruments - - 871 - 1,545 177.4
Scientific Optical 
Instruments - - 799 - 1,459 182.6
Isports froi Nigeria
(Unit: $1,000}
Year Unit of 1972 1973 Coapared
Coaaodity Quant. Quant. Value Quant. Value with previ 
Year (7.)
Total - - 79,961 - 189,010 236.4
Foodstuffs - - 2,815 - 13,378 475.2
Frozen Lobster MT 292 1,123 375 1,270 113.1
Cocoa Beans II 2,713 1,643 5,192 6,322 384.8
Raw Materials 
Non-metalic .
- - 5,930 - 7,340 123.8
Ores
Materials for
MT 650 1,146 1,344 2,876 251.0
Vegetables Oil M 48,804 4,488 26,292 3,761 83.8
Cotton Seed N 41,065 3,597 4,367 556 15.5
Shea Nut * 7,243 750 21,615 3,054 407.2
Natural Rubber If 501 172 801 369 214.5
Mineral Fuels 
Petroluea and
* * 71,029 - 167,844 236.3
Crude Oil 1000KL 3,618 71,029 6,005 167,844 236.3
(Unit: $1,000)
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Year Unit of 1974 1975 Compared
Commodity Quant- Quant- Value Quant- Value with pre
ity ity ity vious
(7.)
Total Exports - 284
r*^CD-D 585,328 205.6
Foodstuffs - 4 066 9,700 238.6
Light industrial
products - 55 845 107,771 193.0
Textiles - 48 327 92,010 190.4
Synthetic Fiber Yarn MT 5,163 19 601 8,641 25,445 129.8
Synthetic Fiber
Fabrics KSM 13,886 10 917 33,527 26,080 233.9
Other Light
Industrial products - 5 690 12,179 214.0
Heavy & Chemical
Industrial products - 223 935 466,524 208.3
Metals - 86 926 137,450 158.1
Iron & Steel MT 188,663 81 271 303,493 128,496 158.1
Plates 4 Sheets H 77,987 28 381 139,400 44,847 158.0
Zinc plates 4 sheets a 4,310 1 804 39,022 15,675 863.9
Steel Pipes N 65,362 34 236 64,679 48,513 141.7
Machinery 4 Equipment - 123 071 321,573 251.1
General Machinery - 25 577 44,637 174.5
Textile Machinery - 7 885 15,298 194.0
Electrical Machinery - 25 983 87,559 337.0
Telecommunication
Equipment - 10 032 55.029 548.5
Radio Sets KNO 147 6 229 703 35,852 575.6
Transportation
Equipment - 73 907 185,161 250.5
Railway Vehicles - 3 21,836 -
Motor Vehicles NO 22,803 48 494 34,316 92,726 191.2
Passenger Motor Cars II 20,747 41 084 26,699 63,898 155.5
(Assembled)
Buses 4 Trucks It 2,045 7 222 7,417 25,603 354.5
(including chassis)
Motorcycles 18 279 64,391 352.3
Total Imports - 443 365 278,538 62.1
Foodstuffs - 6 789 9,498 139.9
Cacao Butter MT 759 2 318 1,503 5,122 181.3
Raw Materials - 7 i24 10,950 153.7
Non-ferrous MetalOres MT 1,066 2 744 1,102 3,749 136.6
Materials for
Vegetable II 12,572 3 168 16,212 7,161 226.0
Oils 4 Fats
Nuts 8,828 n 469 16,212 7,161 290.0
Mineral Fuels - 434 735 257,978 59.3
Crude Petroiuem 4
Partially Refined
Oils KKL 5,092 434 735 3.167 257,973 59.3
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(Unit: $1,000)
Year
Commodity
Unit of
Quantity —  
Quan 
tity
1975 
i Value
1976 Compared
- - - - - - - - -  with
Quan Value Previous 
tity Year (X)
Total Exports - 385,328 573,787 98.0
Foodstuffs - 9,700 15,914 164.1
Industrial Products - 107,771 62,671 58.2
Textiles - 92,010 48,333 52.5
Synthetic Fiber Yarn MT 8,641 25,445 5,394 18,011 70.8
Synethetic fiber fabrics KSil 33,527 26,080 7,387 6,388 24.5
Other Light Industrial 
Products 12,179 13,007 106.3
Heavy & Chemical 
Industrial Products 466,524 492,870 105.6
Beta Is - 137,450 133,257 96.9
Iron & Steel MT 303,493 128,496 348,721 120.635 93.9
Plates $ Sheets » 139,400 44,847 145,771 44,653 99.6
Zinc Plates 4 Sheets ■ 39,022 15,675 73,541 32,513 207.4
Steel Pipes i 64,679 48,513 66,266 23,979 49.4
Machinery 4 Equipment - 321,573 354,113 110.1
General Machinery - 44,637 36,062 80.8
Textile Machinery - 15,298 8,198 53.6
Electrical Machinery - 87,559 85,181 97.3
Telecommunication
Equipment _ 55,029 51,449 93.5
Radio Sets KNQ 703 35,852 600 29,977 83.6
Transportation
Equipment _ 185,161 227,785 123.0
Railway Vehicles 
Motor Vehicles NO 34,316
21,836
92,726
605 2.8 
43,393 138,623 149.5
Passenger Motor Cars 
(assembled) n 26,699 63,898 28,420 79,067 123.7
Busses 4 Trucks 
(Incl. chasis) ■ 7,417 25,603 14,545 53,609 209.4
Motorcycles - 64,391 75,469 117.2
ITotal Imports - 278,538 108,731 39.0
Foodstuffs - 9,498 13,773 145.0
Cacoa Butter MT 1,503 5,122 2,049 8,070 157.6
Raw materials - 10,950 6,726 61.4
Mon-ferrous Metal Ores MT 1,102 3,749 484 1,315 48.4
Materials for 
Vegetable Oils 4 Fats » 16,212 7,161 13,055 4,743 66.2
Nuts H 16,212 7,161 12,083 4,583 64.0
Mineral Fuels M 257,978 88,149 34.2
Crude Petroleum 4 
Partially Refined Oils KKL 3,167 257,978 1,005 83,149 34.2
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(Unit: $1,000)
Year Unit of 1977 1978 Compared
Commodity Ouant- Quant- Value Quant- Value with prev-
ity ity ity ious Year
(7.)
Total Exports . 1,009,534 953,431 94.4
Foodstuffs - 41,521 68,443 164.8
fish & shellfish MT 39.633 41,446 63,413 63,413 165.1
Mackerels, canned Q 35,675 37,338 59,073 64,252 172.1
Raw materials &
fuels - 421 456 108.3
Light industrial
products - 79,551 81,287 102.2
Textiles - 56,146 41,348 74.5
synthetic fibres
Discontinuous MT 1,035 2,251 463 1,210 53.8
Synthetic fibre
Yarn H 7,825 26,476 4,425 16,946 64.0
Rayon Yarn > 1,417 8,291 1,100 6,850 92.6
Synthetic fibre
fabrics !KSM 3,548 2,853 1,546 1,464 51.3
Secondary textile
products - 11,997 10,732 89.5
Clothing - 8,105 5,858 72.3
Nonaetallic
mineral products - 3,914 5,893 150.6
Other light
industrial product - 19,492 33,545 172.1
Tires & Tubes MT 1,399 3,393 3,535 10,051 296.2
Heavy & Chemical
Industrial product - 885,765 798,906 90.2
Chemicals - 7,093 16,933 233.7
Dyes 4 costings MT 59 521 4,145 5.149 989.3
Plastic materials
4 Artificial
Resins 11 1,070 2,805 3,397 5,352 190.9
Metals - 230,849 178,699 77.4
Iron 4 Steel MT 635,324 211,512 327,637 140,259 66.3
Bars 4 Shapes » 29,325 6,582 6.188 1,873 28.5
Light Plates 4
Sheets 195,855 64,143 165,981 60.537 94.4
Tinned plates 4
sheets * 8,384 4,404 7,565 4,562 103.6
Galvanized plates
4 sheets » 110,776 50,164 65,936 35,275 70.3
Hoops 4 Strips * 17,603 4,827 26,226 8,560 177.3
Tubes 4 pipes X 234,934 69,963 31,569 18,412 26.3
Metal products - 16,409 35,739 217.8
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Machinery 4
Equipment - 647.824 603,273
General Machinery - 50,768 88,973
Internal Combustion
Engines (Excl.
Aircraft Engines) - 13,544 24,259
Textile machinery - 9,649 5.907
Constructing 4
Mining Machinery NO 152 3,553 99 2,805
Heating 4 Cooling
Machinery - 3,810 14,830
Cargo Handling
Machinery - 3,277 4,296
Electrical
Machinery - 182,207 155,982
Heavy Electrical
Machinery - 22,660 28,992
Electrical circuit
Articles - 3,572 7,581
Telecommunications
Equipment - 103,268 69.990
Television Sets NO 163,993 26,645 96,541 16,162
Radio Sets N 813,258 53,424 397,082 30,043
Room Fans l» 359,578 16,666 215,517 11.510
Electrical
Apparatus for
Motor Vehicles MT 997 7,559 1.263 11.438
Insulated Wire * 1,303 5,474 1,682 7,028
Transportation
Equipment - 406,081 350,457
Railway Rolling
Stock - 15,852 45,556
Motor Vehicles
(Excl parts) NO 59,339 223,246 45,743 203,540
Passenger Cars ft 32,930 103,923 21,494 81,840
(Assembled)
Buses (Assembled) 4,443 23.058 10,779 59,257
Trucks (Assembled) ii 18,601 60,511 12,708 41,928
Chassis for 8uses
4 Trucks NO 2,949 26,468 457 6,610
Motor Vehicle
parts - i0,016 12,054
Motorcycles
(Assembled) NG 287.908 127,695 91,787 45,426
Precision
Instruments - 8,767 7,861
Scientific 4
Optical
Instruments - 8,393 7,246
Re-exports,
Commodities 4
Transactions not
Classified
According to kind - 2,275 4,339
93.1
175.3
179.1 
61.2
78.9
389.9
131.1
85.6
127.9 
219.8
67.8
60.7
56.2
69.1
151.3
128.4
86.3
287.4
91.2
78.8
257.0
69.3
25.0
120.3
35.6
89.7
96.3 
190.7
Total Imports -
Foodstuffs -
Shrimps, Prawns 4
Lobsters MT 1,060
Cocoa 1) 1,283
Raw materials -
Nonferrous
Metallic Ores MT O CO
Oil Seeds » 10,768
Shea Nuts n 6,916
Mineral Fuels -
Crude 4 Partially
Refined Oil KKL
Manufactured
products -
Re-iiaports,
Commodities 4
Transactions not
Classified
According to Kind -
20,290 7,529 37.1
15,663 3,897 24.9
6,338 524 3,868 61.0
9,324 10 29 0.3
4,253 2,859 67.1
460 42 191 41.5
3,746 5,030 2,479 66.2
2,329 2,353 788 33.8
0 0. -
0 0 -
286 704 246.2
83 69 83.1
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Coaaodity Units of 1979 1980 C'OEpared with
Quantity Quantity Value quantity Value Quatity Value
t Total Exports - 806,889 1,493,602 185.1
Foodstuffs - 54,351 71,700 131.9
Mackerels,Canned MT 53,183 53,109 60,032 70,470 112.9 132.7
Raw Materials k Fuels - 563 1,077 139.6
Light Industrial
Products - 52,319 101.948 193.0
Textiles - 28,706 53,206 185.3
Synthetic Fiber Yarn MT 2,405 12,661 5,447 28,318 226.5 223.7
Rayon Yarn 0 991 7,172 1,095 8,444 110.5 117.7
Synthetic Fiber Fabrics KSM 760 753 1,913 1,995 251.7 264.9
Secondary Textile
Products - 3,953 5,979 151.3
Clothing - 1,495 2,948 197.2
Nonaetallic Mineral
Products - 3,009 7,859 261.2
Other Light Industrial
products - 21,104 40,382 193.7
Tires k Tubes MT 673 2,161 2,197 7,107 326.4 323.9
Fishing Hooks KDZ 48,326 350 102,492 2,305 209.9 271.2
Records,Tapes 4 Other
Siailar - 2,530 4,598 181.7
Articles - 691,134 1,316,755 190.5
Heavy & Cheaical
Industrial Proucts - 691,134 1,316,755 190.5
Cheaical - 20,557 26,506 128.9
Organic Cpapounds MT 301 2,250 431 2,927 53.3 130.1
Dyes 4 Coatings a 643 2,423 1,004 5,181 156.1 213.3
Plastic Hatrials 6
Artificial Resins ■ 7,015 10,297 5,652 9,909 30.6 96.2
Metals - 191,027 413,363 219.0
Iron 4 Steel MT 309,032 155,481 651,272 367,267 210.7 236.2
Bars 4 Shapes 8 9,953 3,376 32,375 13.067 325.3 337.1
Heavy Plates 4 Sheets a 1,675 620 7.647 3,28? 456.5 530.5
Light Plates 4 Sheets ■ 158,367 76,684 326,302 168,708 206.4 220.0
Tinned Plates 4 Sheets a 11.819 8,248 38,220 28,995 323.4 351.5
Galvanized Plates 4
Sheets ■ 45,619 29,018 119,745 02,578 262.5 284.6
Hoops 4 Strips 8 21,313 7,923 31,727 12,342 145.4 155.3
Tubes 4 Pipes H 44,600 23.683 43,294 35.315 108.3 151.2
Nonferrous Metals - 7,125 15,407 216.2
Metal Products - 28,421 35,689 125.6
Machinery 4 Equipsent - 479,549 871,335 181.3
General sachinery - 100,041 125.334 125.3
Internal Coabustion
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Engines (Excl.Aircraft
Engines) -
Agricultural Machinery -
Office Machines -
Metalworking Machinery -
Textile Machinery -
Constructing 4 Mining 
Machinery
NO 19
Heating £ Cooling
Machinery -
Cargo Handling Machinery -
Electrical Machinery -
Heavy Electrical -
Electrical Circuit 
Telecoaaunications
Equipaent -
Television Sets NO 73,311
Radio Sets a 247,200
Rooa Fans ■ 147,804
Insulated Sire MT 4,195
Electrical Apparatus for K6 692,509
Tape Recorders NO 10,856
Transportation Equipaent -
Railway Rolling Stock -
Motor Vehicles (Excl. NO 33,357
Passenger Cars a 8,479
Buses ■ 13,567
Trucks a 10,230
Chassis for Buses £ a 945
Motor Vehicle Parts -
Motorcycles (Knock-down) NO 94,284
Precision Instruaents -
Scientific £ Optical 
Instruaents
Re-exports. Coaaodities £
Transactions not Classifieti -
JTotal Iaports -
Foodstuffs -
Shriaps, Prawns £ Lcbstrs MT 565
Raw Materials -
Cotton MT 4,193
Ncnferrous Metallic Ores -
Oil Seeds MT 2,070
Shea Nuts a 2,070
Mineral Fuels -
Crude £ Partially Refined KKL 0
I Heavy Oil ■ 117
Manufactured Products 
Re-iaport, Coaaadities £ 
jTransactions not Classified 
According to kind
19,194 43,674 227.5
653 3,789 580.2
2,991 5,010 167.5
5,363 8,739 162.9
4,828 11,209 232.1
166 3,408 873.7 10.5
-fold
12,637 7,124 56.4
5,320 10,300 193.6
124,879 248,230 193.8
17,727 20,420 115.2
14,022 17,695 126.2
40,620 125,423 308.3
10,432 133,105 19,838 131.6 190.2
22,019 709,809 75,086 287.1 341.0
8,639 291,500 16,350 197.2 189.3
19,361 2,102 12,945 50.1 66.9
6,843 1,645,386 15,781 237.6 230.6
1,254 82,410 3,346 759.1 665.6
250,993 490,293 195.3
45 2,254 50.1
181,745 68,607 325,942 205.7 179.3
35,898 21,976 84,300 259.2 234.3
76,657 23,725 , 161,061 211.7 210.1
52,499 17,013 63,227 166.4 120.4
12,760 552 3,853 58.4 69.4
12,372 26,850 217.0
45,514 233,672 115,141 247.8 253.0
3,636 8,023 220.8
3,411 7,613 223.2
8,017 2,122 26.5
42,467 120,175 283.0
5,305 4,061 76.6
5,055 530 3,665 93.8 72.5
10,479 3,573 34.1
6,651 0 0 0.0 0.0
2,550 2,191 85.9
1,093 1,964 1,211 94.9 110.3
1,098 1,964 1,211 94.9 110.3
25.198 104,643 415.3
0 399 104,597 - -
25,198 45 - 0.2
44 331 752.3
1,441 7,566 525.1
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Year
Coffiisodity
Units
of
198C 1981 Compared with 
Previous Year (
Quantity Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value
tlotal Exports - i, 493,602 2,153,826 144.5
Foodstuffs - 71,700 101,026 140.9
Fish k  Shellfish MT 62,221 71,473 71,735 100,873 115.3 141.1
Mackerels, canned II 60,032 70,470 69,331 97,906 115.6 133.9
Raw Materials & Fuels - 1,077 1,143 106.1
Light Industrial Products - 101,943 113,689 111.5
Textiles - 53,206 47,245 83.3
Synthetic Fibers, MT 456 1,184 242 879 53.1 74.2
Discontinicus
Synthetic Fiber Yarn It 5,447 23,318 5,274 26,416 96.8 93.3
Rayon Yarn a 1,095 8,444 875 6,950 79.9 32.3
Synthetic Fiber Fabrics KSH 1,913 1,995 351 291 13.3 14.6
Secondary Textile Products - 5,979 5,257 87.9
Clothing - 2,943 1,931 65.5
Nonaetallic Mineral Products - 7,859 8,901 103.0
Other Light Industrial Products - 40,832 58,352 142.7
Tire 4 Tubes MT 2,197 7,107 5,135 16,478 233.7 231.9
Records,Tapes 4 Other Siailar - 4,593 13,298 289.2
Articles
Heavy 4 Cheaical Industrial - 1,316,755 1,940,553 147.4
Products
Chemicals - 26,506 23,327 106.9
Organic Coapounds MT 431 2,92? 878 3,438 203.7 117.5
Dyes 4 Coatings 0 1,004 5,181 565 5,160 56.3 99,6
Plastic Materials 4 Artificial A 5,652 9,909 7,534 12,366 134.2 124.3
Resins
Metals - 418,363 335,535 0« n
Iron 4 Steel MT 651,272 367,267 552,611 326,162 84.9 88.8
Bars 4 Shapes 0 32,375 13,067 32,956 10,733 101.8 82.2
Heavy Plates 4 Sheets 0 7,647 3,289 5,840 2,484 76.4 75.5
Light Plates 4 Sheets ■ 326,302 163,708 274,267 136,406 33.9 30.9
Tinned Plates 4 Sheets 0 33,220 28,995 14,335 11,622 37.5 40.1
Galvanized Plates 4 Sheets 0 119,745 32,578 110,621 71,761 92.4 36.9
Hoops 4 Strips 0 31,727 12,342 30,624 11,150 96.5 90.3
Tubes 4 Pipes a 48,294 35,315 75,361 76,315 157.1 213.1
Nonferrous Metals - 15,407 16,968 1 1 0 . 1
Metal Products - 35,689 42.404 118.3
Machinery 4 Equipaent - 871,885 1,526,691 175.1
General Machinery - 125,334 209,721 167.3
Internal Cosbustion Engines - 43,674 60,741 139.1
(Excl.Aircraft Engines)
Metalworking Machinery - 3,739 18,534 2 1 2 . 1
Textile Machinery - 11,208 12,303 109.8
Constructing 4 Mining NO 166 3,403 508 17,256 306.0 506.3
Machinery
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Heating 4 Cooling Machinery - 7,124 13,539 190.0
Cargo Handling Machinery - 10,300 14,459 140.4
Electrical Machinery - 248,230 278,712 112.3
Heavy Electrical Machinery - 20,420 50,573 247.7
Electrical Circuit Articles - 17,695 14,099 79.7
Telecoauunications - 125,423 126,270 100.7
Equipaent
Television Sets HO 133,105 19,833 117,916 26,482 38.6 133.5
Radio Sets * 709,80? 75,086 534,066 65,574 75.2 87.3
Rooa Fans 1 291,508 16,350 213,568 13,223 73.3 30.9
Insulated Hire MT 2,102 12,945 1,165 6,878 55.4 53.1.
Electrical Apparatus for Motor
Vehicles KS 1,645,336 15,781 2,008,981 19,043 122.1 120.7
Transportation Equipaent 490,293 1,025,540 209.2
Railway Rolling Stock - 2,254 543 24.1
Motor Vehicles {Excl.Parts) HQ 68,607 325,942 152,135 711,909 221.7 218.4
Passenger Cars S 21,976 84,300 68,671 291,457 312.5 345.7
Busses 9 28,725 161,061 44,018 245,759 153.2 152.6
Trucks 9 17,018 63,227 33,457 149,091 226.0 235.8
Chassis for Busses 4 Trucks 9 552 8,853 228 5,235 41.3 59.1
Motor Vehicle Parts - 26,850 28,682 106.8
Motorcycles - 233,750 115,175 353,672 182,175 151.3 158.2
Motorcycles (Asseabled) 9 78 35 42 52 53.8 143.6
Motorcycles (Knock-down) 9 233,672 115,141 353,630 132,123 151.3 153.2
Precision Instruaents - 8,028 12,719 158.4
Scientific 4 Optical - 7,613 12,140 159.5
Instruaents
Re-exports, Coaaodities &
Transactions not Classified - 2,122 2,416 113.9
♦Total Inports - 120,175 340,369 283.2
Foodstuffs - 4,061 6,567 161.7
Shrimps, Prawns 4 Lobsters MT 530 3,665 815 6,558 153.8 178.9
Cocoa ■ 0 j 0 0 - 0.0
Raw Materials - 3,573 2,178 61.0
Cotton MT 0 0 0 0 - -
Honferrous Metallic Ores - 2,191 314 14.3
Oil Seeds MT 1,964 1,211 3,909 1,823 199.0 150.9
Shea Huts • 1,964 1,211 3,909 1,823 199.0 150.9
Mineral Fuels - 104,643 331,191 316.5
Crude & Partially Refined Oil KKL 39? 104,597 1,239 331,185 310.5 316.6
Heavy Oil ■ 0 45 0 6 - 13.3
Manufactured Products - 331 11 3.3
Re-export, Coaacdities & 
Transactions not Classified 7,566 423 5.6
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Units 1981
Year of
Coamedity Quantity Quantity
ITotal Exports -
Foodstuffs -
Fish & Shellfish MT 71,735
Mackerel, Canned « 69,381
Raw Materials 4 Fuels - 1,143
Light Industry Goods - 113,689
Textile Goods - 47,245
Synthetic Fibers, MT 242
Synthetic Fiber Yarn • 5,274
Rayon Yarn a 375
Synthetic Fiber Fabrics KSH 351
Textile Secondary Products -
Clothing -
Ncnaetallic Mineral Products -
Other Light Industrial -
Tires 4 Tubes MT 5,135
Records 4 Tapes -
Heavy and Chemical Industry -
Cheaical Goods -
Organic Compounds Mt 878
Dyes 4 Coatings ■ 565
Plastic Materials 4 
Artificial Resins
a 7,584
Metal Goods -
Iron 4 Steel Ml 552,611
Bars 4 Shapes 9 32,956
1982 Ccapared with
Previous Year(X)
Value Quantity Value Quantity Valui
2,158,826 1,209,057 56.0
101,026 70,766 70.0
100,878 57,117 69,930 79.6 69.3
97,906 47,338 60,120 63.9 61.4
504 44.1
82,235 72.4
32,045 67.8
879 837 1,806 345.9 205.5
26,416 2,995 14,050 56.3 53.2
6,950 422 3,175 43.2 45.7
291 363 325 103.4 111.7
5,257 3,634 69.1
1,931 1,004 52.0
8,091 3,475 42.9
58,352 46,765 30.1
16,478 1,314 5,505 35.3 33.4
13,293 23,400 176.0
1,940,553 1,054,792 54.4
28,327 15,477 54.6
3,433 177 1,646 20.2 47.9
5,160 336 4,067 59.5 78.8
12,366 2,855 4,333 37.6 39.5
385,535 232,602 73.3
326,162 443,247 246,108 80.2 75.5
10,733 26,594 3,781 80.7 31.3
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Heavy Plates & Sheets ■ 5,840 2,484 5,334 2,551 92.2 102.7
Plates & Sheets ■ 274,267 136,406 286,637 144,065 104.5 105.6
Tinned Plates & Sheets * 14,335 11,622 21,364 16,304 149.0 140.3
Galvanized Plates 4 Sheets ■ 110,621 71,761 18,748 9,976 16.9 13.9
Hoops 4 Strips u 30,624 11,150 40,914 14,549 133.6 130.5
Tubes 4 Pipes, of Steel a 75,861 76,315 35,072 45,276 46.2 59.3
Nonferrous Metals - 16,963 9,285 54.7
Metal Products - 42,404 27,203 64.2
Machinery - 1,526,691 756,714 49.6
General Machinery - 209,721 137,584 65.6
Internal Conbustion Engines - 60,741 56,597 93.2
(Excl. aircraft Engines)
Metalworking Machinery - 18,534 9,220 49.7
Textile Machinery - 12,308 5,793 47.1
Constructing 4 Mining HO 503 17,256 227 6,344 44.7 36.8
Machinery
Heating 4 Cooling Machinery - 13,539 7,346 54.3
Cargo Handling Machinery - 14,459 4,639 32.1
Electrical Machinery - 278,712 187,320 67.2
Heavy Electical Machinery - 50,573 39,554 78.2
Electrical Circuit Articles - 14,099 6,759 47.9
Telecoaaunications Equipaent - 126,270 77,334 61.6
Television Sets No 117,916 26,432 80,697 18,042 68.4 68.1
Radio Sets ■ 534,066 65,574 397,728 38,672 74.5 59.0
Rooi Fans 1 213,568 13,223 119,864 7,151 56.1 54.1
Insulated Electric Hire MT 1 u s 6,878 748 5,039 64.2 73.3
Electrical Apparatus for KG 2,008,981 19,043 2,214,963 19,048 110.3 100.0
Motor Vehicles
Transportation Equipaent - 1,025,540 425,833 41.5
Railway Rolling Stock - 543 35 6.4
Motor Vehicles (Excl.Parts) NO 152,135 711,909 62,630 244,778 41.2 34.4
Passenger Cars If 68,671 291,457 35,926 127,596 52.3 43.3
Busses ■ 44,018 245,759 10,634 48,677 24.2 19.3
Trucks (Assembled} a 33,457 149,091 15,180 56,178 39.5 37.7
Bus 4 Truck Chassis a 228 5,235 642 3,782 281.6 7 H  n  / £ « £
Motor Vehicle Parts - 23,682 24,355 84.9
Motorcycles NO 353,672 132,175 263,126 119,844 74.4 65.8
Motorcycles (Assembled > a 42 52 106 109 252.4 209.6
Motorcycles (knock Down) u 353,630 132,123 263,020 119,735 74.4 65.7
Precision Instruaents 12,719 5,977 47.0
Scientific 4 Optical 12,140 5,721 47.1
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Re-exports, Coisaodities 4 
Transactions not Classified - 
According to kind
t Total Iaports
Foodstuffs
Shrimps, Prawns, 4 SIT 815
Cocoa * 0
Raw Materials 
Nonferrous Metal Ore
Oil Seeds HT 3,909
Shea Nuts ■ 3,909
2,416 710 29.4
340,369 8,002 2.4
6,567 6.330 96.4
6,558 738 5,795 90.6 83.4
0 249 534
2,178 354 16.3
314 0 0.0
1,928 650 331 16.6 19.1
1,828 650 331 16.6 18.1
Mineral Fuels 331,191 0.0
Crude 4 Partly Refined KKL
Heavy Fuel Oils *
1,239 331,185
6
0.0 0.0 
0.0
Manufactured 6oods 11 16 145.5
Re-isports 4 Coaaodities 4
Transactions Not Classified - 423 1,303 309.0
According to kind
Lobsters
3 9 1
(Unit:$l,000)
Year
Coasodity
Units
r . - f
1983 1994
QT
Quan­
tity
Quantity Value Share
«f
Quantity P.Y.
(X) Value
P.Y.
(7.)
Share
(X)
t Total Exports - 567,805 100.0 445,513 73.5 100.0
Foodstuffs - 28,308 5.0 1,134 4.0 0.3
Fish £ Shellfish 
Mackerel, Canned
MT
II
22,733
16,234
28,257
21,495
5.0
3.8
940
25
4.1
0.2
991
m
J i
3.5
0.1
0.2
0.0
Raw Materials £ Fuels - 311 0.1 470 151.1 0.1
Light Industry Goods - 38,017 6.7 17,547 46.2 3.9
Textile Goods - 15,446 2.7 9,988 64.7 2.2
Synthetic Fibers, 
Discontinuous MT 954 1,810 0.3 283 29.7 528 29.2 0.1
Synthetic Fiber Yarn n 1,494 7,190 1.3 578 33.7 2,498 34.7 0.6
Rayon Yarn B 98 693 0.1 53 54.1 333 55.3 0.1
Synthetic Fiber KSH 253 180 0.0 56 21.7 80 48.9 0.0
Textile Secondary 
Products - 2,131 0.4 698 32.8 0.2
Clothing - 154 0.0 201 130.5 0.0
Honaetallic Mineral 
Products - 4,017 0.7 1,241 30.9 0.3
Other Light Industrial 
Products - 13,554 3.3 6,317 34.0 1.4
Tires £ Tubes MT 1,168 3,641 0.6 690 59.1 2,381 65.4 0.5
Records & Tapes - 7,213 1.3 1,047 14.5 0.2
Heavy and Cheaical Industry 
Products
499,911 88.0 426.052 35.2
Cheaical Goods - 11,126 2.0 6,345 61.5
Organic Coapounds 
Dyes £ Coatings
MT
1
321
n o
1,710
2,186
0.3
0.4
152 47. 
54 49.
,4
1
581
957
34.0
43.3
Plastic Materials k • 2,944 4,391
Artificial Resins
Metal Goods - 136,422
Iron 1 Steel MT 189,776 99.485
Bars it Shapes » 9.770 3,314
Heavy Plates & Sheets B 3,061 1,147
Plates & Sheets 1 136,049 63,317
Tinned Plates 6 Sheets ■ 9,375 7,481
Galvanized P h t e s  4 Sheets » n 3
Hoops 4 Strips H 13,475 4,731
Tubes 4 Pipes, of Steel a 11,726 10,719
Nonferous Metals - 11,029
Metal Products - 25,908
Machinery - 352,363
General Machinery - 143,915
Internal Combustion engines - 16,426
(Excl.Aircraft Engines)
Metalworking Machinery - 3,201
Textile Machinery - 4,585
Constructing 4 Mining NO 126 3,530
Machinery
Heating 6 Cooling Machinery - 10,340
Cargo Handling Machinery - 6,533
Electrical Machinery - 110,123
Heavy Electrical Machinery - 28,212
Electrical Circuit Articles ■ 10,,943 1.
Telecommunications Equipmen'1 - 35,665
Television Sets N0 25.339 ■* V V ",V , u J w
Radio Sets a 152,732 12,532
Rocs Fans a 166,643 9,301
Insulated Electric Hire MT 460 2,239
Electrical Apparatus tor KG 305,253 7,375
Transportation Equipment - 39,363
Railway Rolling Stock - 72
Motor Vehicles (Excl. Parts) NO 9,829 40,495
Passenger Cars n 5,15 13,641
Busses u 1,526 7,177
Trucks (Assembled) a 2.911 12,103
Bus 6 Truck Chassis H T i gi.A7 1,247
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0.8 1,933 65.7 3,553 80.9 0.8
24.0 96,984 71.1 21.8
17.5 144,460 76.1 79.042 79.5 17.7
0.6 2,923 29.9 1.194 36.0 0.3
0.2 2,575 34.1 1.063 93.1 0.2
12.0 105,363 77.8 56,033 82.1 12.6
1.3 4,496 48.0 3,840 51.3 0.9
0.0 2,300 - 1,341 447 0.3
fold
0.8 9,387 69.7 4,276 90.4 1.0
1.9 13,123 112.0 8,611 80.3 1.9
1.9 7,632 69.7 1.7
4.6 10,260 39.6 2.3
62.1 322,222 91.4 72.3
26.2 194,146 130.4 43.6
2.9 11,969 72.9 2.7
0.6 5,164 161.3 1.2
0.8 2,475 54.0 0.6
0.6 20 15.9 979 27.3 0.2
1 .9 2 0 ,559 189 .7 4 .6
1 .2 3 ,392 51 .5 0 .3
19 .4 37 ,356 7 9 .3 1 9 .6
5 .0 35 ,773 126.8 8 .0
30 ,494 2 7 3 .7 6 .3
6 .3 6 ,4 1 8 1 3 .0 1 .4
0 .7 12.425 49 .0 2 ,0 3 6 54 .4 0 .5
2 .2 48,671 3 1 .9 2 ,0 6 7 16.4 0 .5
1 .6 13,269 1 1 .0 768 3 .3 0 . 2
0 .4 331 72 .0 • *)' sX, i.ltf 53.1 0 .3
1 .3 4 50 ,779 5 6 .0 4 ,533 6 1 .5 1 .0
1 5 .8 39 ,669 44 .1 8 .9
0 .0 40 55 .6 0 .0
7 .1 3 ,703 3 7 .7 19 ,667 43 .6 4 .4
3 .3 129 2 .5 833 4 .5 0 .2
1 .3 6 0 .4 Aii 0 .6 0 . 0
i  1 
i.. i 3 ,559 122 .3 17 ,030 140.7 3 .8
0 .2 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 .0
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Motor Vehicle Parte 
Motorcycles
Motorcycles {Assembled} 
Motorcycles (Knock Down)
NO
«
a
59,025
21
59,004
9,397
23,344
10
23,335
1.7
4.1
0.0
4.1
26,106
20
26,086
44.2
95.2
44.2
4,121
11,480
<7
11,463
41.6
49.2
170.0
49.1
0.9
2.6
0.0
2.6
Precision Instruments 
Scientific 1 Optical 
Instruments
“ 3,457
3,387
0.6
0.6
1,051
1,041
30.4
30.7
0.2
0.2
Re-exports,Commodities 
4 Transactions not 
Classified According 
to kind 1,257 0.2 315 25.1
tTctal Imports - 6,706 100.0 7,012 104.6 100
Foodstuffs - ' 4,773 71.2 6,162 129.1 37
Shrimps, Prawns, 4 
Lobsters MT 580 4,540 67.7 693 119.5 5,104 i  < n  m 72
Cocoa a 121 225 3.4 400 330.6 993 441.3 14
Raw Materials - 1,446 21.6 645 44.6 9
Nonferrous Metal Ore - 0 0.0 212 - 3
Oil Seeds MT 3,324 1,376 20.5 551 16.6 244 17.7 3
Shea Nuts n 3,326 1,376 20.5 551 16.6 244 17.7 3
Manufactured Goods - 119 1.8 78 65.5 1
Re-iisports 4 Commodities 
\ Transactions Not 
Classified According 
to kind 363 5.5 127 34.5 1
INDEX OF EXPORT PERFORMANCE NIGERIA AND JAPAN, 1960-1985
FIG 2 (iv)
YEAR JAPAN NIGERIA JAP. INDEX NIG. INDEX
1960.0 72214.0 8156.0 100.0 100.0
1961.0 72800.0 9480.0 100.8 116.2
1962.0 63982.0 5211.0 88.6 63.9
1963.0 74109.0 6760.0 102.6 82.9
1964.0 79514.0 7351.0 110.1 90.1
1965.0 58984.0 9285.0 81.7 113.8
1966.0 39572.0 13671.0 54.8 167.6
1967.0 38335.0 16163.0 53.1 198.2
1968.0 13094.0 14502.0 18.1 177.8
1969.0 28625.0 12949.0 39.6 158.8
1970.0 62892.0 12841.0 87.1 157.4
1971.0 95989.0 27131.0 132.9 332.7
1972.0 125998.0 79961.0 174.5 980.4
1973.0 141147.0 189010.0 195.5 2317.4
1974.0 284687.0 448865.0 394.2 5503.5
1975.0 585328.0 278538.0 810.5 3415.1
1976.0 573787.0 108731.0 794.6 1333.1
1977.0 1009535.0 20290.0 1398.0 248.8
1978.0 953431.0 7529.0 1320.3 92.3
1979.0 806889.0 42467.0 1117.4 520.7
1980.0 1493602.0 120175.0 2068.3 1473.5
1981.0 2158826.0 340369.0 2989.5 4173.2
1982.0 1209057.0 8002.0 1674.3 98.1
1983.0 567805.0 6706.0 786.3 82.2
1984.0 445518.0 7012.0 616.9 86.0
1985.0 342029.0 5832.0 473.6 71.5
incri
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Fig. 3(i) JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY, 1961-1983
JAPANESE DATE OF CAPITAL NAMES OF MAJOR BUSINESS MAJOR CITY
INVESTOR ESTABLISHMENT RATIO COMPANIES LINES PARTNERS KOmEN
Nishizawa 1961
Nishizawa 1962
Yodogawa Steel 1964
Works 
C. Itoh & Co.
Nippon Kokan 1964
Marubeni Corp.
G.H. Kato & Co.
Toyobo Company 1965
8 Other Spinning 
Firms from Osaka
Sanyo Electrical 1969
Co.
Marubeni Corp.
Nichimen Corp. 1969
Tayo Menka Kaisha 1970
7.4
12.8
12
24
19.1
19.1 
2.7
44.9
20
10
40
40
Afprint (Nig.) Ltd 
Northern Textile Man. 
Galvanising Ind. Ltd.
Pioneer Metal Prod. Co
Arewa Textiles Ltd.
Sanyo (Nig.) Ltd.
Nichimen Co. (Nig.) 
Ltd.
Tayo Menka Kaisha 
(Nig.) Ltd.
Textile Manufacturing
Man. of Textiles
Prod, of Galvanised 
Iron Sheets
Prod, of Galvanised 
Iron Sheets
N/A Lagos
N/A Kano
CFAO and Lagos
Others (64%)
Peterson Lagos
Zochonics,
G.H Kato & Co.
Textile Manufacturing
Assembly & Sales of 
home electrical 
appliances
Trading
Data Collection
Local Capital
(40%) Ka±ma
UK & US Firms 
(15%)
A.G Leventis Ibadan 
Others (70%)
Nabama 
Badamosi 
Holding Co., 
Others (60%)
Lagos
Local Capital Lagos 
(60%)
VOa\co
JAPANESE
INVESTOR
DATE OF
ESTABLISHMENT
CAPITAL
RATIO
NAMES OF 
COMPANIES
MAJOR BUSINESS
LINES
MAJOR
PARTNERS
CITY
IOCKCKN
Teijin Ltd, Osaka 1970 
C. Itoh & Co.
Kuraray Co. 1970
Marubeni Corp.
Mitsui Sekiyu 1970
Kaihatsu
N/A
11
6
100
Nigeria Teijin Textiles 
Ltd.
Woolen and Synthetic 
Textile Man. Ltd.
Japan Petroleum Co. 
(Nig.) Ltd.
Production of Blended 
Synthetic Fabrics
Man. of Textiles 
Piece Goods
Oil exploration
C.F.A.O.
NIDB (20%), 
J.T Chanrai, 
Others (40%)
Lagos
Lagos
Lagos
Momoi Seiko 1970
Daiwa Spinning Co. 1970
Chori Co.
Hirata Spinning 1971
Asahi Chemical 
C. Itoh & Co.
50
5.3
5.3
22.5
19.4
19.4
Toray Industries 1973 17.8
(Capital Participation)
N/A
Mitsui & Co.
Taiyo Fishery
1973
1973
1974
20
30
Nigeria Net & Twine Co. Fishery 
Bhojsons Ind. Ltd.
N/A Lagos
Ninetso (Nig.) Ltd. 
and Processing of 
nylon fishing nets
General Cotton Mill Ltd
Eko-Nippon Fishing 
Co. Ltd.
Woven Cloths, Dying 
and Processing
Textile Production 
Others (40%)
Spinning and weaving 
of polyester/Cotton 
and mixed fabrics
Fishery
Nigeria Wire Industries 
Osadjere Fishing Co. Fishery
Prod, of Steel Rod & 
Secondary Products
Local Capital Lagos 
(89.4%)
CFAO (38.75%) Lagos
Startex, Onitsha
Others (82.2%)
Lagos
LagosBridon Ltd, 
Others (70%)
Ibru Seafoods Lagos 
(70%)
r-'
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JAPANESE
INVESTOR
DATE OF CAPITAL NAMES OF
ESTABLISHMENT RATIO COMPANIES
Unitika Ltd 
Nichimen Corp.
1975 26
25
Zaria Industries Ltd.
Toyo Glass 1975 6.5 Metal Box Toyo Glass 
(Nig.) Ltd.
Kyoei Seiko 
Nisho Iwai Corp.
1975 9.13 Continental Iron &
6.84 Steel Co.
Nichimen Corp. 1977 20 Metcome (Nig.) Ltd.
Mitsubishi Corp. 
Kobe Steel Corp.
1977 17.3 Standard Industrial
10.2 Development Co.
Mitsubishi Electric 1977 
Mitsubishi Corp.
25
15
Melco (Nig.) Ltd,
Sekisui Chemical 1977 
Michimen Corp.
30
10
Eslon (Nig.) Ltd,
MAJOR BUSINESS
LINES
Spinning, weaving 
processing & sales 
of canvas
Glass making
Manufacturing of Iron 
Steel Tubes, Bars, 
Rods, Flats and Wire
Processing & Sales 
of Standard Steel 
Products
Sales of Steel Tubes
MAJOR CITY
PARTNERS IOCKEKN
Industrial Kaduna
Development
Corp., Kaduna
Investments
Co. (49%)
Metal Box Lagos
Overseas
(55.9%),
NIDB (37.6%)
Local Capital Lagos
J .R Anyaechie Aba 
& Co. (40%),
Others (40%)
John Holt & Lagos 
Company 
(Liverpool) ,
Others (72.5%)
LagosSales and Installation Wali Group, 
of heavy electrical Others (60%) 
machinery
PVC Pipes, NNIL (30%) IfeAma
Polyethylene films NRDL, Others
(30%)
COChn
JAPANESE
INVESTOR
DATE OF CAPITAL NAMES OF
ESTABLISHMENT RATIO COMPANIES
Kawasho Corp. 1978 10 Rolled Steel Products 
Limited
Sumitomo Electric 1978 
Industries
Sumitomo Electric 1978 
Industries 
Sumitomo Corp.
Sumitomo Corp. 1978
C. Itoh & Co. 1978
40
40
40
40
Sei (Nig.) Ltd.
Nigeria Wire and Cable 
Company
Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha 
(Nig.) Ltd.
C. Itoh & Co. (Nig.) 
Ltd.
Mitsui & Co. 1978 40 MBK (Nig.) Ltd.
Sumitomo Corp. 1979 40 Sumalco Ltd.
Marubeni Corp. 1979
Mitsubishi Corp. 1979
40
100
Marubeni (Nig.) Ltd.
Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha 
(Nig.) Ltd.
Taisei Corp. 1979 40 Taisei West Africa Ltd.
MAJOR BUSINESS MAJOR CITY
LINES PARTNERS ICCKEKN
Galvanised Iron 
Products Ltd
Comm, and Civil 
Engineering Works
Manufacturing of 
eletrical wires and 
cables
Marketing Survey/ 
Data Collection
Data Collection
Data Collection
Installation of 
electrical wires and 
cables
Trading
Trading
Colada Ibadan
Investments 
(40%), Third 
Country (50%)
M/S Alao & Ibadan
Alade (60%)
Odua Ibadan
Investments 
(40%)
Local Capital Lagos 
(60%)
Chief Thomas Lagos
(30%),
Others (30%)
Local Capital Lagos 
(60%)
Local Capital Lagos 
(60%)
Local Capital Lagos 
Lagos
Civil Engineering, Hawas Services Lagos
Construction and (35%),
Machinery Procurements Others (25%)
cn
cr»
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JAPANESE
INVESTOR
DATE OF CAPITAL NAMES OF
ESTABLISHMENT RATIO COMPANIES
Fujikara Ltd 
Mitsui & Co.
1979 35
5
Fujikara Cable Works 
(Nig.) Ltd.
Nisho Iwai Corp. 1979 40 Nisho Iwai (Nig.) Ltd,
Saibo Company 1980 20 Nigeria Textile 
Products Ltd.
Honda Motor Co. 1981 30 Honda Manufacturing 
(Nig.) Ltd.
NEC Corp. 1981 40 NEC (Nig.) Ltd.
Yamaha Motor Co. 
Mitsui & Co.
1982 17.5 Yamaha Manufacturing
17.5 (Nig.) Ltd.
Taisho Marine & 
Fire Insurance
1983
Toda Construction 1983
15
40
Fire Equity & General 
Insurance Company
Toda Construction 
(Nig.) Company
Matsushita Electric 1983 
Industrial
40 National Panasonic 
(Nig.) Ltd.
MAJOR BUSINESS MAJOR CITY
LINES PARTNERS IOCKEECN
Communications and 
Electric Power Eng.
Trading
Ogoro, Others Lago 
(60%)
Omicron Int. 
Ltd, Others 
(60%)
Lago
Textile Manufacturing Local Capital Kan
(80%)
Production of 
Motorcycles, Parts
Sales of Electronic 
and Communications 
Equipment
Production of 
Motorcycles, Parts
Non-Life Insurance
General Construction
Production of colour 
television, fan and 
other domestic 
appliances
Local Capital Lagos 
(70%)
Chief Ogundej i Lagos 
Two Others 
(60%)
John Holt Lagos
(25%),
Others (40%)
AFIA (25%), Lagos 
Others (60%)
Local Capital Lagos 
(60%)
UAC Int (10%) Lagos 
UAC (Nig) Ltd 
(10%),
Others (40%)
JAPANESE DATE OF 
INVESTOR ESTABLISHMENT
CAPITAL
RATIO
NAMES OF 
COMPANIES
MAJOR BUSINESS 
LINES
MAJOR
PARTNERS
CITY
ioamcN
Chiyoda Chemical 1983 
Engineering & 
Construction
40 Chiyoda (Nig.) Ltd. Construction of 
Petroleum and 
Petrochemical Plants
Chief Thomas 
(60%)
Lagos
Mitsui & Co. 1983 
Tone Boring
20
20
Nija Water Development 
& Construction Co.
Well Drilling, 
Water Resource 
Development
Local Capital 
(60%)
Lagos
Supplement to Fig. 3 (i)
ComDanies whose interests are also reDresented but whose particulars are incomplete due to non-availabilitv
of data.
1. Taichi Company Ltd.
2. Marubeni Engineering (West Africa) Ltd.
3. Dainichi Tsuun Company Ltd. (c/o Panalpina World Transport (Nigeria) Ltd.)
4. Nishizawa (Nigeria) Ltd.
5. J.G.C. (Nigeria) Ltd.
6. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.
7. Suzuki Motor Company Ltd. (c/o Boulous Enterprises Ltd.)
8. Far East West Africa Conference Lines (c/o Alraine (Nigeria) Ltd.)
9. J.N.E. (Nigeria) Ltd.
10. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. (Lagos Reps. Office)
11. Telerex Electronics Ltd.
12. Ninetco Ltd.
13. Delta Freezer Ltd.
14. Nigeria Surgical Products Ltd.
N.B: This list may not be exhaustive. It is also important to note that some of these companies may have 
wound up operations.
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FIG. 4 (i)
NIGERIA - JAPAN TRADE. 1960 - 1985 
VALUE OF TOTAL TRADE (SMILLION^
YEAR JAPAN NIGERIA
1960 72 214 8 156
1961 72 800 9 480
1962 63 982 5 211
1963 74 109 6 760
1964 79 514 7 351
1965 58 984 9 285
1966 39 572 13 671
1967 38 355 16 163
1968 13 094 14 502
1969 28 625 12 949
1970 62 892 12 841
1971 95 989 27 131
1972 125 998 79 961
1973 141 147 189 010
1974 284 687 448 865
1975 585 328 278 538
1976 573 787 108 731
1977 1,009 534 20 290
1978 953 431 7 529
1979 806 889 42 467
1980 1,493 602 120 175
1981 2,158 826 340 369
1982 1,209 057 8 002
1983 567 805 6 706
1984 445 518 7 012
1985 342 029 5 832
SOURCE:
JETRO, WHITEPAPER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (various years)
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FIG.4 (ii)
JAPAN'S SHARE OF NIGERIA'S TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
YEAR IMPORTS (C.I.F) EXPORTS
1960 13.1 1.5
1961 13.8 1.5
1962 12.4 0.9
1963 13.8 1.3
1964 12.3 1.2
1965 9.5 1.2
1966 5.6 1.5
1967 8.4 2.6
1968 3.7 1.8
1969 3.8 1.1
1970 6.3 0.8
1971 8.4 1.4
1972 9.9 3.9
1973 9.2 4.6
1974 9.2 4.1
1975 9.8 3.5
1976 9.3 0.5
1977 10.7 0.1
1978 10.7 0.1
1979 10.9 0.1
1980 10.8 0.1
1981 13.4 1.5
1982 11.2 0.1
1983 9.4 0.1
1984 8.2 0.1
1985 7.4 0.1
SOURCE:
FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS, Review of External Trade (various 
years).
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FIB 4 (III)
Direction of Nigeria’s External Trade, 1960-1984:
I»ports by Regional Groupings as Percentage total Value of Iaports
Countries and Regional Groupings
-ear United
Kingdoa
Other
CoiiBonwealth
Countries
Western
Europe
United
States
Eastern
Europe Japan
west 
Africa Others
Total
I960 43.6 5.9 26.0 5.4 2.0 13.1 0.3 3.6 100
1961 38.3 7.8 26.2 5.4 2.6 13.3 0.3 5.1 100
1962 36.8 7.4 27.5 7.5 3.0 12.4 0.2 5.3 100
1963 36.3 6.4 30.1 4.0 3.6 13.3 0.3 5.4 100
1964 31.3 5.3 30.0 11.5 3.0 12.3 0.4 6.1 100
1965 31,5 5.8 32.1 12 ^ 2.9 9.5 0.4 5.6 100
1966 30.0 6.0 33.9 16.3 2.8 5.6 0.5 4.9 100
1967 29.0 5.6 32.6 12.6 3.8 3.5 0.6 7.3 100
®68 31.4 4.7 32.8 11.7 5.0 3.3 1.0 9.6 100
369 35.0 4.7 30.5 11.9 3.9 3.3 0.6 9.7 100
170 28.3 3.1 45.0 11.5 3.6 0.8 0.3 7.0 100
371 32.0 4.9 31.0 14.1 4.1 3.3 0.3 5.2 100
372 29.5 4.6 36.4 10.4 3.4 9.9 0.3 5.5 100
373 27.1 4.0 37.2 10.3 3.7 9.2 0.2 8.2 100
374 23.1 4.0 40.5 12.3 4.2 9.2 0.4 6.2 100
375 23.0 2.4 43.7 11.0 3.i 9.3 0.5 6.0 100
376 23.5 2.5 44.5 11.7 1.8 9.6 0.5 6.0 100
377 22.0 2.3 44.3 11.2 2.6 10.7 0.8 5.7 100
378 21.9 3.5 45.0 10.6 2.2 10.7 0.4 5.6 100
979 18.9 3.4 45.9 10.7 2.1 10.9 0.4 7.8 100
180 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
381 18.5 5.7 40.7 10.7 1.8 13.4 0.3 3.9 100
382 18.6 4.3 42.5 11.0 3.5 11.2 0.3 3.1 100
383 16.5 4.5 40.0 11.8 4.7 9.3 0.5 10.7 100
384
1
13.5 5.3 43.1 12.7 3.7 8.2 1.3 1  V11J 100
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FIB 4 {IV}
DIRECTION OF NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL TRADE, i960 - 1984 
EXPORTS AND RE-EXPORTS BY REGIONAL GROUPINGS 
(AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VALUE OF EXPORTS)
COUNTRIES AND REGIONAL GROUPINGS
:ar UNITED OTHER COMMONWEALTH WESTERN UNITED EASTERN JAPAN WEST OTHERS TOTAL
KINGDOM COUNTRIES EUROPE STATES EUROPE AFRICA
n  40 47.6 1.4 33.9 9.4 0.4 1.5 0.7 5.2 100
M 43.9 1.2 33.6 11.1 0.4 1.5 0.9 7.2 100
:82 42.0 1.8 38.0 10.8 1.0 0.9 3.3 2.2 100
::3 39.4 2.1 42.7 9 ? 0.8 1.3 3.4 1.1 100
::4 37.9 1.6 40.6 6.7 2.3 1.2 5.2 4.4 100
38.2 1.3 41.0 10.0 3.2 1.2 2.0 3.1 100
U ■*7 ^ 4.3 39.8 8.0 1.2 1.5 1.9 6.0 100
» 7 29^9 4.3 48.0 7.9 3.0 2.6 1.5 2.3 100
28.9 3.8 45.5 8.3 5.7 1.8 3.0 3.0 100
»9 27.3 3.0 44.0 12.6 3.6 1.0 0,8 7.1 100
1)70 28.3 3.1 45.0 11.5 3.6 0.8 2.1 7.0 100
971 21.5 2,3 45.3 17.3 3.4 1.4 2.1 6.2 100
■72 21.0 2.0 42.8 20.9 i.S 3.8 2.1 5.6 100
0 )1?SV/j 18.7 3.3 36.3 24.1 1.4 4.6 1.1 10.5 100
:,4 16.9 2.2 34.7 27.4 i.S 4.1 1.4 11.5 100
75 14.1 1.3 33.5 29.0 1.8 3.5 1.3 11.6 100
1?76 14.3 0.6 32.2 35.1 0.2 3.4 1.7 12.5 100
!iJ7 8.1 10.0 22.1 39.5 0.2 0.1 2.3 17.6 100
1 6.4 4.0 35.0 42.2 0.3 0.1 2.5 9.5 100
)7<3 6.1 7.2 36.1 44.4 0.2 0.1 1.7 4.2 100
ISO n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
ifil 1.2 7.9 38.4 35.6 i.e 1.5 2.7 10.9 100
>182 2.3 4.5 36.6 32.4 0.6 0.1 2.5 21.0 100
4,1 1,7 41.7 23.3 0.6 0.1 1.9 26.6 100
14 4.6 6.3 66.9 13.3 0.4 0.1 3.3 5.1 100
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FIG.4 (v)
JAPAN1S SHARE OF NIGERIA1S TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL NON-OIL EXPORTS 1970 - 1983
YEAR PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NON-OIL EXPORTS
1970 1.6
1971 1.6
1972 1.7
1973 2.7
1974 1.1
1975 4.0
1976 1.6
1977 1.4
1978 0.6
1979 0.6
1980 0.9
1981 0.9
1982 0.9
1983 0.6
SOURCE:
Central Bank of Nigeria, ANNUAL REPORTS AND STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS 
(various years).
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FIG.VII)
Value of External Trade, 1960-1984 (Millions of US Dollars)
(NIGERIA)
Year Exports Imports Balance of Trade
1960 461.80 602.70 -140.9
1961 485.90 621.90 -136.0
1962 471.50 568.30 96.8
1963 531.00 580.90 -49.9
1964 601.20 711.20 -110.0
1965 750-00 766.40 -16.4
1966 781.90 717.10 +64.8
1967 677.70 626.50 +51.2
1968 592.10 539.70 +52.4
1969 905.06 696.44 +208.6
1970 1,142.97 1,011.19 +131.8
1971 1,810.00 1,510.00 +300.0
1972 2,179.00 1,505.00 +674.0
1973 3,461.00 1,861.00 + 1,600.0
1974 9,219.00 2.774.00 +6,445.0
1975 7,995.00 6,032.00 +1,963.0
1976 10,771.00 8.213.00 +2,558.0
1977 11,823.00 11,021.00 802.0
1978 9,956.00 12,811.00 -855.0
1979 17,222.00 10,213.00 +7,009.0
1980 26,802.00 16,517.00 + 10,285.0
1981 21,292.00 18,854.00 +2,438.0
1982 17,650.00 13,787.00 +3,863.0
1983 14,038.00 8,775.00 +5,263.0
1984 14,304.00 7.059.00 +7,245.0
'Source: IMF, Direction o f  Trade, Various Years.
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